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KOREA

STAFF APPRAISAL REPORT OF A

SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

March 10, 1978

Transportation Division  
Projects Department  
East Asia and Pacific Regional Office

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### CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit - Won

US\$1	=	Won 485
Won 1,000	=	US\$2.06
US\$1 million	=	Won 485 million
Won 1 million	=	US\$2,061

### WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 m	=	3.28 ft
1 km	=	0.62 mi
1 kg	=	2.2 lb
1 l	=	1.057 qt (US liquid)
1 ton	=	2,205 lb

### ABBREVIATIONS

CPCS	-	Canadian Pacific Consulting Services
CTC	-	Centralized Traffic Control
EPB	-	Economic Planning Board
FFYP	-	Fourth Five-Year Plan
KAL	-	Korean Airlines
KDB	-	Korean Development Bank
KIST	-	Korea Institute of Science and Technology
KNR	-	Korean National Railroad
MOT	-	Ministry of Transportation
MRP	-	Management Rationalization Plan
OECD	-	Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (Japan)
SMESRS	-	Seoul Metropolitan Electric Suburban Railway System
TCC	-	Transport Coordination Committee
TCO	-	Transport Coordination Office

### GOVERNMENT OF KOREA

#### FISCAL YEAR

January 1 - December 31

KOREA  
STAFF APPRAISAL REPORT OF A  
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

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This report is based on the findings of Bank missions which visited Korea in April-May and July 1977, comprising Messrs. Chapman (financial analyst), Ohlund (engineer), and Yenny (economist) from the Bank; and Messrs. Carrard and Kesson (consultants).

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## KOREA

### STAFF APPRAISAL REPORT OF A SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

#### 1. TRANSPORT SECTOR

##### General

1.01 The rapid economic growth of Korea in the past decade, coupled with industrialization, has resulted in major developments and changes in the transport sector: freight and passenger traffic tripled between 1966 and 1976. This rapid growth in transport demand was accompanied by a greater diversification among modes, as railways lost their predominant position and road transport and coastal shipping increased their share.

1.02 Traffic statistics, in Tables 1.1 /1 and 1.2, illustrate these changes over the 1966-76 decade. The rail transport share of freight traffic fell from 78% of total ton-km to 46%, while road and coastal shipping shares increased respectively from 12% to 27% and from 10% to 27%. For passenger traffic, the rail share of total passenger-km fell from 43% to 25% over the decade, while the road share increased correspondingly from 56% to 74%. These changes very much reflect the economic advantages of the various modes, as rail and coastal shipping increasingly concentrate on long distances and bulk commodities, while road transport handles short distance and more diffuse traffic.

1.03 As Korea's economy continues to grow and diversify, transport demand will continue to experience a parallel expansion. Internally, the transport system will have to cope with larger movements of bulk commodities, such as coal, cement, ores and oil. The industrial complexes being developed along Korea's south and southeast coast will necessitate the import of large amounts of raw materials and the shipment of intermediate products between plants. A more diffuse demand for nonbulk freight and passenger transport will follow the general increase in GNP.

1.04 Recognizing the necessity for the transport sector to keep up with the growing economy, the Government's basic policy in the Fourth Five Year Plan 1977-81 (FFYP) is to develop the transport system to meet increases in traffic demand. Among the other objectives stated in the FFYP documents the most important are: (a) to increase transport efficiency and ensure economic allocation among modes; (b) rate increases and improvements in operations to reduce the fiscal burden imposed on government by the railway; and (c) to favor maintenance expenditures over new investment. Other lesser objectives are described in detail in the Bank's latest Basic Economic Report dated February 23, 1977 (Reference A1)./2

1.05 The FFYP investment allocation for the transport sector is Won 2,780 billion (US\$5.7 billion), or 14.6% of total investment. It is expected that 45% (Won 1,258 billion) will be invested by the public sector in infrastructure and equipment. The remaining 55% (Won 1,526 billion) will

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/1 Tables referred to in main text will be found following the annexes.

/2 Refers to material in the project file and listed in Annex 1.

be invested by the private sector, primarily for road transport vehicles and ships. The allocation for transport investment in the Fourth Plan is about 50% higher in real terms than in the Third Plan (Table 1.3). Forecast transport demand indicates that the proposed investment should provide for increases of about 34 billion passenger-km and 12 billion ton-km, respectively 30% and 180% more than during the Third Plan, thereby justifying the substantially larger capital allocation. The allocation among modes reflects the increasing importance of road transport and coastal as well as international shipping; proposed investments in these modes are, respectively, 47% and 80% above the Third Plan, while railways are allocated only 25% more than in the previous plan.

### The Transport System (Map 13133)

#### Highways

1.06 The present highway system is still inadequate to cope with the rapid growth of road transport, despite the Government's effort since 1968 to develop a modern road network. Only about half of the national highways and less than 20% of local roads are paved, and a high level of investment will continue to be required. The Bank Group has financed three highway projects, totalling US\$191.5 million: Loan 769-K0 in 1971 (US\$54.5 million), Loan 956-K0 in 1974 (US\$47 million) and Loan 1203-K0 in 1976 (US\$90 million). Performance on these projects generally has been satisfactory.

1.07 Road transport of freight and passengers grew rapidly over the last decade and, as mentioned above, the share of road transport increased dramatically at the expense of the railways. This rapid development of road transport occurred despite the Government's restrictive licensing policy for commercial vehicles and heavy taxes which limit private automobile ownership (para. 4.02). Because of restrictive licensing, the number of common carrier trucks is about 34,000, while the private truck fleet, which is subject to less restrictive licensing, has grown to 55,000. In 1966, the number of common carrier trucks was double the number of private trucks. Private trucks can carry only the owner's goods. This limitation, together with the increasing proportion of private trucks, is lowering the efficiency of the truck fleet as a whole. The Bank therefore has been pressing the Government to relax its truck licensing system, and some relaxation was introduced in early 1977. Urban passenger traffic in Seoul moved entirely by road (mainly bus and taxis) until the subway and the railway's electrified suburban lines began operation in 1974 (para. 4.13). As congestion increases in Seoul, the share of the suburban lines will rise, although road transport will remain the dominant mode in the urban area.

#### Railways

1.08 As mentioned above, major structural changes occurred in the transport sector over the last decade: the transport system is now evolving into a more balanced multi-modal system in which different traffic modes complement each other according to their technical and economic characteristics. Cost comparisons indicate that rail transport is still the most economic means of moving bulk traffic over medium and long distances, and also has an important role to play in long distance passenger traffic. In



1976, about 81% of rail freight traffic consisted of six bulk commodities, as against 69% in 1966. In addition to its long distance hauling of bulk freight and passengers, KNR will play a growing role in providing rapid transit service for Seoul and its suburbs. Details are given in Chapter 2.

1.09 Since 1962, Bank Group assistance to KNR through five projects amounted to US\$220 million. The first three lending operations have been satisfactorily completed. Disbursements of the Fourth Railway Project (Loan 863-K0) are 96% completed, but the Closing Date has been extended to March 31, 1979, to allow for disbursements for equipment with long delivery times. The Fifth Railway Loan (1101-K0) made in 1975 for US\$100 million is over 80% disbursed and will be completed before the end of 1978. The major requirements of the Loan/Credit Agreements covering these first five railway projects fall into four main areas: (a) KNR's status and financial autonomy; (b) KNR's financial situation; (c) railway operational and technical matters; and (d) transport coordination.

1.10 Considerable progress has been made in providing KNR with more autonomy, although it has not yet been reorganized as a public corporation or other autonomous agency, as agreed under the Second Railway Project. However, the Government has agreed to enable KNR to operate with autonomous powers by 1979. KNR earned positive returns until 1971; since then its financial situation deteriorated due to increased highway competition, which eroded profitable passenger services, sharp inflation which increased costs substantially, and tariffs, maintained at low levels by the Government, and which did not fully compensate for inflation. The requirements of covenants covering operational and technical matters have, in general, been met satisfactorily, with a consequent improvement in KNR's level of performance. Progress has been made in building up an organization in the Ministry of Transportation to coordinate transport investment, and the Economic Planning Board (EPB) is exercising a greater measure of control (para. 1.14 and 1.15). Further details on compliance with specific covenants are given in Annex 2.

#### Ports and Shipping

1.11 Freight traffic through the ports has increased from about 13 million tons in 1966 to over 80 million tons in 1976. This tremendous increase resulted in serious port capacity problems, particularly at Busan, the largest port, which handles 20% of the country's external trade and is chronically congested. The Bank has assisted development in Busan through two port projects and ADB is financing the expansion of Incheon, the port nearest to Seoul. The Saudi Fund for Development participated in the financing of the first Busan Port Project. The Government has also proceeded to develop a number of specialized ports in connection with industrial development. The latter is largely concentrated on the coast: i.e. Bupyeong for cement, Pohang for the inputs and output of the steelmill, Onsan for a refinery and nonferrous metal industry, and Samil for fertilizer and petrochemicals.

1.12 The role of coastal shipping has greatly increased in the last decade, from 10% of the ton-km moved in Korea in 1966 to 27% in 1976. This is mainly due to the construction of industrial complexes on coastal locations, and, to a lesser extent, to shortages in rail and road capacity. Korea's

share in the merchant shipping of its external trade has been increasing and reached about 38% of total tonnage in 1976.

#### Aviation

1.13 Although domestic air passenger traffic grew rapidly until 1973, it still amounts to less than 1% of total passenger-km; air-freight is also negligible. Domestic routes are served by the privately-owned Korean Airlines (KAL), which also operates internationally. Most international traffic is handled at the Seoul-Kimpo International Airport; other international airports are at Busan and at Jeju Island, a major tourist center.

#### Transport Policy Planning and Coordination

1.14 Over the past two years, the Government has taken steps to improve transport coordination. In 1975, this function was reorganized by the establishment of a Transport Coordination Committee (TCC) consisting of nine directors, representing ministries most directly concerned with transport matters, and a Transport Coordination Office (TCO) in the Ministry of Transportation (MOT Chart 18023). The TCO is headed by a director general, who also acts as Chairman of the TCC. Its main functions are to collect data and assist in the formulation and review of transport policies, especially those related to pricing and regulation.

1.15 While the charter of the TCC includes intermodal coordination of transport sector investments, the TCC has not in fact exercised this function. The Economic Planning Board (EPB), which exercises budgetary control and plays a senior role with regard to all other ministries, has the dominant role in decision on investment projects. EPB intends to make much more intensive reviews of investment projects and has established a separate Bureau of Project Evaluation to this end. Sector studies covering major aspects of transport coordination have been identified by the sector mission and are included in the Project (para. 3.07). They will be carried out under the supervision of EPB.

1.16 This approach appears much more satisfactory and workable than the one where investment coordination was to come under one of the ministries, namely MOT. The role of the TCO should remain one of collecting basic data in the sector and assisting in the formulation and review of transport policies, especially those related to pricing and regulation, since MOT is responsible for licensing and rates and fares setting.

1.17 The Bank should continue to assist the Government in increasing the capacity of its transport system to cope with the demand resulting from the continuous rapid development of the country. Since transport infrastructure is capital-intensive, the Bank can ensure through careful project preparation that capacity increases are provided at the least cost to the economy, and that efficient use is made of existing capacity prior to increasing it.

## 2. RAILWAY SUBSECTOR

### KNR Organization

2.01 KNR is a semi-autonomous agency within the Ministry of Transportation, with its own management, accounts, and section of the national budget. The legal basis for KNR's administration and operation is set out in: (a) Law for Government Organizations No. 2907, revised December 31, 1976; and (b) KNR Organization - Presidential Decree No. 7310, dated November 4, 1974. The Government, largely through the EPB, exercises control over staff, financial, budgetary and tariff matters. The Director General of KNR is appointed (often from outside the railway) by the Government /1, while the Deputy Director General comes from within KNR and is in charge of the day-to-day operations. Chart 18024 shows KNR's organization.

### Management, Staff, Training

2.02 Management is generally satisfactory, but there remains a need to strengthen certain aspects, especially the capability for development of technical, financial and economic policies and investment planning. The Government has recognized the situation and proposed that a management study be carried out by consultants (to be mostly Korean with support from some overseas specialists). The Bank has agreed to finance this study (which will take about six months) from Loan 1101-KO, in accordance with terms of reference prepared by the Bank (Reference B-1) and presently being reviewed by the Government and KNR. Agreement on the terms of reference was reached during loan negotiations.

2.03 Pending the results of the above management study, KNR has prepared and is now carrying out a Management Rationalization Plan (MRP). The main items of this plan are:

- (a) Cost savings due mainly to manpower reductions arising from such measures as mechanization, improved operations, closing or rationalizing of lines and stations, and reorganization of administrative functions; and
- (b) Revenue increases due to improving and upgrading passenger services and baggage handling, expansion of container services, provision of private sidings, reclassification of freight rates (para. 2.30), and improvements to the passenger fare structure.

The expected cost savings and additional revenues are incorporated in the financial projections discussed in Chapter 5.

2.04 The number of permanent employees with Government civil service status was about 33,500 at the end of 1976, a figure which has remained almost constant for about five years. The financial forecasts assume that there will be no major increase over the project period (to end of 1979). In addition, KNR employs about 6,000 semipermanent and temporary personnel,

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/1 The present Director General was appointed from the railway staff.

some on a seasonal basis, in workshops and on track works. Staff productivity in terms of traffic units (pass-km plus net ton-km) per employee is high (1976 - 600,000) compared with other railways; this is due in part to the dense urban and inter-city passenger travel and heavy bulk mineral and commodity traffic. In general, the staff continues to display excellent discipline and productivity.

2.05 Basic salaries per employee (excluding management), which were raised by about 20% on January 1, 1978, range from about W 33,000 to about W 198,000 per month and are in line with Government pay scales. Allowances, which increase with length of service and range from W 20,000 to W 120,000 per month, were also raised on January 1, 1978, by about 10-40%. Staff remuneration is lower than in comparable private industrial and commercial enterprises in Korea, and this causes some difficulties in retaining qualified and experienced personnel.

2.06 KNR's training programs were reviewed by the Bank during the Fifth Railway Project and were found to be fundamentally sound and generating considerable interest among the staff. The main problem lies with a lack of equipment and material for practical training; agreement has been reached on required items and their purchase is being financed from the Fifth Railway Project.

### Railway Facilities

#### Tracks

2.07 The system consists of 3,097 route-km of standard gauge (1.435 m) and 47 km of narrow gauge (0.76 m) lines; 567 km are double track and the remainder single track (Table 2.1 and Map 13134). There are many lines in mountainous areas, with some sections having gradients up to 2.5% and 3%, along with numerous sharp curves. There are about 140 km of tunnels and 97 km of bridges. The main lines are laid with 50 kg/m rail, while secondary branch lines have mostly 50 kg/m and 37 kg/m rail (see Table 2.2); all new rail renewals are carried out with 50 kg/m rail. Sleepers are predominantly timber, but locally manufactured pre-stressed concrete sleepers are being used as replacements on the higher speed lines. Rail joint welding is also being carried out on a limited basis on such lines, with about 190 km completed to end 1976 and another 90 km planned for 1977-81. The mission recommended that KNR consider a larger program of rail joint welding because of the economies in maintenance that can be obtained. All lines have crushed stone ballast.

2.08 During the proposed project period (1978-79), KNR plans to carry out renewal of about 330 track km of worn out rails, of which about 70 km are in connection with complete track renewal. KNR will also increase the use of concrete sleepers and continue its ballast renewal program. Equipment for partial mechanization of track renewal and maintenance work has been provided under the Fifth Project. Under the new project, KNR intends to set up a workshop for the manufacture of points and crossing components, the preparation of timber sleepers and the rehabilitation of used track material.

2.09 Existing double track lines are the Gyeong Bu and Gyeong In lines and the section Bongyang-Jechon of the Jung Ang line. The double tracking of the Ho Nam line between Iri and Daejon (89 km) is being completed, and work has started on quadrupling part of the Yeongdeungpo-Suwon section in the densely trafficked Seoul urban area. Works to increase the capacity of the Chung Bug line (to give an additional access between the industrial northeast and the Seoul-Busan main line), by upgrading and partial doubling, are included in the present project.

2.10 In step with the increasing traffic and train size requirements, additional and lengthened crossing loops and enlarged marshalling yards have been - and more are to be - provided.

2.11 The single track industrial lines between the northeast and Seoul are electrified; an extension of electrification on the Jung Ang line from Jechon to Yeongju has been proposed for consideration in the 1980/81 period (para. 3.03). Most of the Seoul urban tracks are also electrified, in association with the Seoul Metropolitan Electrified Suburban Railway System (SMESRS); extension of electrification to the Seoul-Susaeg urban line is proposed under the new project.

#### Signalling

2.12 Centralized traffic control (CTC) has been installed in the Seoul urban area and on the heavily trafficked electrified single line Seoul-Jechon. Under the new project, CTC is to be installed on the Dae Gu line (about 35 km) and between Yeongju and Gyeongju on the Jung Ang line (about 164 km). Automatic block operation is provided on the Seoul-Busan double line. Most of the other main lines are equipped with tokenless block signalling and interlocking systems. For safety, an automatic train stopping system is being installed under successive projects.

#### Motive Power and Rolling Stock

2.13 KNR's motive power and rolling stock fleet at the end of 1976 are given in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The fleet consists of 386 diesel and 69 electric locomotives (with about 20 steam locomotives still in service on shunting duties), 120 diesel rail cars, 128 electric rail cars (on the Seoul urban electrified lines), about 1,800 passenger cars, and about 16,000 freight cars (with another 1,400, mostly tank cars, privately owned). Another 20 electric locomotives, 90 electric rail cars and 750 freight cars, not included in the project, are ordered or being ordered for delivery during 1977 and 1978. An additional 30 diesel locomotives, 211 passenger cars and 1,420 freight cars are included in the project. Fifty-two of the diesel locomotives have recently been re-powered; another 59 are to be re-powered under the proposed project.

2.14 Under the Fifth Railway Project KNR agreed:

- (a) to submit a firm plan acceptable to the Bank to ensure:

- (i) the satisfactory maintenance of KNR's fleet of locomotives and rolling stock; and
  - (ii) rehabilitation of out-of-service diesel locomotives; and
- (b) to appoint for a period of not less than two years a technical adviser to assist KNR in the implementation of the aforesaid plan.

After some delay, a technical adviser from Canadian Pacific Consulting Services (CPCS) has been provided for a two-year period from September 1976, and the implementation of the maintenance and rehabilitation plans are now under way. The adviser's first reports (Reference B2), however, indicate that much needs to be done to clean up the workshops and to organize rational programs for inspection and maintenance; all of which will require considerable effort by KNR over the next few years. The transfer of all passenger and freight car maintenance operations to the new workshop at Daejeon (para. 2.15) should facilitate the new improved maintenance methods being adopted. Improved training facilities now being provided (para. 2.06) should also help in the longer term. Sufficient spare parts to carry on the improved maintenance program have been or are being procured under the Fifth Railway Project. Further measures to be taken will be included in the action plan to be prepared by KNR (para. 3.20).

#### Workshops

2.15 KNR has at present four main workshops: at Seoul (electric locomotives, passenger cars, freight cars, diesel rail cars and electric rail cars), Yeongdeungpo (steam locomotives, passenger cars and freight cars), Busan (diesel locomotives, passenger cars and freight cars), and Incheon (passenger cars and freight cars). Steam locomotives are expected to be completely phased out by 1979. A new freight car workshop is being constructed at Daejeon and will be completed in 1978; a new adjacent passenger car shop is proposed under the project (paras. 3.14 and 4.14). KNR is planning to transfer all passenger and freight car maintenance to the new workshops at Daejeon and, by about 1980, to close the existing workshops at Yeongdeungpo and Incheon after transferring usable equipment to other workshops. Provision is also made in the project for necessary improvements to remaining running sheds for locomotives, rail cars and passenger and freight cars.

#### Telecommunications

2.16 A microwave system has recently been installed between Seoul and Busan, and a start has been made on providing improved station-to-station and station-to-train communications. The latter is to be continued under the project.

#### Other Property

2.17. In general, the buildings, stations, offices and general plant of the railways are reasonably maintained. A considerable program of bridge strengthening, carried out under the Fourth and Fifth Railway Projects, is to be continued under this project.

## Traffic

### Freight Traffic

2.18 KNR's freight traffic statistics from 1966 to 1976 are given in Tables 2.5 through 2.7. During this period, freight traffic grew 6.2% p.a. in tons and 6% p.a. in ton-km. Major commodities which contributed to these increases were cement and coal. Cement transportation increased from 1.7 million tons in 1966 to 10.2 million tons in 1976, and coal rose from 10.5 to 16.1 million tons during the same period. In 1976, freight traffic was 43.8 million tons and 9.7 billion ton-km, the average transport distance was 222 km. Freight net ton per route km averaged 3.1 million in 1976. Preliminary results for 1977 indicate that ton-km are in line with the forecast given in Table 2.7 and 8% above 1976. Freight densities (see Char. 18070) are higher on KNR industrial lines between Seoul and the northeast region of coal mines and cement plants, exceeding 13 million tons on the heaviest section. The next highest freight densities are on the Jung Ang line south of Jecheon and on the Seoul-Busan line, with the busiest sections carrying around 4 million tons annually.

2.19 Bulk commodities best suited for rail transport - such as coal, cement, ore, oil, fertilizer, and grain-accounted for 81% of KNR's total freight ton-km in 1976, up from 69% in 1966. Apart from some military and KNR's own transport, the remainder consists mainly of general cargo. Tonnage of this carried by KNR since 1966 has fluctuated between 4.5 and 6 million tons per annum, reacting to factors such as the opening of the Seoul-Busan expressway in 1970 (much of the general cargo originally carried by KNR was suitable for highway transport), and the economic slowdown in 1975.

2.20 Freight traffic forecasts from 1977 to 1981 are given in Tables 2.5 through 2.7. They take into account the expected increases in production of bulk commodities during the FFYP, and prospective competition from other modes, namely coastal shipping and road transport (Reference C1). The forecast for coal transport is based on the targeted national production of 24 million tons in 1981. While the government will do its utmost to reach it, this target is ambitious and a delay of about one year is not unlikely. Nevertheless, the target has been accepted for coal car acquisition in 1978-79 to avoid creating a bottleneck should the production indeed be on target. The acquisition program for the last two years of the FFYP could then be adjusted if necessary. General cargo has also been assumed to grow over the plan period, as the heavy metal and machinery industry develops and generates inputs and outputs suitable for rail transport. The development of container services between Seoul and Busan will also contribute to the growth of general cargo suitable for rail transport. In 1977 general cargo tonnage was 43% above the same period of 1976.

2.21 Overall, the average freight traffic growth rate has been estimated at 7% p.a. in tons and 7.5% p.a. in ton-km; it is projected to reach 62 million tons and 14 billion ton-km by 1981, with the basic composition of traffic remaining unchanged. These forecasts were discussed and agreed with KNR, and appear realistic (with the above reservation on coal). However, in

view of past experience where freight forecasts generally have been proven over optimistic, traffic development should be closely monitored and reviewed by KNR and the Bank before finalizing investments in the last two years of the FFYP (para. 3.03).

### Passenger Traffic

2.22 Tables 2.8 through 2.10 show KNR's passenger traffic statistics from 1966 to 1976, as well as forecasts to 1981. Significant changes occurred during this period which greatly affected passenger traffic. They were the opening of expressways in 1970-71, followed by the development of long distance bus transport; the rise in personal incomes, which increased mobility and the demand for greater comfort, resulting in a shift to the higher class trains; and, finally, the opening in 1974 of the first Seoul subway line connected to KNR's electrified suburban lines.

2.23 Regarding long distance travel, passenger traffic grew regularly until 1969, when it reached 115 million passengers and 9.7 billion pass-km. Due to sharp bus competition, particularly following the opening of the Seoul-Busan and the Daejon-Gwangju expressways, the number of long distance passengers fell to 85 million in 1971. By 1973, however, passengers and pass-km were back to their 1969 levels, and both have been growing steadily since then, despite the 1974-75 economic slowdown. In 1976, the number of long distance passengers was about 7% above 1975 and, according to preliminary results, the growth in 1977 was 11%.

2.24 As mentioned above, the growth in long distance passenger traffic has been paralleled by a shift from lower class (ordinary) trains to limited express and special express. The number of passengers on express trains quadrupled in the last five years, while the number of ordinary passengers remained almost constant (Table 2.9).

2.25 Regarding the Seoul urban system, SMESRS (Seoul subway plus the KNR electrified suburban lines), passenger traffic grew rapidly from the start of service in 1974 and reached 134 million passengers in 1976; of these, 100 million were KNR passengers and 34 million Seoul city subway passengers. In 1977 urban passenger traffic was 40% above 1976.

2.26 In view of these recent and major changes in passenger traffic patterns - both for long distance and urban services - and the resulting absence of well-established trends, it is difficult to forecast future traffic. To illustrate this point: in 1977, special express passengers were up 23% and limited express passengers up 84% from the same period in 1976. The best possible forecast agreed with KNR is for a 3.7% p.a. overall growth in long distance passengers and a 6% p.a. growth in pass-km. This would result in 156 million passengers and 15.6 billion pass-km by 1981, with most of the growth occurring in the special and limited express categories. For Seoul (SMESRS), a doubling of the number of passengers, to 209 million by 1981, has been assumed until the results of a comprehensive urban transport study are available (para. 4.13). Even more than for freight traffic, further developments in passenger traffic should be closely monitored to ensure that investments are compatible with demand - not only in terms of quantities, but also in terms of the quality of service demanded by KNR's customers.



### Operations

2.27 Table 2.11 gives a summary of KNR's operating statistics for 1971-76. Operating efficiency and utilization of available equipment remain high and, in some aspects, continue to improve: for example, annual pass-km per available passenger car (from 5.7 to 8.1 million) and freight net ton-km per available freight car (from 600 to 680 thousand). On the other hand, availability of equipment remains lower than expected and, in the case of cars, is not likely to reach the targets set for the end of 1977 in the Plan of Action for improved availability under the Fifth Project (Annex 5, Appraisal Report No. 610a-KO). In 1976, availability of passenger cars was 88.7%, compared with the target for this year of 90%; for freight cars, availability was 89.3% against the target of 93%. There were delays, however, in the appointment of the technical advisor on equipment maintenance (para. 2.14), in the supply of spares and components, and in the provision of new centralised freight and passenger workshops (para. 2.15). With varying progress now being made on all three aspects, it should be feasible to improve the situation during the 1977-81 investment plan period. Operational forecasts are defined in para. 3.19.

### Tariffs and Costs

2.28 Tariffs are uniform throughout the system, and are regulated by the Government; the latter, in exercising controls on the prices of essential commodities, has held railway freight rates at low levels. For many years, freight revenues have not covered the fully distributed costs of moving the traffic, although passenger traffic had been profitable until 1976. The following table gives average cost and revenue comparisons for the years 1973-76:

	<u>Freight</u>		<u>Passenger</u>	
	Cost per ton-km	Revenue per ton km (Won)	Cost per pass-km	Revenue pass-km
1973	2.27	1.84	1.76	2.14
1974	3.14	2.31	2.44	2.97
1975	4.05	3.34	2.93	3.53
1976	5.76	4.64	3.69	3.67

2.29 Action on tariff increases over the last ten years is detailed in Tables 2.12 through 2.14. These show that, since 1973, the Government has permitted KNR to increase freight tariffs at a rate faster than passenger fares, thereby reducing KNR's dependence on passenger traffic revenues. However, coal, which constitutes 38% of total railway freight traffic, is carried at the lowest class rate (class 4); grains, fertilizers, limestone and ores (18% of total freight traffic) are rated at class 3.

2.30 The last tariff increase was in January 1977, when the five existing freight class rates were restructured to four classes by combining classes 1 and 2 (at existing class 1 rate) and moving up the remaining classes, with some additional increases in the rates for the new classes 2, 3 and 4. This raised average revenues per ton-km by about 19%. The spread between the lowest and highest class rates, which used to be as much as 110%, has now been reduced to 32%. This is good, and in fact, the spread could be further reduced by merging class 4 with class 3. Passenger fares have not been increased since July 1975.

2.31 KNR's operating costs are low, due to a high degree of utilization of rail facilities and rolling stock, low salaries and wages, and high staff productivity. Cost analysis indicates that in 1976 the average fully distributed costs were about W 3.69 (US\$0.76) per pass-km and W 5.75 (US\$1.19) per freight ton-km; these costs are somewhat understated, since KNR's expenditure on maintenance was below the minimum level. However, these average costs should rise in 1977, with a better supply of maintenance spares becoming available.

2.32 The cost data given for 1976 in Table 2.15 indicates that high class, express passenger services earn a good profit margin, but that lower class, ordinary passengers and commuters and baggage service lose money. All freight classes except cement lose money, particularly grain, fertilizer, ores and coal. However, all passenger services (except commuters) and all major freight traffic revenues (except for grain and military) covered variable costs and made full or partial contributions to overheads.

2.33 For KNR to reach a satisfactory financial position, the level of tariffs must be raised. Prompt action should be taken in the future to maintain a satisfactory level in the face of inflation. Future increases should be selective rather than across the board. For instance, ordinary and commuter passenger fares should be raised to a greater extent than the higher class fares. KNR is already proposing a considerable increase in baggage charges. Regarding freight traffic rates, where the need is greater, more emphasis is needed on raising the charges on grains, fertilizers, ores and coal (para. 5.08). Agreement was reached during loan negotiation on increases in both passenger fares and freight rates (para. 5.22).

#### Budget, Accounting, and Audit

##### Budgets

2.34 KNR prepares detailed annual operating and investment budgets. Through the Government Office of Audit, expenditures are rigidly controlled against the very detailed budget provisions. KNR management has very little flexibility in reallocating budget funds and, when other than minor revisions are needed, approval must be sought from the House of Representatives. Agreement was reached at loan negotiations on measures to allow KNR to submit its budgets in a commercial form, to give KNR more flexibility in reallocating budget funds and to allow KNR fix the emoluments of its staff.

### Accounting

2.35 A requirement of the Fifth Project was that KNR would, within 12 months, complete the installation of a commercial accounting system devised by consultants /1, and would install a traffic costing system. Implementation of the computerized, commercial accounting system has been subject to considerable delay, largely due to KNR's inability to provide sufficient qualified and experienced accounting staff - particularly staff with computer experience - to work with the consultants. Actual implementation commenced during 1977, and should be completed in 1978.

2.36 KNR has been using a manual traffic costing system introduced by the consultants in 1970. A new, computerized system has been devised by the Present team, and will be introduced when the accounting system is working satisfactorily.

### Audit

2.37 In accordance with loan requirements that KNR retain auditors satisfactory to the Bank, international firms (latterly with local affiliation), have been auditing KNR's commercial accounts since 1967. To date: (a) the auditors have not been able to give a clear audit certificate, due to deficiencies in operating the accounting system; and (b) KNR has not been able to comply with the requirement that the Bank receive a copy of the audit report not later than five months after the end of fiscal year, largely due to delays in appointing the auditors. However, accounting has been improving with the aid of consultants, and the audit report for 1976 was received within six months. At negotiations it was reaffirmed that audited accounts for 1977 and thereafter will be submitted to the Bank within five months of the end of the fiscal year.

### Uneconomic Lines and Stations

2.38 Data from KNR's 1975 costing study has indicated seven branch lines, totalling 164 km, on which the operating ratio was over 400% (Table 2.16). A decision to close the An Seong line will be made in 1978, while the Korea Electric Co. has agreed to bear the costs of the Yong San line as from 1977. KNR is negotiating with the Korea Coal Corporation to bear the costs of the Hwa Sun line. The Jin Sam, Og Gu and Kim Po lines are all used exclusively by military authorities, who do not wish the lines to be closed. KNR is discussing with the Ministry of National Defense the possibility of the latter bearing the costs of operating these lines. Regarding the Su In line, the Government is studying the future traffic demand arising from the construction of an industrial estate near Suweon, and will make a decision on the future of this line, and on other uneconomic lines, by mid-1979.

2.39 KNR has identified 145 stations where revenues from passenger services fail to cover 30% of the personnel costs involved, 97 stations where freight revenues fail to cover 30% of personnel costs, and 230 stations where baggage revenues fail to cover 100% of labor costs involved. Action

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/1 Touche, Ross and Co., Canada.

is proposed over the years 1977-79 to close 36 of these stations, change 56 into crossing stations only (i.e. used to arrange train meets, but without either passenger or freight services), and to simplify operations at 70 stations for passengers and 49 stations for freight services. This would eliminate about 166 employees and save about W 320 million in 1979. The proposed measures appear to be satisfactory. Action as above was actually taken on 132 stations in 1977.

### 3. INVESTMENT PLAN AND PROJECT

#### KNR's Investment Plan (1977-81)

3.01 As a result of discussions during appraisal, KNR's Investment Plan, which forms part of the Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan of Korea, 1977-81, was substantially revised, both in regard to its size and to the phasing of expenditures. The revised plan, as agreed between the Government and the Bank, comprises investments totalling W 503 billion (US\$1037 million), with a foreign exchange component of W 211 billion (US\$436 million). This includes items carried over from the 1972-76 Investment Plan, such as the new Daejeon freight car shop, completion of double tracking of the Honam line and the purchase of electric locomotives. It also includes items which are being financed under Loan 1101-K0: for example, rails and freight cars.

3.02 The composition and cost of the plan are shown in detail in Table 3.1, a summary of which is given below.

KNR 1977-81 INVESTMENT PLAN

	<u>W billion</u>			<u>US\$ million</u>			% of total expenditure
	<u>Local</u>	<u>Foreign</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Local</u>	<u>Foreign</u>	<u>Total</u>	
New line construction	10.97	-	10.97	22.62	-	22.62	2.2
Electrification	4.69	3.96	8.65	9.67	8.16	17.83	1.7
Increase in station and line capacity	86.24	9.65	95.89	177.80	19.90	197.70	19.0
Way and structures	41.96	18.22	60.18	86.52	37.57	124.09	12.0
Motive power and rolling stock	46.21	133.06	179.27	95.28	274.36	369.64	35.7
Motive power and rolling stock repair facilities	15.68	8.87	24.55	32.34	18.28	50.62	4.9
Miscellaneous	17.70	1.58	19.28	36.51	3.25	39.76	3.8
Subtotal	<u>223.45</u>	<u>175.34</u>	<u>398.79</u>	<u>460.74</u>	<u>361.52</u>	<u>822.26</u>	<u>79.3</u>
Contingencies	68.15	35.99	104.14	140.52	74.21	214.73	20.7
<u>Total</u>	<u>291.60</u>	<u>211.33</u>	<u>502.93</u>	<u>601.26</u>	<u>435.73</u>	<u>1036.99</u>	<u>100.0</u>

3.03 Items started before or during 1977 total about W 119 billion, of which about W 77 billion is expected to be spent in 1977 (Table 3.2). They include: (a) ongoing works, such as the completion of double tracking of the sections Yeongdeungpo-Anyang on the Gyeong Bu line and Daejeon-Iri on the Ho Nam line, by-pass lines, station extensions and improvements, rail and track renewal, and the new Daejeon freight car shop; and (b) material and equipment already ordered or being ordered, such as new electric locomotives and rail cars, new passenger and freight cars, and rails. Investments starting in the 1980/81 period of the plan, totalling about W 187 billion (Table 3.3), will be subject to further adjustments on the basis of actual traffic developments in the next two years. Also, detailed technical, financial and economic analyses should be performed during the intervening two years for some of the major fixed capacity investments proposed for 1980/81: that is, double tracking, electrification and signalling. Assurances were obtained during negotiation that KNR will submit these studies and justification, for agreed items and in agreed format, to the Bank by the mid-1979.

3.04 The plan as now drawn up assumes continued high operational efficiency and improving availability of motive power and rolling stock.

#### The Project and the Proposed Loan

3.05 The project to be financed under the proposed loan consists of the plan investments, intended to start in 1978 and 1979 (Table 3.4). Total cost of the project is estimated at W 197 billion (US\$406 million equivalent), with a foreign exchange component of about US\$190 million, of which US\$120 million would be covered by the proposed loan. A summary of the estimated project expenditure and items to be financed by the proposed loan is given in the following table.

	<u>Total project cost</u>			<u>Proposed loan</u>
	<u>Local</u>	<u>Foreign</u>	<u>Total</u>	
	(US\$ million)			
New line construction (industrial sidings)	4.74	-	4.74	-
Electrification	1.65	1.73	3.38	-
Increase in station and line capacity (including double tracking, bypass lines, additional crossing loops, yard extensions, freight handling facilities, lengthening of crossing loops, station installations and signalling)	60.81	7.26	68.07	-
Way and structures (including rail and track renewal concrete sleepers, points and crossings, bridge and tunnel strengthening, ballast, road crossings, track material, workshop and right-of-way improvements)	43.13	14.76	57.89	14.76
Motive power and rolling stock (including new diesel locomotives, breakdown cranes, passenger cars and freight cars and remodelling of locomotives, railcars, breakdown cranes, passenger cars and freight cars)	24.11	126.34	150.45	84.65
Rolling stock repair facilities	18.68	11.14	29.82	3.31
Miscellaneous (including telecommuni- cations, power facilities, housing, training and technical assistance)	13.73	0.72	14.45	0.62
Contingencies	49.88	27.73	77.61	16.16
Subtotal	<u>216.73</u>	<u>189.68</u>	<u>406.41</u>	<u>119.50</u>
Transport sector studies (para. 3.07)				0.50
<u>Total</u>	<u>216.73</u>	<u>189.68</u>	<u>406.41</u>	<u>120.00</u>

3.06 The proposed loan would cover acquisition of rails, passenger and freight cars, breakdown cranes, workshop machinery, and provision of training equipment and technical assistance (Table 3.5). The remaining foreign currency items, including electrification, increase of line capacity, diesel locomotives, re-engining of diesel locomotives and diesel railcars and workshop equipment, would be financed by other agencies (para. 3.17).

3.07 Transport Sector Studies. The Government is strengthening its transport sector analysis capability, but has requested Bank assistance to do so. As a first step, EPB intends to have studies done in the following areas: (a) distribution of major bulk commodities, such as coal, cement and oil; (b) costs and tariffs of various modes, to ensure economic allocation of traffic; and (c) passenger transport demand by various modes. The Government intends to have these studies carried out by local consulting firms with the assistance of foreign experts in specialized fields, such as the bulk handling of major commodities in the case of (a) above. This was confirmed during negotiations. The proposed loan would include US\$500,000 to finance about 70 man-months of such foreign experts assistance. Local costs of the various studies would be determined when the terms of reference are prepared and agreed with the Bank. This procedure and timing of the various studies was agreed during negotiations, together with terms of reference for the study in (a) above. The findings of the studies would be valuable in a variety of feasibility studies of transport investment projects, and will provide useful experience for local consulting firms in the transport field. In particular, it is expected that the bulk commodity study would lead to a project for Bank financing.

#### Description of Main Project Items

3.08 The main project items are described in the following paragraphs.

##### New Line Construction

3.09 New line construction comprises only two new industrial sidings.

##### Electrification

3.10 Electrification is limited to the Seoul-Susaeg suburban line in the Seoul City area, subject to justification under the Seoul Urban Transport Study to be carried out by Korean consultants (para. 4.13).

##### Increase in Station and Line Capacity

3.11 The main items under this category are:

- (a) Double tracking of the section Gongjeon-Bongyang (8.6 km) of the Chung Bug line, to increase its capacity as an alternative route between Seoul and coal mines and cement plants of the northeast region;
- (b) Double tracking and electrification of the Yongsan-Susaeg and Seongbug-Euijeongbu suburban lines (Seoul), to carry increasing suburban traffic. As for the electrification of Seoul-Susaeg (para. 3.10), the Seoul Urban Transport Study will review and check the justification;
- (c) Additional crossing loops at seventeen places on eight lines throughout the system, to increase train capacities;

- (d) Marshalling yard extensions at Jecheon (from 1000 to 1440 cars per day) and at Deogha, south of Ulsan, (from 30 to 350 cars per day), to deal with industrial expansion;
- (e) Extensions to station yards at seven stations on three lines of the system;
- (f) Expansion of Susaeg, as the principal West Seoul Terminal for improved coal and cement handling, and Bugog, similarly to serve South Seoul;
- (g) Lengthening crossing loops at three stations on the single track section of the Ho Nam line, to take longer trains and give increased capacity;
- (h) Additional passenger platforms at Seoul central station, new station buildings at 30 stations, underground passages at eight stations, new passenger sheds at twelve stations and new freight sheds at 30 stations; also included are about 100 sets of automatic ticketing machines; and
- (i) Installation of centralized traffic control system (CTC) on the Dae Gu Line between Dongdaegu and Yeongcheon (35 km), and on the Jung Ang Line between Yeongju and Gyeongju (about 163 km); extensions of automatic train stopping systems, interlocking signals, and level crossing warning devices.

#### Way and Structures

3.12 The main components are:

- (a) Rail renewal on about 260 km of track (see Table 3.6, Reference C-2);
- (b) Complete track renewal over about 70 km (see Table 3.7, Reference C-2);
- (c) Provision of concrete sleepers (about 150,000);
- (d) Provision of ballast (about 320,000 cu m);
- (e) Provision and equipping of a workshop for permanent way material manufacturing and rehabilitation (list of equipment is shown in Table 3.8);
- (f) Separation of road and rail at level crossings when road/rail traffic densities reach levels set by Government (50% of total costs carried by road authorities);
- (g) Right-of-way improvements, stabilization of soils, drainage works, anti-erosion measures, security fencing, etc.; and
- (h) Track maintenance equipment.



### Motive Power and Rolling Stock

3.13 The main project items are:

- (a) Provision of 30 main line diesel locomotives (calculated according to traffic forecasts, Reference C-3); provision of two breakdown cranes; repowering of about 59 diesel shunters and about 14 diesel railcars; and remodelling of about 40 heating cars;
- (b) Provision of 34 special express cars and 145 limited express air-conditioned cars (as calculated, according to traffic forecasts, Reference C-4); provision of 19 power source cars for use with the special and limited express trains; provision of 13 dining cars (partly as renewals); remodelling of older existing cars for use as ordinary passenger and baggage cars; and
- (c) Provision of 550 box cars and 870 gondola cars (calculated according to traffic forecasts, Reference C-5); remodeling of about 230 older box cars for use as cabooses, of about 130 flat cars for use as container cars, and improvement of about 1000 freight cars of different types.

### Motive Power and Rolling Stock Repair Facilities

3.14 This part of the project comprises the following items:

- (a) Provision of a new passenger car shop at Daejeon, to replace old and congested existing shops at Incheon and Yeongdeungpo; and
- (b) Improvements to existing locomotive and car workshops and running sheds.

### Telecommunications, Power Facilities and Miscellaneous

3.15 Items included are:

- (a) Provision of telecommunication lines on the Yeong Dong Line (50 km) and Jong San Line (40 km), train radio equipment (about 310 sets at wayside stations and about 50 sets on trains), and about 10 train dispatcher units;
- (b) Provision of power supplies (10 stations), lighting facilities (about 30 stations), emergency power line (Seoul electrified services), and power line improvements (about 400 km);
- (c) Construction of housing for train crews and other employees (about 680 units);
- (d) Provision of training equipment for KNR's training center and vocational training institutes; and

- (e) Provision of continued technical assistance (estimated at about 70 man-months) in specific areas, such as technical and economic feasibility studies of major projects envisaged for 1980-81, accounting, and mechanical equipment maintenance.

#### Cost Estimates

3.16 Project costs are based on estimated prices at the end of 1976 (Reference C-6), adjusted for price escalation and physical contingencies over the project period. The foreign currency cost of technical assistance, not including airfares and subsistence, is estimated at US\$6,000-7,000 per man month. Physical contingencies of 10% have been included in the project for all items except motive power and rolling stock, rail and track renewal, track material workshop and track maintenance equipment. Price contingencies have been included for all items; assumed price increases for local currency items are 8% annually in 1977-1978, 7.5% in 1979 and 7% in 1980-1981; and for foreign currency items 8% annually in 1977, 7% in 1978, 6.5% in 1979 and 6% in 1980-1981. Contingencies, physical and price, on all items taken together represent about 19% of project cost.

#### Financing Plan

3.17 Proposed financing of the foreign currency part of the project is given in Table 3.9 and summarized as follows:

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	Amount including contingencies (US\$ million)
<hr/>	
IBRD loan	120.0 <u>/a</u>
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (O.E.C.F.) Japan	3.2
European consortium (50-cycle group)	8.6
U.S. Export-Import Bank plus US commercial banks	39.7
Suppliers' credits	10.8
Korean Foreign Exchange (KFX) - purchase by KNR	7.9
Total	<u>190.2</u>

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/a Includes US\$0.50 million for financing transport sector studies (see para. 3.07).

### Project Implementation

3.18 KNR will be responsible for implementation of the project, with the exception of the transport sector studies, which will be directed by EPB. A project execution schedule and a procurement schedule for Bank financed items are given in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. Monitoring of progress based on these schedules will be further discussed during supervision. KNR's performance in executing the five previous projects has been in general satisfactory.

### Action Plans

3.19 The calculation of motive power and rolling stock requirements during the Investment Plan period is based on traffic forecasts given in Tables 2.5 through 2.7 and the following operational forecast:

	<u>Actual</u> 1976	1977	1978	<u>Forecast</u>		
				1979	1980	1981
<u>Availability of rolling stock (%)</u>						
Main line locomotives, diesel	86.4	87.0	87.5	88.0	88.5	89.0
Main line locomotives, electric	84.6	85.0	85.5	86.0	87.0	88.0
Passenger cars	88.7	89.0	89.5	90.0	90.5	91.0
Freight cars	89.3	90.0	91.0	92.0	93.0	93.0
<u>Locomotive-km per available main line locomotive ('000)</u>						
Diesel	152	173	174	174	175	175
Electric	118	120	122	124	127	130
<u>Passenger car-km per available passenger car ('000)</u>						
Special express coaches	187	237	256	267	277	285
Limited express coaches	196	204	215	226	237	248
<u>Turnaround time for freight cars (days)</u>						
Box cars	5.7	5.7	5.5	5.3	5.1	4.9
Gondolas	4.4	4.3	4.1	3.9	3.8	3.7
Flat cars	6.4	6.2	6.1	6.0	5.9	5.8
Container cars	3.8	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3
<u>Average car load per loaded car (tons)</u>						
Coal	45.0	45.3	45.4	45.5	45.6	45.7
Cement	45.4	45.6	45.7	45.9	46.0	46.1
Ore	43.9	44.3	44.5	44.7	44.9	45.1
Oil	42.0	42.2	42.4	42.6	42.8	43.0
General cargo	42.3	42.5	42.5	42.5	42.5	42.5

3.20 During negotiations agreement was reached that KNR will prepare, by December 31, 1978 a plan for achieving the operational forecasts indicated in para. 3.19, provided forecast traffic is offering. The measures to be included in such a plan are mainly:

- (a) improvement of maintenance of locomotives and rolling stock through:
  - (i) implementation of the recommendations given by the technical advisor presently assisting KNR in establishing improved maintenance and rehabilitation schedules, including further reduction of the number of major running sheds;
  - (ii) provision of funds for spare parts, in accordance with the action plan agreed to under the Fifth Project (from 1978 on not less than W 2.2 billion annually for diesel locomotives, W 1.0 billion for passenger cars and W 1.5 billion for freight cars);
  - (iii) complete phasing out of steam locomotives;
  - (iv) concentration of passenger and freight car maintenance at the new workshops at Daejeon, and closing the existing workshops in Yeongdeungpo and Incheon; and
  - (v) improved training;
- (b) continued attention to utilization of rolling stock in order to maintain the present trend of improvement.

3.21 The operational forecast given in para. 3.19, particularly for 1981, may be revised as a result of the management study to be carried out under Loan 1101-K0 (para. 2.02).

#### Procurement

3.22 All items to be procured under the proposed loan will be subject to international competitive bidding, in accordance with Bank guidelines. In bid evaluation, Korean manufacturers of equipment will be allowed a preferential margin of 15% of the c.i.f. cost of competing imports, or the relevant prevailing level of customs duties, whichever is lower.

#### Disbursements

3.23 Disbursements would be made as follows:

- (a) 100% of the c.i.f. cost of imported equipment and materials; and/or
- (b) 100% of the ex-factory cost of locally manufactured equipment and materials if local bidders are successful;

- (c) 100% of the foreign exchange cost of specialized technical assistance (para. 3.07);
- (d) 100% of total cost for training and technical assistance (para. 3.15 (d) and (e)).

Any savings under the loan would be used for financing additional, but similar, project items, subject to review and agreement with the Bank.

3.24 An estimated schedule of disbursement is given in Table 3.12. Disbursements are based on the assumption that the proposed loan would become effective by June 15, 1978.

#### 4. ECONOMIC EVALUATION

##### General

4.01 KNR continues to play a vital role in the economy of Korea. While road transport and coastal shipping have increased their share of total transport demand over the last decade (para. 1.02), the railway remains the most economic mode of moving bulk commodities to inland destinations. The line haul costs are only a fraction of road costs and, while the costs of coastal shipping are competitive with rail costs on a ton-km basis, the circuitous sea routes around the peninsula often give rail the advantage. The traffic forecasts given in Chapter 2 have taken into consideration competition from other modes, particularly from coastal shipping for bulk movements of cement, oil and fertilizer from plants located on the coast. However, for coal and most cement, which account for over 50% of railway ton-km, the major production areas are inland. It is imperative that rail capacity be at all times sufficient to handle this traffic, which is vital for the country's continuous development (para. 4.07).

4.02 Regarding passenger traffic, the combination of increasing incomes and the government policy of restricting the use of private automobiles has led to a sharply increasing demand for the more comfortable and faster train services. Korea is indeed far behind most other countries in terms of private automobile ownership, despite its relatively high per capita income. The 70,000 private cars presently in Korea amount to only 2 per 1,000 persons. The ratios are 2.6 in Indonesia, 7.7 in Thailand, 10.6 in the Philippines and 37.4 in Malaysia. Only the latter has a higher per capita income than Korea. For long distances in the 300-400 km range, such as Seoul-Busan (445 km), Seoul-Gwangju (371 km) and others, express trains offer more comfortable, safer and slightly faster trips than highway buses. Special express trains also compete favorably with air travel on the Seoul-Busan route. The price is about half and the time is comparable when terminal transport between airports and city centers is taken into account. In view of the above, it appears well justified to develop express train services to satisfy the fast increasing demand, particularly since these are the most profitable services of KNR. Operating ratios for the special and limited express services were, respectively, 63 and 66% in 1977. Traffic forecasts are given in Chapter 2.

### Benefits and Economic Returns

4.03 The investment analysis has focused on the last four years of the 1977-81 FFYP. Investments starting in 1978 and 1979, which form the proposed project, are analyzed in detail below. Investments starting in 1980-81 are presently indicative of the order of magnitude of the need. Detailed technical and economic justifications for the major investment items will be prepared before the end of 1979 (para. 3.03).

4.04 The economic evaluation focuses on project investments globally, and on particular items whenever possible. Table 4.1 shows project investments classified for the purpose of economic analysis. The larger group, about 62% of all project costs, consists of investments which are primarily geared to increase the capacity of the railway to carry traffic for which rail transport is the most economic way of satisfying transport demand. The remaining project items consist of: (a) way and structures renewals 10%; (b) investments in the Seoul suburban rail system (SMESRS) 7%; (c) a new central passenger car workshop at Daejeon 5%; and (d) miscellaneous investments 16%. Items in (b) and (c) above are subject to further review following completion of studies now in progress. No economic return has been calculated on these items because of lack of appropriate cost benefit data, although there is enough evidence to support their tentative inclusion in the project.

### Capacity Increasing Investments

4.05 These investments are basically of two types: fixed installations on the lines, and motive power and rolling stock. The latter can, of course, be used more flexibly throughout the network than the former, and thus have a lower risk factor than line installations. Consequently, line capacity investments have been very carefully analyzed on a line-by-line basis. Existing capacity has been estimated, and ways to increase it through improved operations discussed extensively with KNR. The Bank also retained consultants Rapp A.G. (Switzerland) to apply a line capacity model on two of the lines for which KNR planned sizeable fixed investment: namely, a section of the Jung Ang line (64 km from Jecheon to Yeongju) which was proposed for electrification, and the Donghae-Nambu line (Busan-Pohang), on which KNR proposed to install CTC, new crossing loops, stations, and marshalling yards. Application of the model, which uses an "interactive graphic" approach, indicated that in both cases it would be possible to reach a practical capacity at least 10% above the level of the present timetable without major investments (Reference B3). The consultants also identified some low cost measures which would further increase practical capacity, without yet engaging the larger proposed investments. As a consequence, electrification of a section of the Jung Ang line and CTC on the Donghae-Nambu line was postponed for a few years, and KNR was asked to further review its justification (para. 3.03). Where traffic demand forecasts still exceeded possible line capacity, the analysis focused on the least cost investments to increase it. For instance, by adding as many crossing stations as possible on a single track line, instead of installing either expensive

signalling systems or double tracking. As a result, line capacity investments in the project period were reduced by about US\$40 million from the original investment plan proposal, and now represent only 15% of total project costs.

4.06 Capacity in motive power and rolling stock has been analyzed on a network-wide basis. Careful consideration was given to possibilities for increasing operating performance, such as train-km for locomotives and turnaround times, loadings, and distances traveled for wagons. For the purpose of rate of return calculations, capacity-increasing investments have been allocated to freight and passenger services. This was done directly in the case of freight and passenger cars, and for some fixed investments. In the case of locomotives and joint fixed investments on lines - such as crossing loops, bypass lines and signalling - allocation was in proportion to the relative capacity provided for each service (Table 4.2).

4.07 Freight - The benefits of investments to increase the railway's capacity in carrying freight traffic are measured in terms of transport cost savings for the economy of the country. They are calculated as the difference between the economic cost of rail transport and the economic cost of the next best alternative mode. The major variables involved in the calculation of benefits are: (a) the amount of traffic that would be diverted to other modes based on the capacity of the railway with and without the project; and (b) the economic costs of transport by various alternative modes (Table 4.3). Alternative modes could be road, or a combination of either rail or road and coastal shipping. As mentioned in para. 4.01, rail traffic forecasts already reflect the share of coastal shipping when it is the most economic mode; i.e. for traffic having origins and destinations at, or very near, the coast. For the remaining traffic, for which rail capacity is provided by the proposed project, coastal shipping is no longer a valid alternative, as it would involve long terminal transport at either end, which would require either rail capacity or the higher cost road transport. Consequently, in this analysis, rail costs are compared to road costs, as the costs of an alternative using coastal shipping for part of the way are even greater than the all road alternative. The economic benefits in terms of transport cost savings would yield an economic rate of return (ERR) of over 40% (Table 4.4). This is a conservative estimate, since the amount of traffic that would divert to other modes without the project has been assumed at only 60% of the traffic increase forecast for 1978 and 1979; i.e. equivalent to the capacity provided by new cars acquired under the project. The remaining 40% of anticipated traffic growth will be handled by conversion and improved utilization of existing cars. No benefits have been attributed to this traffic, since the costs are small and most of the benefits should accrue even without the project.

4.08 Passengers. The proposed capacity increases are for the better quality services provided by KNR: the special and limited express trains. No capacity increase is provided for ordinary trains. The economic cost of these better services is comparable to that of the air-conditioned expressway buses. Rail fares for these services, however, are substantially higher than either rail costs or bus fares; 91% higher than costs for special express and 72% higher than limited express (Table 4.5). The fact

that people are ready to pay twice as much as the bus fare to travel on the special express trains reflects the benefits they derive from such service: e.g. comfort, speed, lesser accident risk, etc. Consequently, benefits of increasing the capacity of the better passenger services are measured in terms of willingness to pay for the service over and above their costs. They are calculated as the difference between the cost of the services and their revenues, and give a return of 17% on the investment (Table 4.6).

#### Way and Structures Renewals

4.09 The main items in this category are rail and track renewal, including sleepers replacement and new ballast. The remainder of the cost is for strengthening of bridges and tunnels. While it is a general practice of railways to show way and structure renewal costs in their investment programs, the nature of these costs is more periodic maintenance than investment. Rail and sleepers have to be periodically replaced, and ballast has to be added in order to keep the trains operating safely at normal speeds. The program submitted by KNR for implementation during the plan and project period was examined on the basis of the age and characteristics of rail, track, and traffic on a particular line.

4.10 KNR's network consists of 4,100 km of track. Some 930 km or 23% of the network, have rails over 20 years old; another 880 km have rails between 10 and 20 years old. In terms of traffic, rail renewal timing can be related to the number of gross tons which have passed over a given line section. This is only broadly indicative, as conditions will vary widely from one line to the other as a function of topography, alignment, and train types. Assuming, however, that the useful rail life is on average around 300 million gross tons, there would be some 1,000 km (24% of the network) on which rail life would be between 10 and 20 years, and another 250 km with a 20-30 year life (based on 1976 traffic volumes). For the rest of the network, rails would last up to 40 and 50 years. On the basis of the above assumed rail life for various sections of the network, renewal should average about 140-150 km/year. This figure would increase over time, as traffic growth shortens rail life.

4.11 The rail and track renewal program discussed with KNR, and confirmed during negotiations, would cover the recurrent need and also some of the urgently needed rail replacement in curves on the industrial lines. If this program was not carried out, the quality of the track would deteriorate, with the risk of increased accidents. Speed restrictions needed to ensure safety would gradually reduce capacity, particularly on single track lines which account for most of KNR's network. In calculating line capacity as described in para. 4.05, it was assumed that track conditions would not be allowed to deteriorate and that speeds would be maintained at least at their present levels. To prevent track deterioration without the proposed rail and track renewal program would require increased maintenance. On the basis of maintenance costs savings, rail renewal on the 8 lines included in the project would yield ERRs ranging from 20% on the line with the lowest traffic (6 million gross tons p.a.) to 32% on the line with the highest traffic (25 million gross tons p.a.), with a weighted average of 27% (Reference C-7).



### Seoul Suburban Lines

4.12 The city of Seoul now has over 7 million inhabitants. Furthermore, urban development has spread beyond the city boundaries along the transport lines. Cities such as Incheon (800,000), Anyang (135,000) and Suwon (225,000) to mention only the larger ones on the rail lines, are growing rapidly; thus creating with Seoul an interconnected urban system of some 9 million people. Until 1974, urban transport consisted almost exclusively of buses and taxis. Because of the configuration of the center of Seoul, which includes large blocks penetrated by narrow streets suitable only for pedestrians and small delivery vehicles, traffic congestion on the major arteries is acute despite the very low rate of private car ownership (para. 4.02).

4.13 In 1974, the first sections of a mass rail transit system were put into service, consisting of a 9.5 km underground line (Seoul City Subway) and 86 km of electrified existing KNR lines (MAP). The system met with immediate success and acceptance by the public, carrying over 130 million passengers in 1976. For the first half of 1977, traffic was 40% above that in 1976. The city of Seoul is considering further extensions of the subway but, because of the high cost of subway lines no final decision has been made. Meanwhile, KNR proposes to upgrade about 63 km of existing lines with electrification and some double tracking, in order to expand suburban services. There is no doubt that, given the densities of urbanization in Seoul, there is a good case for making the maximum use of existing rail infrastructure and right of way. Costs of upgrading existing rail lines are small compared to subway construction. However, to derive maximum benefit from the investment, it is necessary to analyze in detail potential transport demand in the corridors in which KNR proposes to expand service, to forecast traffic in relation to other modes, ensure the optimum location of stations, and confirm the order of priority and timing of construction of the various sections. A comprehensive urban transport study of the larger Seoul Metropolitan Area was started in July 1977 by the Transportation Economic Group of the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST). It is expected to take about one year to complete and would answer the above questions. It was agreed during negotiations that KNR would postpone investment on the suburban lines until the results of the study become available. Meanwhile, the proposed investments are included in the project, although none of the loan funds will be applied to them.

### Daejeon Passenger Car Workshop

4.14 KNR has decided to consolidate its passenger car maintenance at Daejeon, a central location on the two most heavily traveled lines: from Seoul to the Southeast (Busan) and to the Southwest (Gwangju-Mogpo). Existing workshops, particularly those at Seoul and Incheon, are old and crowded. Urban development prevents their extension and access is difficult in view of the intensive use of the Seoul area lines for frequent urban services. Studies for the proposed Daejeon workshop have recently

been completed and will be reviewed by the Bank prior to the start of construction.

#### Miscellaneous

4.15 This category, comprising some 16% of the project cost, almost all in local currency, includes numerous small investments dispersed over the entire network. The largest amount, about a third of the total, is for improving safety at rail and road intersections. This ranges from simple signalling, to level crossing barriers and grade separation where justified by higher traffic volumes. The cost of these safety measures is shared equally between KNR and the Ministry of Construction (MOC). The locations of these improvements are selected jointly by KNR and MOC, according to established rules, based on respective levels of traffic on rail and on the intersecting road. Other items include improvement of existing backshops and sheds, relocation of lines to accomodate new industrial and urban developments, and general improvements to right of way, buildings, housing and training facilities.

#### Overall Economic Evaluation

4.16 The average economic return on the capacity increasing investments and on way and structure renewals, which account for 72% of total project costs, is 30%. This rate of return excludes the investments in: (a) the SMESRS lines and Daejon Workshop, for which studies are still underway (para. 4.12 to 4.14), totalling 12% of project costs; and (b) miscellaneous small investments dispersed over the entire network (para. 4.15), totalling 16% of project costs.

#### Sensitivity and Risks

4.17 As previously mentioned (para. 2.21), traffic forecasts for railway projects have often been over-optimistic. This is the main area of risk. However, in an economy growing as rapidly as Korea's it is only a matter of time for the forecasts to be achieved. Thus, full project benefits are realized at most one or two years later than expected. For the purpose of sensitivity analysis, the ERR's of the capacity increasing investments have been recalculated assuming that both freight and passenger traffic would increase at 50% of the forecast between 1977 and 1981. This same assumption is used for the sensitivity analysis in the financial evaluation (para. 5.27).

4.18 Estimated costs for Korea railway projects have typically been realistic, and slightly on the high side, as illustrated by the funds remaining in previous loans after the projects have been fully executed. For the sensitivity analysis, the ERRs of the capacity increasing investments have been recalculated with cost variations of  $\pm 10\%$ . The results of sensitivity analysis are given in the table below:

ERR IN PERCENT

	Best estimate	Sensitivity		
		Traffic growth 50%	Cost +10%	Cost -10%
Capacity increasing investments				
Freight	42	30	37	49
Passenger	17	15	15	19

4.19 As expected, the impact of even substantially slower traffic growth on the rate of return is not very large, since benefits are postponed but not cancelled. Another risk which is, however, impossible to quantify and time, relates to passenger services. As mentioned in para. 4.02, the high demand for better quality trains is related to low private car ownership. Should government policy change, passenger traffic would certainly be negatively affected. However, the effect of increased car ownership would spread over a period of years and may be tempered by overall growth in transport demand. Since railway equipment has a long life (assumed at 25 years for the ERR calculation), it is important to closely monitor shifts in demand for rail services in order not to be saddled with excess capacity.

5. FINANCIAL EVALUATION

General

5.01 With heavy passenger and freight traffic, generally efficient operations and low unit costs, KNR has the potential to become a financially viable enterprise. Revenues could be sufficient to cover operating expenses, debt service and a reasonable proportion of its capital investment needs. KNR earned annual profits through 1969, although the amounts were relatively modest and, due to inadequate depreciation provision and maintenance expenditures, its profits were overstated.

5.02 As explained in para. 2.28, tariffs are strictly regulated by the Government, which has held freight rates at low levels. As a result after 1970 - with rising cost levels inflating KNR's operating expenses, and the Government reluctant to permit adequate railway tariff increases (para. 5.06) - the situation changed. KNR has since sustained regular annual net deficits.

5.03 Reduced earnings, together with Government refusal to provide equity capital (other than operating subsidies commencing in 1972), have forced KNR to finance most of its investment requirements by borrowing.

This has increased its debt service burden, further reducing available funds, and even causing KNR to borrow from the Korean Development Bank funds needed to cover debt service.

5.04 Rates could be substantially raised on most of KNR's major freight traffic (coal, cement, fertilizer, ores, grains and oil) with little fear of significant diversion to other transport modes. In view of KNR's continual efforts to improve passenger services (introducing new equipment and providing more frequent services), passenger fares could also be raised (para. 2.33). Thus, it should be possible for KNR to achieve financial viability, provided the Government takes the needed action on tariffs.

#### Past Financial Performance

5.05 Income statements for the years 1971 through 1977 are given in Table 5.1 and are summarized below:

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977 /b
	(W billion)						
Total operating revenues	<u>31.2</u>	<u>36.5</u>	<u>41.6</u>	<u>53.0</u>	<u>75.6</u>	<u>102.6</u>	<u>135.1</u>
Less: Total cash expenses	27.8	29.8	34.0	48.9	68.2	97.6	118.0
Depreciation	<u>4.0</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>15.0</u>	<u>17.4</u>
Total operating expenses	<u>31.8</u>	<u>34.3</u>	<u>38.9</u>	<u>54.1</u>	<u>74.7</u>	<u>112.6</u>	<u>135.4</u>
Net operating revenue (loss)	(0.6)	2.2	2.7	(1.1)	0.9	(10.0)	(0.3)
Less: Interest charges	<u>3.3</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>10.4</u>	<u>15.1</u>	<u>20.3</u>
Net railway revenue (loss)	(3.9)	(3.3)	(3.8)	(8.5)	(9.5)	(25.1)	(20.6)
Add: Other revenue (expense) net /a	(0.7)	(7.6)	(3.3)	(23.2)	5.4	1.7	<u>0.5</u>
Net revenue (loss)	(4.6)	(10.9)	(7.1)	(31.7)	(4.1)	(23.4)	(20.1)
Add: Government Subsidy (cash)	<u>-</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>14.4</u>	<u>13.7</u>	<u>21.7</u>
Net income (adjusted)	<u>(4.6)</u>	<u>(10.2)</u>	<u>(5.6)</u>	<u>(26.0)</u>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>(9.7)</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Operating ratio (%)	102.0	94.0	93.5	102.0	99.0	110.0	100.0
Interest charge coverage (times)	-	0.3	0.4	-	0.1	-	-
Debt service coverage (times)	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.5
Return on net fixed assets (actual)	-	0.9%	1.1%	-	0.1%	-	-
Return on net fixed assets (required)							
(a) Under Loan 669-KO	7.0%	7.0%	7.0%	-	-	-	-
(b) Under Loan 663-KO	-	-	-	-	2.0%	3.0%	3.0%
(c) Under Loan 1101-KO	-	-	-	-	-	2.0%	3.5%

/a Includes losses or gains on foreign currency fluctuations.

/b Tentative figures, based on 11 months actual results.

5.06 This table shows that because tariff increases generally have been inadequate and too late, KNR has been unable to generate sufficient revenues to cover debt service requirements (which have risen from W 8.8 billion in 1971 to W 23.2 billion in 1976), or to earn agreed rates of return. The Government recognizes this, but has maintained it would be inflationary to raise railway freight tariffs to a level sufficient to cover fully distributed costs. Consequently, to compensate for the loss in revenues due to delayed or inadequate freight rate increases, the Government commenced, in 1973, to pay a subsidy to KNR. This subsidy rose from W 1.5 billion in 1973 to W 14.4 billion in 1975, declined slightly to W 13.7 billion in 1976, and increased to W 21.7 billion in 1977.

5.07 Confronted with this Government policy regarding freight tariffs, KNR has tended to rely on passenger service profits to offset losses on freight services. Until recently, average revenue per passenger-km has been higher than revenue per freight ton-km (Table 2.14). However, this has tended to make railway passenger service more vulnerable to highway competition; in fact, KNR's passenger-traffic declined by 17% from 1969 to 1971. Since 1973, as seen in Table 2.14 the Government has allowed freight tariffs to increase more rapidly than passenger fares. The result has been that, by 1976, average revenue per ton-km exceeded that per passenger-km. The slower increase in passenger fares, and improvements to passenger services, have resulted in a reversal of the downward trend in passenger-km, which have increased by 68% since 1971.

5.08 Table 5.2 illustrates the effects of inflation on revenues and costs. Average revenues per passenger-km increased in current won from W 1.976 in 1970 to W 3.673 in 1976, but declined in real terms to W 1.313. Average revenues per ton-km increased in current won from W 1.44 in 1970 to W 4.636 in 1976, but declined in real terms to W 1.107 in 1974 (this has since improved to W 1.657 in 1976).

5.09 Costs rose significantly in 1976, due largely to a mandatory wage award, and for KNR to have covered its debt service obligations, operating revenues would have needed to be increased by about 15%; i.e. the increase in freight tariffs granted in January 1976 should have been matched by a similar increase in passenger fares. As noted in Table 2.12, freight rates were raised in January 1977 by the restructuring of the freight tariff, but there was no increase in passenger fares. The freight rate increases ranged from 16% for the previous class 2 to 27% for the lowest class (mainly coal). Tentative results for 1977 indicate that KNR almost broke even on operations. Freight revenues, aided by the tariff increases noted above, rose from W 43.5 billion in 1976 to W 59.5 billion in 1977, and passenger revenues, due to increased traffic rose from W 52.5 billion in 1976 to W 66.7 billion. The net deficit, after interest charges, of W 20.1 billion was more than covered by the government subsidy of W 21.7 billion.

5.10 KNR's balance sheets for the years 1971-76, given in Table 5.3, are summarized below:

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
	----- (W billions) -----					
Current assets	11.7	7.7	9.9	11.3	20.3	29.4
Less: Current liabilities	<u>16.4</u>	<u>19.6</u>	<u>18.3</u>	<u>22.1</u>	<u>13.9</u>	<u>15.3</u>
Net working capital (deficiency)	(4.7)	(11.9)	(8.4)	(10.8)	6.4	14.1
Net fixed assets <u>/a</u>	196.5	229.8	340.6	370.7	410.4	790.9
Other assets	<u>46.3</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Total assets	<u>238.1</u>	<u>222.4</u>	<u>338.7</u>	<u>365.9</u>	<u>416.9</u>	<u>805.1</u>
Long term liabilities	75.3	80.5	100.5	154.6	194.5	245.1
Other liabilities	-	1.0	1.3	1.7	1.9	3.3
Net equity <u>/a</u>	<u>162.8</u>	<u>140.9</u>	<u>236.9</u>	<u>209.6</u>	<u>220.5</u>	<u>556.7</u>
Total debt and equity	<u>238.1</u>	<u>222.4</u>	<u>338.7</u>	<u>365.9</u>	<u>416.9</u>	<u>805.1</u>

/a Include effect of revaluation of assets in 1973, (land only), and in 1976 (all assets including land).

5.11 As shown by the above table, KNR's working capital position, which had steadily deteriorated until 1974, has improved. This is largely because the Government paid considerable operating subsidies to KNR in 1975 and 1976. However, the long-term debt has risen sharply over the period, from W 100 billion in 1973 to W 245 billion at the end of 1976.

5.12 The Fifth Railway Loan Agreement reaffirmed the debt limitation covenant of the Fourth Railway Loan Agreement, which required the Bank's agreement before KNR incurred any debt should KNR's net cash revenues be less than 1.2 times the maximum debt service requirements. KNR's net cash revenues have not been sufficient to achieve this ratio, and the outstanding debt has continued to grow, with a consequent rise in debt service requirements. The increase in the outstanding long-term debt referred to in para. 5.11 was largely due to: (a) the drawing down of loans already negotiated, such as IBRD loans 863 and 1101-KO, O.E.C.F, KFW, Eximbank and 50 c/s group /1 loans,

/1 European manufacturer's consortium.

which rose by W 84 billion; and (b) the increase in borrowing from the KDB, for capital investment and to help finance KNR's growing annual debt service (para. 5.03). The debt limitation covenant was re-affirmed at negotiations.

5.13 The total debt outstanding at the end of 1976 is given in detail in Table 5.4, and is summarized below:

Type of loan or finance	Amount outstanding (US\$ million)	Equipment financed
50 c/s Group (European Consortium)	51.1	Electrification (locomotives and fixed equipment)
US Exim Bank and Commercial Banks	35.1	Diesel locomotives and engines
IDA credits and IBRD loans	161.6	Miscellaneous equipment
O.E.C.F. (Japan)	67.1	Miscellaneous equipment
U.S.A.I.D.	15.0	Miscellaneous equipment
Suppliers credits and foreign loans	<u>15.3</u>	Miscellaneous equipment
Total Foreign Finance	345.2	
Korean Development Bank (KDB)	<u>158.1</u>	US\$ equivalent of local expenditures in Won
Total	<u>503.3</u>	(Equivalent to W 244.1 billion)

5.14 In a side letter to the Fifth Railway Loan Agreement dated April 10, 1975, the Government undertook to provide KNR with the funds needed to service debt, until such time as KNR's cash generation became sufficient for this purpose (which should not be later than Fiscal 1980). During 1975 and 1976, such funds were provided by the Government in the form of further borrowing from the KDB. In the same letter, the Government also undertook to formulate a financial recovery plan designed to enable KNR to generate revenues sufficient to cover its operating expenses, meet its debt service obligations in full and make a contribution towards its capital investments. The elements, and effects, of such a plan are discussed in paras. 5.16 - 5.21.

5.15 As agreed under the Fifth Railway Loan, KNR carried out a revaluation of fixed assets in 1975/76, the results of which are reflected in the balance sheet of December 31, 1976. This revaluation added W 470 billion to the gross value of fixed assets (including W 97 billion for land), and resulted in a rise in annual depreciation provision from W 6.5 billion in 1975 to W 15.0 billion in 1976. A further revaluation done in 1977, using cost indices, added W 25.7 billion to the gross value of fixed assets. KNR has agreed to revalue its fixed assets on an annual basis.



Forecast Financial Performance (1978-81)

5.16 KNR has prepared financial forecasts, based on assumptions and data detailed in Table 5.5. These forecasts have been adjusted to take into account tariff increases proposed by the Government, and are given in Tables 5.1, 5.3 and 5.6. The proposed increases, which would enable KNR, after 1978, to generate funds sufficient to cover debt service requirements, and make some provision towards capital investment needs are listed below:

Proposed tariff increases	Passenger	Freight
1978	10%	15%
1979	10%	15%
1980	10%	15%
1981	10%	10%

The Government has proposed the tariff increases listed above in the light of its policy to restrict inflation within a limit of 10% annually. Thus passenger fares would keep pace with inflation, and KNR's freight revenues would improve by about 5% annually in real terms. The proposed tariff increases are lower than those suggested by the Bank; to compensate for the reduced revenues the Government also proposes to grant subsidies to KNR of W 14.6 billion (1978), W 12 billion (1979) and W 7.5 billion (1980).

5.17 The methodology and principal assumptions are summarized below:

(a) Income accounts

(i) Revenues: Based on agreed traffic forecasts, converted to revenues by applying average 1977 revenues per pass-km or ton-km. The effect of tariff increases is shown separately. Other minor increases are due to a Management Rationalization Plan (MRP) KNR is carrying out.

(ii) Operating Expenses

- a. Labor costs take into account some minor increases in staff, plus forecast 11-12% average annual cost increases.
- b. Fuel costs are based on estimated engine-km (derived from traffic forecasts), plus forecast 7.5-8% average annual cost increases.
- c. Maintenance costs include labor costs calculated as in (a) above, materials costs adjusted for traffic increases and for cost increases as in (b) above.

d. Other costs are based on the 1977 level, inflated as in (b) above.

(iii) Depreciation is calculated at 2.4% of the annual value of gross fixed assets, excluding land. Calculations include the effect of proposed annual revaluations.

(iv) Interest charges: Forecast on the basis of: existing debt, plus new foreign debt at 8% p.a. (largely repayable over 17 years, including 4 years grace); and new local borrowing at 6% p.a. (repayable over 20 years with 5 years grace, as presently obtained from the KDB).

(b) Balance sheets

- Receivables vary largely with freight traffic;
- Inventories vary with total operating costs;
- Accounts payable vary with cash operating costs; and
- Fixed Assets take into account (i) investment proposed under the Investment Plan; (ii) annual retirements or disposal of assets at about 10% of annual investment, (iii) annual revaluations at 8% for the years 1977-79, and 7.5% for 1980 and 1981.

(c) Detailed calculations are available in the Project File (Reference C-8).

5.18 Overall, the projections show an improved financial performance. The actions proposed would enable KNR to maintain a satisfactory working capital position. However, it would be unable to contribute anything toward capital investment requirements of W 202 billion needed over the project period (1978/79) but would be able to contribute W 33 billion towards overall investment plan requirements of W 503 billion; the Government is expected to provide about W 76 billion in subsidies and grants, and about 78% (W 394 billion) of the investment plan would have to be borrowed (para. 5.20). Long-term debt would thus rise from W 245 billion at the end of 1976 to W 533 billion by the end of 1981 (Table 5.3).

5.19 The 1978-81 income account forecast, given in Table 5.1 is summarized below.

	1978	1979	1980	1981
	----- (W billion) -----			
Operating revenues	158.8	196.6	235.7	273.2
Operating expenses	<u>155.8</u>	<u>174.6</u>	<u>192.9</u>	<u>213.8</u>
Net operating revenue (loss)	3.0	22.0	42.8	59.4
Interest charges	22.0	28.5	33.5	37.7
Other revenues/expenses (net)	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.8</u>
Net revenue (deficit)	<u>(18.0)</u>	<u>(5.2)</u>	<u>10.8</u>	<u>23.5</u>
Operating ratio (%)	98	89	82	78
Interest charge coverage	0.1	0.8	1.3	1.6
Debt service coverage	0.7	1.1	1.4	1.6
Return on net fixed assets	0.3%	2.1%	3.5%	4.2%

The operating ratio would improve from 110 in 1976 to 78 by 1981; the interest charge coverage would rise from negative in 1976 to 1.6; the debt service coverage would improve from 0.4 in 1976 to 1.6, and KNR would earn a rate of return of 0.3% in 1978, improving to 4.2% in 1981. While the latter is relatively modest, further improvement would require raising tariffs higher than as proposed, which would conflict with the Government's policy of inflation restraint (para. 5.16).

5.20 The cash flow forecast for the project period (1978/79), <sup>/1</sup> and for the investment period (1977-81) (detailed in Table 5.6), is summarized below:

<sup>/1</sup> Some project investment will spread over into the years 1980-81.

	Project period 1978/79 ----- (W billion) -----	Investment plan period 1977-81 -----
(i) <u>From KNR</u>		
Cash generated by KNR <u>/a</u>	73.7	260.7
Less: Debt service	80.5	229.9
	<u>(6.8)</u>	<u>30.8</u>
KNR's working capital - add	(0.5)	-
- from	-	1.9
Net cash available from KNR for investment	<u>(7.3)</u>	<u>32.7</u>
(ii) <u>Equity</u>		
Funds from Government for operations and investment	34.1	76.1
(iii) <u>Borrowing</u> - IBRD loan	52.1	57.9
- Other foreign	37.0	153.4
- Local (KDB)	86.5	182.8
Subtotal borrowing	<u>175.6</u>	<u>394.1</u>
Funds needed for investment	<u>202.4</u>	<u>502.9</u>
Funds provided by KNR	(3.6%)	6.5%
Funds provided by Government	16.8%	15.1%
Funds needed from borrowing	86.8%	78.4%

/a Includes non-operating and other revenues.

KNR will not be able to contribute to the project cost, and with the Government providing equity funds of about 17%, KNR will have to borrow the remaining funds needed. KNR's earning power will improve in later years, and its dependence on the Government and on the need to borrow for investment will decline. Thus over the whole investment plan period (1977-81) KNR would be able to contribute about 7% of the total cost, the Government share would decline to 15% and borrowing would account for 78%.

5.21 Forecast balance sheets for the years 1977-1981 are summarized below:

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Current assets	29.1	32.5	36.9	43.7	48.6
Less: current liabilities	<u>20.2</u>	<u>23.6</u>	<u>27.5</u>	<u>29.9</u>	<u>33.0</u>
Net working capital	8.9	8.9	9.4	13.8	15.6
Net fixed assets	842.0	982.7	1,160.2	1,341.5	1,528.2
Other assets	<u>7.4</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>7.4</u>
Total assets	<u>858.3</u>	<u>999.0</u>	<u>1,177.0</u>	<u>1,362.7</u>	<u>1,551.2</u>
Long-term debt	275.0	340.3	420.6	482.8	533.0
Provision for severance pay	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
Net equity	<u>580.0</u>	<u>655.4</u>	<u>753.1</u>	<u>876.6</u>	<u>1,014.9</u>
Total liabilities and equity	<u>858.3</u>	<u>999.0</u>	<u>1,177.0</u>	<u>1,362.7</u>	<u>1,551.2</u>

Current and liquid ratios should be about 1.4 and 0.8, respectively, after 1977. The debt/equity ratio should rise from 29/71 in 1976 to 36/64 in 1979, then fall to 35/65 by 1981. These ratios would be satisfactory.

5.22 A financial recovery plan, agreed on at negotiations included the following points:

- (a) the aggregate of tariff increases in any fiscal year will be not less than the increase in the wholesale price index in Korea for that year;
- (b) the earning by KNR of a rate of return of not less than 2% in fiscal year 1979, 3.2% in fiscal 1980 and 4% annually thereafter;
- (c) the funds needed to finance debt service (para. 5.14) will be provided by way of grants or equity contributions;
- (d) tariff increases acceptable to the Bank will be made before loan effectiveness.

#### Sensitivity Analysis

5.23 Experience with most railway projects has shown that forecasting traffic presents the greatest difficulty. With few exceptions, project appraisal forecasts have been overly optimistic, particularly for freight.

5.24 In Table 5.7, 1972-76 freight and passenger traffic, forecast in appraisal reports for Loans 863-K0 and 1101-K0, are compared with actual results. As the forecasting periods of the two reports overlap, there is some duplication. In general, the forecasts for Loan 1101-K0 were more optimistic than those for 863-K0.

5.25 For Loan 1101-K0, actual freight ton-km rose at 50% of the rate forecast; actual passenger traffic (in pass-km) rose at 73% of the rate forecast. For the purposes of a sensitivity analysis, it is assumed that both freight and passenger traffic will increase over the years 1977-81, at 50% of the rate forecast.

5.26 Another risk relates to the adequacy of tariff increases granted by the Government. As discussed in para. 5.06, tariff increases, due to the Government's reluctance to take such action, have been generally granted too late and too small. The financial forecasts given in this chapter have assumed tariff increases as now proposed by the Government. Should the actual tariff increases fall short of these, then the effect of such action is shown in Table 5.8.

5.27 Table 5.8 presents the effects of three alternatives:

- (a) Page 1. 50% reduction in traffic growth, with the Government's proposed tariff increases;
- (b) Page 2. No reduction in traffic growth, with 50% of the Government's proposed tariff increases after 1978; and
- (c) Page 3. 50% reduction in traffic growth, with 50% of the Government's proposed tariff increases after 1978.

5.28 Only in alternative (a) would KNR's cash generation be sufficient to cover debt service and make some contribution to investment. In all other cases, unless the Government continued to pay increasingly large annual operating subsidies, KNR would have to incur a much higher debt. This is illustrated by the table below:

Additional Government subsidies needed (or additional borrowing)	1978	1979	1980	1981	Total 1978-81
	(W billion)				
Alternative (a)	16.5	8.8	-	-	25.3
Alternative (b)	12.6	15.8	14.3	15.4	58.1
Alternative (c)	14.5	17.9	19.4	27.2	79.0

The rate of return under alternative (a) would be negative in 1978, rising to 2.6% by 1981; under (b) it would be 0.3% in 1978 rising to 1.0% in 1981, and under (c) it would be negative in 1978 rising to 0.5% in 1980 and falling to 0.2% in 1981.

5.29 The foregoing analysis emphasizes the importance of adequate tariff action. Slower traffic growth by itself would reduce cash generation, but KNR would still be able to finance debt service after 1979. Inadequate tariffs would only worsen the present unsatisfactory financial position of KNR.

5.30 The project's sensitivity to changes in (a) cost of the project and (b) level of operating costs was examined. Relatively generous price contingencies have been built into the estimated project costs (para. 3.16) and as further increases are not expected to be substantial, their effect is likely to be minimal, and has been disregarded. Regarding (b), as labor cost is the most significant, and has risen more sharply than other cost increases over recent years (Table 5.2, Item 3), the effect of annual increases of (i) 20% and (ii) 25% (as against annual increases of 12% assumed in the forecasts) was examined. The additional costs and the further annual tariff increases needed to generate the equivalent additional revenues are given below:

	1978	1979	1980	1981
Additional labor costs (W billion)				
(i)	4.9	11.6	20.2	32.3
(ii)	8.0	19.2	34.3	55.5
Additional annual tariff increases needed (%)				
(i)	3.0	2.9	2.4	3.0
(ii)	4.9	4.7	4.3	5.0

## 6. AGREEMENTS REACHED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.01 During loan negotiations satisfactory assurances were obtained from the Government on the following principal points:

- (a) a management study of KNR will be carried out by June 1979 (para. 2.02);
- (b) KNR will submit to the Bank, by mid-1979, detailed technical, financial and economic analyses of major fixed capacity investments proposed for 1980/81, such as double tracking, electrification and signaling (para. 3.03);
- (c) transport sector studies will be carried out under the supervision of EPB, mainly by local consulting firms, with some specialized expatriate technical assistance (para. 3.07);
- (d) KNR will establish a plan by end 1978 including measures necessary to achieve specific operational forecasts in 1979, 1980 and 1981 (para. 3.20);
- (e) investment to upgrade Seoul suburban lines will be postponed until the results of the urban transport study of the larger Seoul metropolitan area become available (para. 4.13);

(f) construction of the proposed Daejeon passenger car workshop will not commence until the Bank has reviewed studies recently completed (para. 4.14);

(g) a financial recovery plan for KNR, (para. 5.22).

6.02 A condition for loan effectiveness is that KNR's freight and passenger tariffs have been increased to levels acceptable to the Bank (para. 5.22).

6.03 The proposed project is suitable for a Bank loan of US\$120 million for a period of 17 years including 4 years of grace to the Government of the Republic of Korea, for onlending to the KNR.



KOREA

SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

Related Documents and Data Available in the Project File

A. General Reports and Studies on the Transport Sector

- A-1 World Bank "Growth and Prospects of the Korean Economy" Annex F:  
Transport, Report No. 1489-K0

B. General Reports and Studies Relating to the Project

- B-1 Terms of Reference for Management Study (para. 2.02)  
B-2 Reports by CPCS's technical advisor for maintenance of rolling stock  
(a) Quarterly Report No. 1 dated January 3, 1977  
(b) Quarterly Report No. 2 dated April 15, 1977  
(c) Interim Report on Busan Shop dated April 30, 1977 (para. 2.14)  
B-3 Consultants W.J. Rapp A.G. Basel, Switzerland. Application of the  
RAILNET Model to Elements of Korean Railroad Projects, Final  
Report and Appendices, Basel, September 20, 1977 (para 4.05).

C. Working Papers

- C-1 Notes on the Forecast of Freight Traffic by Commodities (para. 2.20)  
C-2 Review of KNR Rail and Track Renewal Program (para. 3.12)  
C-3 KNR Locomotive Requirements 1977-81 (para. 3.13)  
C-4 KNR Passenger Car Requirements 1977-81 (para. 3.13)  
C-5 KNR Freight Car Requirements 1977-81 (para. 3.13)  
C-6 Unit Prices for Project Items (para. 3.16)  
C-7 Rail Renewal Program, Economic Evaluation (para. 4.11)  
C-8 Detailed Calculations for Financial Projections (para. 5.17)

KOREASIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTMajor Covenants of Past Loan and CreditAgreements - Degree of Compliance

1. The major covenants in the Loan/Credit Agreements relating to the five railway projects for which the Bank Group has provided financing fall into four main areas:

- A. KNR's Status and Financial Autonomy
- B. KNR's Financial Situation
- C. Operational and Technical Matters
- D. Transport Coordination

2. The specific covenants and the degree of compliance with them are detailed in the following paragraphs.

A. KNR's Status and Financial Autonomy

I. First Project - Credit 25-KO (August 17, 1962)

<u>Requirement</u>	<u>Degree of Compliance</u>
<u>Section 4.07</u> - The Borrower shall maintain, or cause to be maintained, separate accounts for the National Railroad adequate to reflect the expenditures and capital transactions of the National Railroad or attributable thereto.	Separate accounts are being maintained.
<u>Section 4.08</u> - The Borrower shall employ competent and experienced consultants, satisfactory to the Association, upon terms and conditions satisfactory to the Borrower and the Association, to assist in carrying out the part of the Project described in paragraph (iii) of the Schedule hereto (installation of a statistical and accounting system in accordance with generally accepted commercial accounting practices).	Consultants (Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc. - U.S.) were employed (Contract of April 8, 1963). In this connection see V on page 4.

Section 4.09 - Promptly after the establishment of the accounting and statistical system included in the Project, but in any case not later than December 31, 1964, the Borrower shall establish and thereafter maintain the National Railroad as a separate entity which, as an agency of the Borrower, will be responsible for the management, operation and development of the railroad facilities of the Borrower and will have such organization, financial resources and procedures and legal status and powers as are required to enable it to carry out its responsibilities efficiently and in accordance with sound business, financial and railroad practices.

KNR was established in 1963 as a separate entity, with an independent manager and its own budget and accounting system.

## II. Second Project - Credit 110-KO (December 18, 1967)

### (i) Letter of December 18, 1967 re Organizational and Operational Policies

#### Organization and Budget

KNR will be reorganized as a public corporation or other autonomous agency by the end of 1969.

Management will exercise full authority over reallocations within budget, and

in the meantime, Government will take immediate action on any request by DG of KNR regarding reallocation from one item to another in the Budget.

#### Budget System

KNR will adopt the performance budget system as recommended by the consultants appointed under Cr. 25-KO.

KNR created as a semi-autonomous agency. Its powers were regarded as generally satisfactory by the Bank.

Not given, although as noted in the Appraisal Report on the Fourth Project, KNR had been given greater financial autonomy in financial matters since 1970/71.

Such actions were taken.

Not done. Not practically possible while KNR operates existing Government form of Budget.

Staff

Limitation of numbers, and of  
converting temporary staff to permanent  
status.

Done

(ii) Letter of December 18, 1967 regarding Consultants

Consultants

KNR to employ consultants to  
provide assistance on statistics,  
traffic costs and tariffs, rolling  
stock maintenance, marshalling yard  
requirements and review of uneconomic  
lines.

Consultants employed  
Ross and Co., Canada  
August 1969, and studies  
completed.

III. Third Project - Credit 183-KO (May 14, 1970)

Section 4.06 (b) (i) KNR to maintain ac-  
counts solely in accordance with the  
commercial accounting system, and to cease to  
maintain them as hitherto, not later than  
January 1, 1976.

Not done, adequate trained account-  
ing staff for the implementation  
of the commercial accounting system  
was not available (see IV and V  
on pages 3 and 4).

Section 4.06 (b) (ii) Installation of  
performance budgeting system by December  
31, 1973.

Not done, see item II above.

Section 4.21 Director-General of KNR to be  
given, not later than June 1, 1970, power  
to reallocate funds within the budget.

Increased powers were delegated  
to KNR's Director-General in  
mid-1970.

IV. Fourth Project - Loan 863-KO (November 22, 1972)

Section 3.03 - In order to assist KNR in  
the implementation of a commercial account-  
ing system for the KNR's accounts, the  
Borrower shall cause the KNR to employ  
consultants acceptable to the Bank upon  
terms and conditions satisfactory to the Bank.

KNR engaged Touche, Ross and  
Co. (Canada), contract dated  
October 16, 1974.

Section 4.02(c) - Except as the Bank shall  
otherwise agree, the Borrower shall cause the  
KNR (i) to prepare, with the assistance of  
the consultants referred to in Section 3.03  
of this Agreement, a time-phased program for  
implementing, not later than January 1, 1975,  
the commercial accounting system for the  
KNR's accounts adopted from 1971; and (ii) to  
promptly furnish the said program to the Bank  
for its comments.

Program prepared and furnished  
to the Bank.

V. Fifth Project - Loan 1101-KO (April 10, 1975)

Section 4.04 - The Borrower shall cause KNR within 12 months of the date of this Agreement, or such other date as the Borrower and the Bank shall agree, to implement a time-phased program for the installation of a commercial accounting and traffic costing system acceptable to the Bank.

The contract with consultants (section 3.03 above) was extended in phases until early 1977. The consultants revised the manual system prepared by the original consultants (under Cr. 25-KO) and computerized it. There have been considerable delays in installing the revised system due to KNR's lack of suitably qualified and experienced accounting and computer staff needed to work with the consultants. Work on installing the system commenced in 1977 and is expected to be completed early this year (para 2.35 of Staff Appraisal Report on Sixth Project).

3. When the first Credit was made in 1962, the Ministry of Transportation was responsible for the operation of the railway and had four bureaus dealing almost exclusively with the matters relating to it. Since then considerable progress has been made in providing KNR with a greater degree of autonomy, both operationally and financially. Progress on commercial accounting, developed by consultants, has been slow, due to difficulties in KNR supplying sufficient qualified and experienced staff to work with the consultants and in developing and implementing a commercial accounting system in parallel with the traditional budgetary accounts required by the Government. However, as indicated above, installation should be completed by the end of this year (para. 2.35 of Staff Appraisal Report and para. 4.03 of the draft Loan Agreement sets a deadline of December 31, 1978 for such completion).

4. Because of the importance that the Government attaches to the railway, not only as an important transport mode but also for security reasons, it is understandable that it wants to keep substantial control on KNR. As shown by the very high operating performance of KNR this has not been detrimental. However, there are measures which can be taken within the Government accounting and budgetary framework, while giving KNR as much autonomy as possible. We intend to include in the proposed Loan Agreement a covenant similar to the one agreed to for the Korea Maritime and Port Authority (KMPA) in Loan 1401-KO, which would achieve this objective.

B. KNR'S Financial Situation

1. Tariffs and Financial Performance. All the five Loan/Credit Agreements have covenants stipulating that the Borrower shall cause KNR to have its tariffs reflect costs and also that KNR shall take all measures, not limited to tariffs, to enable KNR to cover its working expenses, meet debt service requirements, maintain adequate working capital, establish reserves for contingencies, and finance a reasonable proportion of its capital.

2. The requirements, and degree of compliance, under each agreement are as follows:

I. Second Project - Credit 110-KO (December 18, 1967)

Section 4.03 - The Borrower shall cause the National Railroad to establish and maintain tariffs of rates and fares which will provide revenues sufficient to meet all operating expenses, including adequate maintenance and depreciation, and to earn an adequate rate of return on the net fixed assets in use of the National Railroad.

According to the Supplemental Letter entitled "Rates and Charges: Cash Position"

Actual Returns Earned:

(i) the adequate rates of return were to be "not less than 5% for 1969-70 and not less than 6% for 1971 and thereafter.

1969	4.4%
1970	2.9%
1971	nil

(ii) tariff increases of 50% passenger fares and 30% freight rates no later than January 1, 1968.

Done, October 1, 1967.

(iii) and further revisions of tariffs as needed to bring rates and fares in close relation to costs of service provided.

May 20, 1969 reclassification of freight rates corresponding to 15% p.a. increase in freight revenues. December 27, 1969 35% increase in passenger fares.

(iv) adequate cash position to meet debt interest and amortization, working capital contingencies, a material part of the costs of capital investment.

Not achieved.

II. Third Project - Credit 183-KO/Loan 669-KO (May 14, 1970)

Section 4.15 - Revise tariffs as necessary to bring rates and fares into close relationship to the costs of services provided, no later than 12 months from the date of receipt of ongoing consultant's study (i.e. about July/August 1971).

Recommendations of study not yet implemented. Apart from some action in revising the freight tariff structure (i.e. increasing from 3 classes to 5 classes in May 1969 and reducing to 4 classes in January, 1977) the Government has almost always adjusted tariffs across the board. For the proposed Sixth Project we are seeking agreement that tariffs will, in future, be raised selectively, with due regard to costs.

Section 4.16 - General requirements similar to Supplemental Letter of December 18, 1967 to Second Project. Specifically, KNR was to earn annual rates of return of 7% commencing 1971.

Actual returns earned:

1971	-	nil
1972	-	0.9%
1973	-	1.1%

III. Fourth Project - Loan 863-KO (November 22, 1972)

Section 4.05 - The Borrower shall enable KNR to charge fares on the Seoul Metropolitan Electrified Suburban Services (SMESRS) to cover, at least, the variable cost of operating the services. The Borrower shall promptly reimburse the KNR for any uncovered portion of the full cost of operating the SMESRS.

KNR's costing indicates that full costs of the SMESRS are being covered by revenues.

Section 4.07 - Required KNR to earn return of not less than 2% (1975), 3% (1976) and 5% (by 1978).

KNR actually earned:

1975	-	0-1%
1976	-	nil

IV. Supplemental Letter of November 22, 1972

The Government undertook:

Regarding:

(i) To increase freight tariffs by at least 20% as soon as possible, but in any case by January 1, 1974;

(i) Freight rates were raised 10% in January 1974, and a further 5% in February 1974; passenger fares were raised by 25% in February 1974, and KNR was allowed to retain the 10% transportation tax on passenger fares, in force since 1963, and previously paid over to the Government.

(ii) To increase passenger and freight tariffs, but no later than January 1, 1975 by such amounts as would secure total additional revenues equal to the total additional revenues which would have been earned had the passenger tariffs only been raised by 20%, by this date.

Regarding (ii) Freight rates were raised selectively in December 1974, by amounts of between 35% and 40%. Passenger fares were not increased.

(iii) To increase freight tariffs by an average of at least 20% by January 1, 1976.

Regarding (iii), freight rates were raised 10% (excluding coal) in July 1975 and by 35% in January 1976; passenger fares were raised by 20% in July 1975.

The above increases were to be made on the assumptions that:

(a) the wholesale price index in Korea would rise at no more than 3% p.a., and

(b) KNR's staff wage levels would be subject to general wage revisions of no more than 10% each year and only in the years 1974 and 1976.

In addition, should the increases assumed in (a) and (b) actually be higher, or should any other events arise which would make it unlikely that the above mentioned tariff increases would be sufficient to achieve the required rates of return, the Government undertook to review, in October of each year, KNR's financial situation, and would consult with the Bank on measures, such as tariff increases or cost reduction, needed to achieve the required results.

#### V. Fifth Project - Loan 1101-KO (April 10, 1975)

Section 4.05 - The Borrower shall cause KNR, by December 1976 or such other date as the Borrower and the Bank shall agree, to carry out a revaluation of KNR's fixed assets in accordance with appropriate and consistently maintained methods of valuation acceptable to the Bank.

Section 4.06 - The Borrower shall cause KNR to take all necessary measures, including but not limited to adjustments of the tariff structure and rates of KNR, as shall be required to enable KNR (a) to earn an annual rate of return of not less than 2% commencing fiscal year 1976, 3-1/2% by 1977 and 5-1/2% thereafter; and (b) attain a ratio of current assets to current liabilities of not less than 1.2 by fiscal year 1979. (The rate of return requirement was modified by a Supplemental Letter of April 10, 1975 which set 1980 as the deadline for achieving the agreed financial targets).

Regarding (a), the wholesale price index in Korea rose by 7% in 1973, 42% in 1974, 26% in 1975 and 11% in 1976.

Regarding (b) KNR's staff wages were raised by over 20% in 1974; in early 1976, although the increase in wages granted nationally was 45%, due to KNR's salary structure the effect was to raise railway wage costs by about 70%.

The Government paid to KNR cash subsidies of W 1.5 billion in 1973, W 5.7 billion in 1974, W 14.4 billion in 1975 and W 13.7 billion in 1976 described as "partial compensation for revenues foregone due to not implementing a general rate increase in 1973."

Revaluation was carried out and the results reflected in KNR's balance sheet of December 31, 1976.

In 1975 KNR earned a return of 0.1%, but no return was earned in 1976. Although revenues were higher than forecast, expenses were much higher, particularly staff costs, due to mandatory wage awards. Freight rate increases of 10% (April 1975) and 35% (January 1976) and a passenger fare increase of 20% (April 1976) were inadequate to compensate for inflation and the wage awards.



## VI. Supplemental Letter of April 10, 1975 - "KNR's Financial Situation"

(a) The Government intends, until such time as a financial plan acceptable to the Bank can be formulated and implemented, to provide the KNR with the funds necessary to meet the service of all its foreign and local borrowings.

(a) Funds were provided in 1975, and 1976 in the form of additional borrowings from the Korean Development Bank.

(b) The Government shall formulate such a (financial recovery) plan and discuss it with the Bank within eighteen months of the signature of the Loan Agreement pertaining to the above-mentioned Project so that KNR could attain the agreed financial targets set out in Section 4.06 of said Loan Agreement and the objectives set forth in this letter no later than its fiscal year, 1980.

(b) In a letter dated December 7, 1977, the Government spelled out its intentions regarding tariff increases (see para. 4, page 8).

3. Although in the late 1960s KNR was not able to earn the full required rates of return, it did earn positive returns until 1971. In that year competition from improved highways, and in particular, the opening of the Seoul-Busan expressway, eroded KNR's profitable passenger traffic. The financial performance deteriorated even further in 1973-75 following the sharp inflation caused by the oil crisis. The Korean Government, as most other governments have done, has argued for keeping public sector tariffs low so as not to further contribute to inflation. As a result freight rates were not increased between March 1972 and January 1974, while passenger fares were not increased between January 1970 and January 1974. In order to alleviate the effect on KNR's finances the Government has provided annual subsidies of W 0.7 billion in 1972, W 1.5 billion in 1973, W 5.7 billion in 1974, W 14.4 billion in 1975 and W 13.7 billion in 1976.

4. With inflation somewhat abated in 1977, the Government is now prepared to grant reasonable tariff increases as given in the letter of the Deputy Prime Minister dated December 7, 1977, the receipt of which was made a condition of submitting loan documents to the Loan Committee. Assuming that the rate of inflation will not exceed 10%, the proposed tariff increases will enable the achievement of the financial targets by the date specified in the Supplemental Letter to the Loan Agreement for the Fifth Railway Project. We will seek assurances that the proposed tariff increases will be adjusted upwards if inflation is greater than anticipated.

## C. Operational and Technical Matters

1. Most agreements specify technical and operational studies to be conducted generally in association with proposed developments and investments. All required studies have been conducted and the results communicated and discussed with the Bank. In general recommendations have been implemented. The continuously improving performance level of KNR shows that the dialogue with the Bank on operational and technical matters has generally been successful. Further studies are included in the Sixth Project to continue improvements. A list of the subjects studied under the various agreements is given below:

Second Project - Credit 110-K0 (December 18, 1967)

2. Rolling stock maintenance and design, marshalling yard requirements, coal transport and distribution in Seoul area, uneconomic lines (Supplemental Letter on consultants). All studies were done and agreements to implement recommendations were reached during negotiations of the Third and Fourth projects with the major ones being the object of covenants in those agreements (see paras. 3 and 4 below).

Third Project - Credit 183-K0/Loan 669-K0 (May 14, 1970)

3. Maintenance of diesel locos and rail cars, modernization and expansion of telecommunication network, evaluation of bids for diesel locos, workshop construction at Daejon (Section 4.10 to 4.13). All studies have been conducted. Availability of diesel locos and rail cars has been constantly increasing from 83% in 1971 to 87% in 1976 for diesel locos and from 67% to 80% for diesel rail cars. Detailed schemes for improving telecommunications were recommended by consultants and financed and implemented under the Project. Consultants recommended the construction of a new workshop at Daejon, construction has started for the freight car workshop and will start under the Sixth Project for the passenger car workshop. Recommendations regarding coal transport were partially implemented (Section 4.14). A study of bulk commodities including coal is included in the Sixth Project with a view to preparing a project for Bank financing to further improve distribution of bulk commodities, mainly coal and cement.

Fourth Project - Loan 863-K0 (November 22, 1972)

4. No new study was specified under this agreement but covenants covered the completion of construction and improvement of marshalling yards studied under the Second Project (Section 3.07) and further rationalization of workshops in connection with the electrification of the industrial line (Section 3.08). Marshalling yards and workshops continue to be improved and expanded in line with traffic growth.

Fifth Project - Loan 1101-K0 (April 10, 1975)

5. No new study was specified under this agreement but covenants covered further improvements to be made in workshops with a view to further increasing availability of motive power and rolling stock (Section 3.07). An advisor was appointed and commenced work late in 1976. Since the availability and utilization of motive power and rolling stock in Korea is generally high compared to most other railways, improvements, while always possible, require constant efforts. Results are gradual and long term.

D. Transport Investment and Coordination

1. In 1965, the Bank made a technical assistance grant for a comprehensive survey of all modes of transport in Korea. The study drew attention to the need to develop roads in the country as well as provide for transport coordination. In 1968 a Technical Assistance and Engineering Credit (S4-K0) was made to study the highway sector as well as review responsibilities of ministries concerned with transportation, with a view to establishing an organization for the coordination of transport.

Third Project - Credit 183-KO/Loan 669-KO (May 1970)

2. This Credit refers to the study conducted under S4-KO mentioned above as follows:

Section 4.19 - Upon completion of the study by consultants of transport coordination and highway organization currently in progress, the Borrower shall promptly consult with the Association with a view to agreeing, not later than December 31, 1970, on (i) measures necessary to achieve adequate coordination in the field of transportation, particularly with respect to the establishment of a body satisfactory to the Borrower and the Association for overall planning of the transport sector; and (ii) the timing for the implementation of said measures.

In early 1970 the Government established a three-tiered organization responsible for transport planning and coordination:

The Transport Coordination Ministers Conference (TCMC);

The Transport Coordination Working Group (TCWG); and,

The Transport Planning Office (TPO) in the Ministry of Transport (MOT).

It was intended that TPO would be responsible for undertaking economic analysis and rendering professional advice to TCMC on investment planning and important policy measures including licensing, pricing and taxation within the subsectors of transport. TCMC met rarely and the TPO with limited staff and its location in one of the concerned Ministries could hardly be expected to perform its envisaged role of investment coordination.

Fourth Project - Loan 863-KO (November 22, 1972)

Section 4.06 - With a view to improving transport planning and coordination, the Borrower shall (i) take all measures necessary on its part to enable the TPO to collect and prepare reliable data relating to the cost and operations of all modes of transport; (ii) review the function and work program of the TPO; (iii) cause the TPO to furnish to the Bank quarterly reports relating to its work; (iv) cause all relevant agencies of the Borrower, including the Ministry of Construction of the Borrower, to ensure

Slow progress was made in strengthening TPO. In 1973 the first two staff members were sent overseas for training as transport economists.

that all major investment proposals relating to the transport sector are furnished to the TPO for the purposes of appraisal and ensuring coordination in respect thereof; and (v) strengthen economic expertise in the TPO by making appointments to, or training the staff of, TPO.

4. In 1973, EPB was reviewing the functions and work program of TPO with a view to implementing this agreement (Appraisal report of the Second Highway Project). This matter was discussed during the negotiations of that project (956-KO, January 25, 1974) and the Government promised to submit a status report on TPO with a view to discussing appropriate action by mid-1974. Little progress was made as the Government could not reach a firm conclusion about TPO's work program.

#### Fifth Project - Loan 1101-KO (April 10, 1975)

Section 3.13 - Within 12 months of the date of submission of the time-phased program referred to in Section 6.01 of this Agreement or other date as the Borrower and the Bank shall agree, the Borrower shall take measures, including the issuance of appropriate decrees acceptable to the Bank, to ensure the effective formulation and review of the Borrower's policies and investment proposals made by all its agencies and ministries related to the transport sector, including, inter alia, highways, railways, ports, inland water transport, shipping and aviation.

Presidential decrees were issued in July and August 1975 establishing a Transport Coordination Office (TCO) in the Ministry of Transportation, and an inter-ministerial Transport Coordination Committee (TCC). TCO is headed by a Director General, a high ranking civil servant reporting directly to the Vice Minister of Transport; he also chairs the TCC. The functions of TCO and TCC are given in Annexes 4 and 5 of the Korea Transport Sector Mission full report of February 11, 1976. For the preparation of the Fourth Plan an inter-ministerial working group on transportation prepared detailed transport demand forecasts providing a useful basis for investment planning.

6. While the charter of the TCC includes intermodal coordination of transport sector investments, the TCC has in fact not exercised this function. The Economic Planning Board (EPB), which exercises budgetary control and plays a senior role with regard to all other ministries, has the dominant role in decision on investment projects. EPB intends to make much more intensive reviews of investment projects and has established a separate Bureau of Project Evaluation to this end. Sector studies covering major aspects of transport coordination have been identified by the sector mission and are included in the Sixth Project. They will be carried out under the supervision of EPB.

7. This approach appears much more satisfactory and workable than the one where investment coordination was to come under one of the ministries, namely MOT. The role of the TCO should remain one of collecting basic data in the sector and assisting in the formulation and review of transport policies, especially those related to pricing and regulation since MOT is the Ministry responsible for licensing and rates and fares setting.

KOREA  
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

Traffic Statistics 1966 to 1976 Actual and 1981 Forecast

Freight

	Actual								Forecast			
	1966		1971		AAGR/a 66-71	1976		AAGR 71-76	1981		AAGR 76-81	
	%		%		% p.a.	%		% p.a.	%		% p.a.	
<hr/>												
Tons (million)												
Railway	24	41	32	22	5.9	44	20	6.6	62	18	7.1	
Highway	33	56	102	70	25.0	164	74	10.0	263	75	10.0	
Public	(25)		(74)		(24.0)	(94)		(4.9)	(151)		(10.0)	
Private	(8)		(28)		(29.0)	(70)		(20.0)	(112)/b		(10.0)	
Coastal	2	3	11	8	40.0	14	6	4.9	25	7	12.3	
<u>Total</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>100</u>		<u>222</u>	<u>100</u>		<u>350</u>	<u>100</u>		
<hr/>												
Ton-km (billion)												
Railway	5.4	78	7.8	47	7.6	9.7	46	4.5	13.9	41	7.0	
Highway	.8	12	4.0	24	38.0	5.7	27	7.3	9.8	30	11.5	
Public	(.6)		(3.3)			(4.4)		(5.9)	(7.6)		(11.5)	
Private	(.2)		(0.7)			(1.3)		(13.2)	(2.2)/b		(11.5)	
Coastal	0.7	10	4.7	29	46.0	5.5	27	3.2	9.4	29	11.4	
<u>Total</u>	<u>6.9</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>16.5</u>	<u>100</u>		<u>20.9</u>	<u>100</u>		<u>33.1</u>	<u>100</u>		

/a AAGR: Average Annual Growth Rate.

/b Estimated using the same growth rate as for public transport since no forecasts are available.

Source: Ministry of Transport, Statistics Yearbook of Transportation 1976 (M.O.T.), FFYP 1977-81, and mission's estimates.

## KOREA

## SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

## Traffic Statistics 1966 to 1976 Actual and 1981 Forecast

## Passengers

				Actual				Forecast					
1966		1971		AAGR/a 66-71		1976		AAGR 71-76		1981		AAGR 76-81	
%		%		% p.a.		%		% p.a.		%		% p.a.	
<b>Passengers (million)</b>													
Railway	138	8	128	4		288	5	not signif.	433	5	not signif.		
Intercity	(138)	-	(128)	-	-1.5	(149)	-	3.1	(178)	(2)	(3.6)		
SMESRS /b	-	-	-	-		(134)	-	-	(265)	(3)	(14.6)		
Highway	1,512	91	3,024	96	14.9	5,051	95	10.8	7,769	95	9.0		
Intercity	(272)	(16)	(333)	(11)	(4.1)	(652)	(12)	(14.4)	(792)	(10)	(4.0)		
Urban	(1,240)	(75)	(2,691)	(85)	(16.8)	(4,399)	(83)	(10.3)	(6,977)	(85)	(9.7)		
Coastal	6	1	6	<1	-	6	<1	-	7	<1	-		
Aviation	-	-	1	<1	-	1	<1	-	2	<1	-		
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,656</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>3,159</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>5,341</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>8,221</b>	<b>100</b>			
<b>Passenger-km (billion)</b>													
Railway	8.7	43	8.8	27	0.0	14.7	25	not signif.	20.4	22	not signif.		
Intercity	(8.7)	-	(8.8)	-	-	(12.4)	(21)	7.1	(16.5)	(18)	(5.9)		
SMERS /b	-	-	-	-	-	(2.3)	(4)	-	(3.9)	(4)	(11.1)		
Highway	11.5	56	22.9	71	14.8	43.4	74	13.6	71.6	77	10.6		
Intercity	N.A.		(11.6)	(36)	N.A.	(25.0)	(43)	(16.6)	(42.4)	(46)	(11.1)		
Urban	N.A.		(11.3)	(35)	N.A.	(18.4)	(31)	(10.2)	(29.2)	(31)	(9.7)		
Coastal	0.2	1	0.3	1	-	0.2	<1	-	0.4	<1	-		
Aviation	0.1	-	0.3	1		0.3	<1	-	0.6	<1	-		
<b>Total</b>	<b>20.5</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>32.3</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>58.6</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>93.0</b>	<b>100</b>			

/a AAGR: Average Annual Growth Rate.

/b SMESRS includes Traffic on KNR Seoul Suburban lines as well as Seoul City Subway.

Source: Ministry of Transport, Statistics Yearbook of Transportation 1976 (M.O.T.), and mission's estimates. The 1981 figures are those included in the Fourth Five-Year Plan 1977-81 except for railway where the revised KNR/mission estimates are shown. FFYP figures for railway were 458 million passengers and 19 billion pass-km.

KOREASIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

Total Transport Investment - Third Plan  
(1972-76) and Fourth Plan (1977-81)  
 (Billion Won)

Modes		1972-76 <u>/a</u> Actual		1977-81 <u>/b</u> Planned	
Highways	(Public)	(237)	833	(458)	1,226
	(Private)	(596)		(768)	
Railways			318		402
Ports and Marine	(Public)	(130)		(251)	
	(Private)	(412)	522	(745)	996
Air Transport			122		59
Seoul Subway			57		101
Others			5		-
Total Transport Investment			1,857		2,784
Total Capital Expenditure			11,996		19,028
Transportation as % of Total			15.7%		14.6%

/a and /b Constant 1975 prices.

Source: EPB



KOREA

SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

KNR Track and Infrastructure - Summary by End 1976  
(Standard gauge lines)

Line	Route length (km)	Maximum gradient (%)	Minimum curve radius (m)	Total curve length (km)	Maximum axle load (tons)	Maximum speed (km/hr)	Permanent speed restrictions (km)	Sleeper type		Remarks
								Wood (%)	Concrete (%)	
Gyeong Bu	445	1.00	400	330	24.5	110	443	64	36	Double track
Jung Ang	380	2.30	300	162	24.5	80	328	76	24	Double track 11 km
Gyeong In	25	1.00	300	22	24.5	80	27	68	32	Double track
Jang Hang	144	1.53	300	45	22.0	70	64	100	0	
Chung Bug	122	1.67	300	56	24.5	70	88	100	0	
Gyeong Bug	110	2.50	250	36	24.5	70	65	96	4	
Dae Gu	35	1.25	300	12	24.5	80	22	56	44	
Gyeong Eui	46	1.00	300	12	24.5	90	25	96	4	
Gyeong Weon	89	1.33	300	24	24.5	80	56	87	13	
Gyeong Chun	87	2.45	250	41	24.5	70	71	100	0	
Gyeong Jeon	320	2.50	250	133	22.0	70	257	99	1	
Ho Nam	260	1.33	300	92	24.5	90	152	60	40	Double track 78 km
Jeon Ra	198	2.50	250	87	24.5	80	142	74	26	
Donghae Nambu	146	1.40	300	55	24.5	80	85	80	20	
Tae Baeg	91	3.03	300	51	24.5	70	95	98	2	
Yeong Dong	199	3.00	250	120	24.5	70	196	96	4	
Other lines	400			176			274	96	4	
<u>Total</u>	<u>3,097</u>			<u>1,454</u>			<u>2,390</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>19</u>	

Source: KNR

Rails in KNR Standard Gauge Main Line Tracks at End of 1976  
(Quantities in track km)

Source: KNR

Table 2.3

## KOREA

## SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

Inventory of Motive Power and Rolling Stock  
(December 31, 1976)

	Total			Out of service		Age				Condition		
	In fleet Number	In service Number	%	Under repair Number	Awaiting repair Number	<10 yrs Number	11-20 yrs Number	21-30 yrs Number	>30 yrs Number	Good Number	Fair Number	Poor Number
1. <u>Steam Locomotives</u>	68	20	29.4	-	48	-	-	25	43	-	-	68
2. <u>Diesel Locomotives</u>												
Shunter, series 2000 (800 HP)	13	13	100.0	-	-	-	9	4	-	-	-	13
Shunter, series 2100 (1,000 HP)	28	28	100.0	-	-	28	-	-	-	28	-	-
Shunters, total	41	41	100.0	-	-	28	9	4	-	28	-	13
Mainline locomotives, series 3000 (875 HP)	52	47	90.4	5	-	-	52	-	-	-	30	22
Mainline locomotives, series 3100 (950 HP)	32	32	66.7	-	16	17	31	-	-	-	17	31
Mainline locomotives, series 3200 (875 HP)	16	16	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mainline locomotives, series 4000 (1,300 HP)	15	13	86.7	2	-	-	15	-	-	-	15	-
Mainline locomotives, series 4100 (1,300 HP)	10	10	100.0	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	10	-
Mainline locomotives, series 4200 (1,300 HP)	22	22	100.0	-	-	22	-	-	-	-	22	-
Mainline locomotives, series 5000 (1,750 HP)	29	26	89.7	3	-	-	29	-	-	-	15	14
Mainline locomotives, series 6000 (1,800 HP)	14	13	92.8	1	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	14
Mainline locomotives, series 6100 (1,800 HP)	6	6	100.0	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	6	-
Mainline locomotives, series 6200 (1,800 HP)	16	14	87.5	2	-	16	-	-	-	-	16	-
Mainline locomotives, series 6300 (2,000 HP)	23	20	86.9	3	-	23	-	-	-	-	23	-
Mainline locomotives, series 7000 (3,000 HP)	10	10	100.0	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	10	-
Mainline locomotives, series 7100 (3,000 HP)	10	10	100.0	-	-	10	-	-	-	10	-	-
Mainline locomotives, series 7500 (3,000 HP)	90	87	96.7	3	-	90	-	-	-	90	-	-
Mainline locomotives, total	345	310	89.8	19	16	188	177	-	-	100	164	81
Grand total	386	351	90.9	19	16	216	186	4	-	128	164	94
3. <u>Electric Locomotives</u>												
a. Mainline locomotives	69	59	85.5	6	4	69	-	-	-	69	-	-
b. Shunters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4. <u>Diesel Railcars (Hauling units)</u>	120	99	82.5	11	10	4	116	-	-	-	4	116
5. <u>Electric Railcars (Hauling units)</u>	128	114	89.1	14	-	128	-	-	-	128	-	-
6. <u>Heating Cars</u>	140	114	81.4	20	6	103	37	-	-	-	103	37
7. <u>Passenger Cars</u>												
a. Airconditioned coaches	71	65	91.5	4	2	71	-	-	-	71	-	-
b. Other coaches	1,388	1,297	93.4	67	24	707	538	50	93	707	588	143
c. Sleeping cars	29	27	93.1	2	-	22	-	-	7	22	-	7
d. Restaurant cars	21	20	95.2	1	-	18	3	-	-	18	3	-
e. Baggage cars	114	107	93.9	4	3	35	26	12	41	35	26	53
f. Railcar trailers	143	138	96.5	5	-	32	111	-	-	32	111	-
g. Other	40	38	95.0	2	-	17	-	4	19	17	4	23
Total	1,806	1,692	93.7	85	29	902	678	66	160	902	678	226
8. <u>Freight Cars</u>												
a. Box cars	5,169	4,680	90.5	233	256	2,967	32	1,665	505	2,967	1,445	757
b. Gondolas	6,655	6,175	92.7	366	114	4,635	982	540	498	4,635	1,409	611
c. Tank cars	2,427	2,280	93.9	72	75	1,662	161	440	164	1,662	508	257
d. Others	1,804	1,679	93.8	81	44	77	1,049	322	356	77	1,381	346
Total	16,055	14,814	92.3	752	489	9,341	2,224	2,967	1,523	9,341	4,743	1,971
9. <u>Privately Owned Freight Wagons</u>												
a. Box cars	(125)			-	-	(125)	-	-	-	(125)	-	-
b. Gondolas	(224)			-	-	(224)	-	-	-	(224)	-	-
c. Tank cars	(1,071)			-	-	(844)	(54)	(173)	-	(844)	(227)	-
d. Others	(35)			-	-							
Total	(1,455)			-	-	(1,225)	(54)	(176)	-	(1,225)	(230)	-

Source: KNR

KOREASIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTCarrying Capacity of Rolling Stock  
(As of December 31, 1976)

	Number		Total carrying capacity /a	
<hr/>				
1. <u>Passenger Cars</u>				
(a) Airconditioned sitting cars	71		3,396	
(b) Other sitting cars	1,388		97,932	
(c) Sleeping cars	29		812	
<u>Total</u>	<u>1,488</u>		<u>112,140</u>	
2. <u>Freight Cars</u>				
(a) Box cars - up to 30 tons	550		15,405	
31-40 tons	2,834		113,360	
over 40 tons	1,785	5,160	89,250	218,015
(b) Gondolas - up to 30 tons	513		15,030	
31-40 tons	2,291		91,640	
41-50 tons	3,851	6,655	192,550	299,220
(c) Tank cars- up to 30 tons	391		10,783	
31-40 tons	1,044		40,035	
over 40 tons	992	2,427	49,565	100,383
(d) Other cars	1,804	1,804	76,358	76,358
<u>Total</u>	<u>16,055</u>		<u>693,976</u>	

/a For passenger cars seats, for freight wagons tons.

Source: KNR.

KOREA

SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

KNR Freight Traffic: 1966-76 Actual and 1977-81 Forecast  
(Million tons)

Years	Major Commodities							Others				Total
	Coal	Cement	Ore	Oil	Fertilizer	Grain	Subtotal	General cargo	Container	Military	KNR	
<u>Actual</u>												
1966	10.5	1.7	1.1	0.9	1.2	1.2	16.6	4.4		2.1	0.9	24.0
<u>Second FYP</u>												
1967	11.2	2.2	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.3	18.7	5.6		2.3	0.8	27.4
1968	9.7	3.2	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.6	19.4	5.9		2.8	1.0	29.1
1969	10.4	4.4	1.7	2.1	1.2	1.4	21.2	5.6		2.7	1.2	30.7
1970	12.1	4.9	1.8	2.4	1.1	1.3	23.6	5.0		2.1	1.0	31.7
1971	12.2	5.8	1.6	2.5	1.1	1.4	24.6	4.6		1.9	0.9	32.0
<u>Third FYP</u>												
1972	11.3	6.0	1.5	2.2	1.3	1.6	23.9	4.6	-	2.4	0.7	31.6
1973	13.6	7.5	2.3	2.7	1.5	1.6	29.2	5.5	0.2	1.7	1.0	37.6
1974	15.1	7.8	2.9	2.7	1.9	1.3	31.7	5.1	0.2	1.3	1.1	39.4
1975	16.7	9.0	3.0	3.1	2.2	1.0	35.0	5.0	0.2	1.4	1.1	42.7
1976	16.1	10.2	3.4	3.1	1.8	1.3	35.9	4.8	0.3	1.5	1.3	43.8
<u>Forecast</u>												
<u>Fourth FYP</u>												
1977	17.1	11.0	3.6	3.4	1.9	1.5	38.6	5.6	0.4	1.5	1.3	47.3
1978	18.7	11.8	4.0	3.7	2.2	1.6	42.0	5.9	0.6	1.5	1.3	51.3
1979	20.2	12.2	4.8	4.0	2.4	1.7	45.3	6.2	0.8	1.5	1.3	55.1
1980	21.5	12.5	5.2	4.0	2.6	1.7	47.5	6.5	1.1	1.5	1.3	57.9
1981	23.0	13.0	5.8	4.5	2.7	1.8	50.8	6.8	1.2	1.5	1.3	61.6

Source: KNR and mission.

KOREA

SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

KNR Freight Traffic: 1966-76 Actual and 1977-81 Forecast  
(Average distance in km)

Years	Major Commodities						Others			KNR	Total
	Coal	Cement	Ore	Oil	Fertilizer	Grain	General cargo	Container	Military		
<u>Actual</u>											
1966	108	280	244	351	155	265	270		200	104	
<u>Second FYP</u>											
1967	206	257	239	302	168	260	263		197	104	
1968	219	264	216	346	208	254	267		196	97	
1969	321	207	236	297	275	274	286		205	104	
1970	230	205	252	267	284	309	305		209	148	
1971	236	211	272	290	313	288	279		236	113	
<u>Third FYP</u>											
1972	232	188	231	261	267	251	255		240	110	
1973	235	179	247	239	280	238	270		264	113	
1974	226	171	259	240	2786	257	298	incl. in general cargo	275	116	
1975	221	160	253	223	268	256	271		275	118	
1976	228	177	261	224	287	270	260		266	125	
<u>Fourth FYP (forecast)</u>											
1977-81	226	165	260	225	282	270	255	445	270	125	

Source: KNR and mission.

KOREA

SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

KNR Freight Traffic: 1966-76 Actual and 1977-81 Forecast  
(Million ton-km)

Years	Major Commodities							Others				Total
	Coal	Cement	Ore	Oil	Fertilizer	Grain	Subtotal	General cargo	Container	Military	KNR	
<u>Actual</u>												
1966	2,185	476	269	316	186	318	3,750	1,186		420	94	5,450
<u>Second FYP</u>												
1967	2,306	565	335	423	202	338	4,169	1,472		454	83	6,178
1968	2,125	845	368	589	312	406	4,645	1,577		548	97	6,867
1969	2,397	911	402	624	330	384	5,048	1,602		553	125	7,328
1970	2,785	1,003	453	641	312	402	5,595	1,526		439	148	7,709
1971	2,881	1,222	435	724	344	403	6,009	1,281		449	102	7,841
<u>Third FYP</u>												
1972	2,620	1,125	347	574	347	402	5,415	1,174		575	77	7,241
1973	3,201	1,344	568	645	420	381	6,559	1,486	Incl. in general cargo	433	113	8,591
1974	3,408	1,336	751	649	525	334	7,003	1,517		357	128	9,005
1975	3,688	1,437	760	692	590	256	7,423	1,355		385	130	9,293
1976	3,662	1,804	889	695	516	352	7,918	1,248		399	163	9,728
<u>Forecast</u>												
<u>Fourth FYP</u>												
1977	3,865	1,815	939	765	564	405	8,353	1,428	178	405	162	10,526
1978	4,226	1,947	1,040	833	620	432	9,098	1,505	267	405	162	11,437
1979	4,565	2,013	1,238	900	677	459	9,852	1,581	356	405	162	12,356
1980	4,859	2,063	1,349	900	733	459	10,363	1,658	490	405	162	13,078
1981	5,198	2,145	1,578	1,013	761	486	11,121	1,734	534	405	162	13,956

Source: KNR and mission.

KOREA

SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

KNR Intercity Passenger Traffic: 1966-76 Actual and 1977-81 Forecast

	<u>Number of Passengers (millions)</u>				<u>Passenger-km (millions)</u>				<u>Average Distance (km)</u>			
	Commuter	Long distance /a	Military	Total	Commuter	Long distance /a	Military	Total	Commuter	Long distance /a	Military	Total
<u>Actual</u>												
1966	38.4	98.0	1.9	138.3	830	7,288	546	8,664	21.6	74.4	285.0	62.7
<u>Second FYP</u>												
1967	41.6	108.4	1.9	151.9	883	8,150	543	9,576	21.2	75.2	288.9	63.6
1968	38.7	110.6	1.6	150.9	828	9,280	482	10,590	21.3	83.9	301.2	70.1
1969	37.9	114.8	2.0	154.7	799	9,680	598	11,077	20.0	84.0	304.0	71.0
1970	38.2	91.4	1.7	131.3	854	8,425	539	9,818	22.4	92.2	299.4	74.8
1971	41.4	85.2	1.6	128.2	940	7,300	510	8,750	22.7	85.7	320.0	68.3
<u>Third FYP</u>												
1972	26.3	109.2	1.6	137.2	629	8,914	519	10,062	23.9	81.6	324.4	73.3
1973	22.5	118.9	1.6	143.0	552	9,681	487	10,720	24.5	81.4	304.4	75.0
1974	20.6	117.6	1.6	139.8	481	9,581	471	10,533	23.4	81.4	294.4	75.3
1975	15.1	122.0	1.4	138.6	326	10,626	434	11,386	21.6	87.1	310.0	82.1
1976	17.2	130.1	1.3	148.6	367	11,678	395	12,440	21.3	89.8	303.8	78.6
<u>Forecast</u>												
<u>Fourth FYP</u>												
1977	18.2	138.0	1.4	157.6	400	13,175	427	14,002	22.0	96.0	305.0	88.9
1978	19.3	142.0	1.4	162.7	425	13,790	427	14,642	22.0	97.0	305.0	90.2
1979	20.0	146.3	1.4	167.9	440	14,451	427	15,318	22.0	99.0	305.0	91.5
1980	20.0	151.3	1.4	172.7	440	15,034	427	15,900	22.0	99.0	305.0	92.0
1981	20.0	156.1	1.4	177.5	440	15,588	427	16,455	22.0	100.0	305.0	92.7

/a See detail forecast by type of service, Table 2.9.

Source: KNR and mission.



KOREA

SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

KNR Long Distance Intercity Passenger Traffic by Type of Service  
1971-76 Actual, 1977-81 Forecast

	<u>Number of Passengers (millions)</u>					<u>Passenger-km (millions)</u>					<u>Average Distance (km)</u>				
	Spec. Exp.	Ltd. Exp.	Ord. Exp.	Ord.	Total	Spec. Exp.	Ltd. Exp.	Ord. Exp.	Ord.	Total	Spec. Exp.	Ltd. Exp.	Ord. Exp.	Ord.	Total
<u>Actual</u>															
1971	0.3	3.8	-	81.7	85.8	117	1,071	-	6,112	7,300	393	285	-	75	85
<u>Third FYP</u>															
1972	0.4	5.9	-	102.9	109.2	147	1,653	-	7,115	8,915	383	283	-	69	82
1973	0.5	7.6	-	110.8	118.9	183	2,105	-	7,393	9,681	374	277	-	67	81
1974	0.6	8.8	4.4	103.8	117.6	234	2,224	940	6,183	9,581	367	254	213	60	81
1975	0.8	11.5	4.7	104.8	121.8	298	2,862	1,004	6,463	10,627	359	250	203	62	87
1976	1.3	15.0	5.4	108.3	130.1	465	3,673	1,025	6,516	11,679	352	245	190	60	90
<u>Forecast</u>															
<u>Fourth FYP</u>															
1977	1.7	24.0	7.6	104.7	138.0	569	5,520	1,330	5,756	13,175	345	230	175	55	96
1978	2.0	26.4	7.6	106.0	142.0	690	5,940	1,330	5,830	13,790	345	225	175	55	97
1979	2.4	29.0	7.6	107.5	146.5	828	6,380	1,330	5,913	14,451	345	220	175	55	99
1980	2.9	32.0	7.6	108.8	151.3	1,000	6,720	1,330	5,984	15,034	345	210	175	55	99
1981	3.5	35.0	7.6	110.0	156.1	1,208	7,000	1,330	6,050	15,588	345	200	175	55	100

Source: KNR and mission.

Table 2.10

KOREASIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTKNR Seoul Urban (SMESRS) Passenger Traffic  
1974-76 Actual and 1977-81 Forecast

	<u>Number of Passengers (millions)</u>			<u>Passenger-km</u>	<u>Average distance</u>
	<u>Commuter</u>	<u>Noncommuter</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>(millions)</u>	<u>(km)</u>
<u>Actual</u>					
1974	5.9	22.7	28.6	545	19.1
1975	17.1	65.3	82.4	1,540	18.7
1976	19.1	80.5	100.2	1,865	18.6
<u>Forecast</u>					
<u>Fourth FYP</u>					
1977	25.6	112.8	138.4	2,560	18.5
1978	71.8	107.7	179.5	3,231	18.0
1979	80.7	107.0	187.7	3,285	17.5
1980	91.0	107.0	198.0	3,365	17.0
1981	104.5	104.5	209.0	3,448	16.5

Source: KNR

Table 2.11

## KOREA

## SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

## Selected Operating Statistics

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Index 1976 (1971 = 100)
<b>A. System (at end of year)</b>							
1. Route length (km)	3,199	3,121	3,133	3,143	3,144	3,144	101
(a) Standard gauge (1.435 m)	3,074	3,069	3,086	3,096	3,097	3,097	101
(b) Narrow gauge (1.067 m)	125	52	47	47	47	47	38
(c) Double track	537	537	537	553	561	567	106
(d) Electrified	-	-	155	340	402	402	-
2. Number of stations	589	573	573	565	566	566	96
3. Average distance between stations (km)	5.43	5.45	5.47	5.56	5.56	5.56	102
<b>B. Staff (at end of year)</b>							
1. Number of employees	43,638	44,344	41,202	39,911	39,560	39,293	90
(a) Permanent	36,067	35,914	33,748	33,594	33,758	33,481	93
(b) Temporary	7,571	8,430	7,454	6,317	5,807	5,812	77
<b>C. Rolling Stock /a</b>							
1. Steam locomotives /b							
(a) In fleet, number	80	80	60	51	41	25	31
(b) Available, number	56	56	43	38	32	12	21
(c) Available, %	70.0	70.0	71.7	74.5	78.0	48.0	69
2. Diesel locomotives, main line							
(a) In fleet, number	296	295	295	295	300	330	111
(b) Available, number	245	259	259	264	260	285	116
(c) Available, %	82.8	87.8	87.8	89.5	86.7	86.4	104
3. Diesel locomotives, shunters							
(a) In fleet, number	38	41	41	41	41	41	108
(b) Available, number	34	39	39	39	39	36	106
(c) Available, %	89.5	95.1	95.1	95.1	95.1	87.8	98
4. Electric locomotives, main line							
(a) In fleet, number	-	-	37	49	66	65	
(b) Available, number	-	-	31	42	56	55	
(c) Available, %	-	-	83.8	85.7	84.8	84.6	
5. Diesel railcars, powered units							
(a) In fleet, number	156	155	152	121	119	123	79
(b) Available number	109	101	79	71	86	98	90
(c) Available, %	69.9	65.2	48.0	58.7	72.3	79.7	114
6. Electric railcars, powered units							
(a) In fleet, number	-	-	-	78	126	126	
(b) Available, number	-	-	-	72	110	114	
(c) Available, %	-	-	-	92.3	87.3	90.5	
7. Passenger cars, including railcar trailers							
(a) In fleet, total number	1,662	1,604	1,581	1,571	1,712	1,760	106
- airconditioned coaches	55	55	55	55	65	71	129
- other coaches	1,272	1,219	1,206	1,180	1,293	1,335	104
- sleeping cars	16	16	16	19	27	29	181
- restaurant cars	26	26	26	26	26	24	92
- baggage cars	110	109	109	116	122	117	106
- railcar trailers	142	145	145	146	146	144	101
- other	34	34	30	29	33	40	118
(b) Available, total number	1,412	1,357	1,387	1,388	1,515	1,559	110
(c) Available, %	85.0	84.6	82.4	88.4	88.5	88.7	104
8. Freight cars							
(a) In fleet, total number (including privately owned cars)	14,575	15,975	16,491	15,887	15,794	15,964	110
- box cars	4,850	5,391	5,343	5,128	4,993	5,096	105
- gondolas	5,663	6,073	6,546	6,264	6,380	6,548	108
- flat cars	1,252	1,585	1,755	1,656	1,572	1,416	113
- tank cars	2,137	2,289	2,264	2,234	2,266	2,379	111
- others	673	637	583	605	583	525	78
(b) Available, total number	13,038	13,845	14,543	14,251	14,358	14,259	109
(c) Available, %	89.5	86.6	88.2	89.7	90.9	89.3	100
(d) In fleet, privately owned	1,367	1,389	1,385	1,407	1,422	1,445	106

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Index 1976 (1971 = 100)
<b>D. Traffic</b>							
1. Passenger traffic							
(a) Number of passengers							
total (million)	128.1	137.1	143.0	168.5	221.0	248.7	194
- Seoul suburban (SMESRS)	-	-	-	28.7	82.4	100.1	-
- Other	128.1	137.1	143.0	139.8	138.6	148.5	116
(b) Passenger-km (million)	8,750	10,062	10,720	11,077	12,926	14,305	163
- Seoul suburban (SMESRS)	-	-	-	545	1,540	1,865	-
- Other	8,750	10,062	10,720	10,532	11,386	12,440	142
(c) Average journey, total	68.3	73.4	75.0	65.7	56.5	57.5	84
- Seoul suburban (SMESRS)	-	-	-	19.0	18.7	18.6	-
- Other	68.3	73.4	75.0	75.3	82.2	83.7	123
2. Freight traffic							
(a) Net tons (000)	31,955	31,541	37,762	39,708	42,758	43,630	137
(b) Net ton-km (million)	7,841	7,241	8,591	9,005	9,293	9,728	124
(c) Average freight haul	245	230	228	227	217	223	91
3. Traffic units (million)	16,591	17,303	19,311	20,082	22,219	24,033	145
4. Traffic density							
(a) Passenger-km per route km (000)	2,735	3,224	3,422	3,524	4,111	4,550	166
(b) Freight net ton-km per route km (000)	2,451	2,320	2,742	2,865	2,956	3,094	126
(c) Traffic units per route km (000)	5,186	5,544	6,166	6,389	7,067	7,644	147
<b>E. Operations</b>							
1. Train-km (000)	42,226	44,528	46,017	46,790	51,022	55,393	131
(a) According to types of train:							
(i) Passenger (incl. railcars)	24,455	27,602	27,794	27,669	31,123	34,807	142
(ii) Freight	17,771	16,926	18,223	19,121	19,899	20,586	116
(b) According to types of traction:							
(i) Steam locomotive	976	257	240	105	69	45	5
(ii) Diesel locomotive	35,426	38,808	39,665	38,015	37,876	41,326	117
(iii) Electric locomotive	-	-	2,145	4,449	5,336	5,475	-
(iv) Diesel railcar	5,824	5,463	3,967	3,204	4,380	4,662	80
(v) Electric railcar	-	-	-	1,017	3,361	3,885	-
2. Engine-km, excluding shunting	52,887	53,812	53,702	58,457	76,923	84,781	160
(a) Steam locomotives	1,291	365	290	148	-	-	0
(b) Diesel locomotives	39,310	41,356	41,812	40,051	39,870	43,324	112
(c) Electric locomotives	-	-	2,227	4,625	6,242	6,509	-
(d) Diesel railcars	12,286	12,091	9,373	8,221	10,647	11,641	95
(e) Electric railcars	-	-	-	5,412	20,164	23,307	-
3. Rolling stock-km (million)							
(a) Passenger cars, total	178	204	208	213	241	265	149
(b) Freight cars, total	332	322	372	374	385	402	121
- loaded	208	180	200	201	208	217	104
- empty /c	124	142	172	173	176	185	149
4. Loaded freight cars forwarded (000)	847	782	883	888	966	972	117
5. Average freight car turnaround time (days)	5.6	6.5	6.0	5.9	5.4	5.4	93
6. Average freight car turnaround distance (m)	392	412	421	421	399	414	105

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	Index 1976 (1971 = 100)
<b>F. Performance Indicators</b>							
1. Passenger traffic							
(a) Average number of passengers per passenger train	358	364	386	400	415	411	115
(b) Average number of passengers per passenger car	49.2	49.3	51.5	52.0	53.6	54.0	110
2. Freight traffic							
(a) Average number of freight cars per freight train	18.7	19.0	20.4	19.6	19.3	19.5	104
- loaded	11.7	10.6	11.0	10.5	10.5	10.5	90
- empty	7.0	8.4	9.4	9.1	8.8	9.0	128
(b) Average freight train load (net tons)	441	428	471	471	467	472	107
(c) Average load per loaded freight car (net tons)	37.7	40.3	42.8	44.8	44.6	44.9	119
(d) Net ton-km per available freight car (000)	601	523	590	632	647	682	113
3. Staff							
(a) Traffic units per employee (000)	379	393	451	495	561	612	161
(b) Employees per route-km	13.7	14.1	13.7	12.98	12.6	12.5	91
4. Rolling stock							
(a) Availability (%):							
(i) Steam locomotives	70.0	70.0	71.7	74.5	78.0	48.0	69
(ii) Diesel locomotives, main line	82.8	87.8	87.8	89.5	86.7	86.4	104
(iii) Electric locomotives	-	-	83.8	85.7	84.8	84.6	
(iv) Diesel railcars, powered units	69.9	65.2	48.0	58.7	72.3	79.7	114
(v) Electric railcars, powered units	-	-	-	92.3	87.3	90.5	
(vi) Passenger cars	85.0	84.6	87.4	88.4	88.5	88.7	104
(vii) Freight cars	89.5	86.6	88.2	89.7	90.9	89.3	100
(b) Yearly distance covered per available unit: (km 000)							
(i) Diesel main line locomotives	160	160	161	152	153	152	95
(ii) Electric main line locomotives	-	-	72	110	111	118	
(iii) Diesel railcars	113	120	119	116	123	119	105
(iv) Electric railcars	-	-	-	75	183	204	
(v) Passenger cars	126	150	150	153	159	170	135
(vi) Freight cars	25.4	23.2	25.6	26.2	26.8	28.2	111
(c) Passenger-km per available passenger car, including rail cars (000)	5,722	6,901	7,312	7,235	7,528	8,077	141
(d) Net ton-km per available freight car (000)	601	523	591	632	647	682	113

/a Number in fleet is average of number at beginning and end of year. Available number is average number during year.

/b Excluding locomotives kept in reserve.

/c Including cabooses.

Source: KNR.

## KOREA

## SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

Freight Tariffs  
(Effective January 1, 1977)

Class	Commodities	Car-load rates in Won per ton for each 50 km	
		Prior to Jan. 1, 1977	From Jan. 1, 1977
1	Gasoline, cattle, textiles, clothing, furniture, meat and dangerous goods <u>/a</u> , plus sugar, cotton, plywood, hardboard, tobacco <u>/b</u>	312 270	312 312
2	Cement, diesel and bunker oils, fruits and vegetables <u>/c</u>	237	283
3	Lumber, rice, grains, salt, fertilizer, limestone, ores, pulp, asphalt, bricks <u>/d</u>	207	258
4	Coal <u>/e</u>	187	237

/a In addition, dangerous goods have a 10% surcharge.

/b These commodities previously rated as Class 2.

/c Previously Class 3.

/d Previously Class 4.

/e Previously Class 5.

- (a) Tariffs are straight line, in direct proportion to distance travelled (i.e. no taper for distance) and rates are quoted in increments for each block of 50 kilometers. Intermediate distances are charged at the next highest 50 km level (i.e. 227 km charged at 250 km rate).
- (b) There is a Won 14,220 minimum charge, to help cover basic non-distance related charges (i.e. terminal costs); it also introduces a slight distance taper on a rate per ton-km basis.
- (c) Car-load charges are billed at a minimum car-load weight which is usually equivalent to the practical capacity of the car for the particular commodity density. In addition, these minimum charges effectively penalize the use of smaller freight cars (under 30 tons) for hauls up to 100 km.
- (d) Miscellaneous charges include:
  - (i) Switching - W 1,877 per km per movement.
  - (ii) Demurrage - W 120 per ton for each 6 hours (after first 6 hours free use).
  - (iii) Storage - W 476 per ton (car-load basis) each 24 hours.

Source: KNR

KOREASIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

Passenger Tariffs  
(Effective January 6, 1977)

	Basic fare	Minimum charge
Ordinary	W 2.51 per pass/km	W 40 (up to 17 km)
Ordinary express	W 3.76 " " "	W 200 (up to 54 km)
Limited express	W 4.87 " " "	W 500 (up to 103 km)
Special express	W 9.41 " " "	W 1,040 (up to 111 km)

In addition there are:

- |  | <u>Up to</u><br><u>200 km</u> | <u>201 to</u><br><u>400 km</u> | <u>Over</u><br><u>400 km</u> |
|--|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|
| (a) Seat charges   |                               |                                |                              |
| Limited express -  | W 300                         | W 500                          | W 700                        |
| Special express -  | W 500                         | W 750                          | W 1,000                      |
| (b) Sleeper charges - upper berth - W 2,000<br>lower berth - W 2,700   |                               |                                |                              |
| (c) For commuters:   |                               |                                |                              |
| (i) <u>Students</u> can buy one month, or three monthly tickets (can be used 50 times in one month), with minimum charges of W 1,090 (one month), or W 3,270 (three months), for journeys up to 18 km. Thereafter, the charge is on a straight line kilometrage basis at W 1.21 per pass-km.   |                               |                                |                              |
| (ii) <u>Nonstudents</u> can buy monthly or three monthly tickets (but which can be used 60 times in one month) with minimum charges of W 1,880 or W 5,640, respectively, also for journeys up to 18 km. Thereafter, the straight line kilometrage charge is at W 1.74 per pass-km, i.e. a 30% discount over the ordinary basic fare. |                               |                                |                              |

Source: KNR

## KOREA

## SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

Tariff Increases Granted During 1967-77 Period

Year	Freight rates increase	Average revenue per ton-km (Won)	Passenger fares increase	Average revenue per pass-km (Won)
1967	30% (October)	1.19	50% (October)	1.12
1968	-	1.42	-	1.46
1969	- /a	1.52	30% (December)	1.64
1970	-	1.45	-	1.97
1971	-	1.48	-	1.98
1972	20%-(February)	1.84	- /b	2.06
1973	-	1.84	-	2.14
1974	10% (January) 5% (February) 35-40% (December) /d	2.17	25% (February) /c	2.68
1975	10% (July) /e	3.22	20% (July)	3.22
1976	35% (January) /f	4.64		3.67
1977	(January) /g	5.20		

/a Changes were made in commodity classification only.

/b There were reductions in commuter ticket discounts.

/c In addition, KNR allowed to retain the 10% transportation tax on passenger fares, in force since 1963.

/d Selective increases, including coal.

/e Excluding coal.

/f Excluding coal but on April 1, coal raised to Class 5.

/g Existing five classes compressed to four (see Table 2.12).

Source: KNR



KOREASIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTTraffic Revenues and Costs - 1976  
(Won million)

	Operating revenues (1)	Operating Costs		Net revenue (loss) (1-2) (4)	Contributions to overheads (5) (1-3)	Operating ratio (%) (6)
		Fully distributed (2)	Variable (3)			
<u>Passengers</u>						
Saemaul Express	3,734	2,361	1,611	1,373	2,123	63.2
Limited Express	18,519	12,279	8,521	6,240	9,998	66.3
Ordinary Express	4,834	5,427	4,109	(593)	725	112.3
Ordinary	22,941	28,702	19,432	(5,761)	3,509	125.1
Military	1,085	1,083	788	2	297	99.8
Commuters	1,431	2,871	1,815	(1,440)	(384)	200.6
Baggage	2,923	3,941	2,759	(1,018)	164	134.8
<u>Total</u>	<u>55,467</u>	<u>56,664</u>	<u>39,035</u>	<u>(1,197)</u>	<u>16,432</u>	<u>102.2</u>
Average per pass-km	3.67	3.69	2.54			
<u>Freight</u>						
Coal	14,143	18,722	12,049	(4,579)	2,094	132.4
Cement	9,815	9,309	5,872	506	3,943	94.8
Ores	3,904	4,718	3,071	(814)	833	120.9
Oil	3,482	3,781	2,455	(299)	1,027	108.6
Fertilizer	2,368	3,504	2,317	(1,136)	51	148.0
Grain	1,660	2,667	1,769	(1,007)	(109)	160.7
Miscellaneous	6,597	8,267	5,152	(1,670)	1,445	125.3
Military	1,517	3,338	2,221	(1,821)	(704)	220.0
KNR	1,609	1,647	1,332	(38)	277	102.5
<u>Total</u>	<u>45,095</u>	<u>55,953</u>	<u>36,238</u>	<u>(10,858)</u>	<u>8,857</u>	<u>124.1</u>
Average per ton-km	4.64	5.76	3.73			

Source: KNR.

## KOREA

## APPRAISAL OF A SIXTH HIGHWAY PROJECT

## Uneconomic Lines and Stations

A. Uneconomic Lines

<u>Line</u>	<u>Length</u>	<u>1975 Operating ratio %</u>	<u>Cost saving if closed (W million)</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Su In	65.1 km	603	490	Narrow gauge line, adequate highway available.
Jin Sam	34.8 km	642	171	Line to military port.
An Seong	29.8 km	458	74	Adequate highway available.
Og Gu	11.8 km	814	42	Line to military airport.
Hwa Sun	11.1 km	590	52	Used by Korea Coal Corporation.
Kim Po	9.2 km	n.a.	29	Used by U.S. military forces.
Yong San	<u>2.4 km</u>	436	<u>34</u>	Used by Korea Electric Co.
	164.2 km		862	

B. Uneconomic Stations

1. Passengers and freight. The following stations where passengers and freight services earn revenues covering less than 30% of personnel costs involved are regarded as operating uneconomic services. KNR proposes action to discontinue services, simplify operations, or close stations, as under:

(i) Passenger services

1977	30	stations - ratio of revenues to personnel costs:	12% /a
1978	60	" - " " " " " " " "	18%
1979	<u>55</u>	" - " " " " " " " "	26%

145 stations

(ii) Freight services

1977	25	stations - ratio of revenues to personnel costs:	4% /b
1978	21	" - " " " " " " " "	5%
1979	<u>51</u>	" - " " " " " " " "	14%

97 stations

2. Baggage services. At the following stations, where the revenues fail to cover 100% of the personnel costs involved, KNR proposes action similar to (1) above, as under:

1977	110	stations - ratio of revenues to personnel costs:	72% /c
1978	81	" - " " " " " " " "	66%
1979	<u>39</u>	" - " " " " " " " "	84%

230 stations

/a	Actual performance in 1977	-	14 closed
/b	" " " " " "	-	26 closed
/c	" " " " " "	-	92 discontinued

Source: KNR

**KOREA**  
**SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT**

KMR Investment Plan 1977-81

Table 3.1

	1977			1978			1979			1980			1981			Total expenditure 1977-81																										
	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total																					
									Won			million									US\$'000																					
1 New Line Construction																																										
1.1 Industrial sidings (5 places)	1,000	-	1,000	2,300	-	2,300	1,300	-	1,300	3,420	-	3,420	2,949	-	2,949	10,969	-	10,969	22,616	-	22,616																					
Subtotal Category 1	1,000	-	1,000	2,300	-	2,300	1,300	-	1,300	3,420	-	3,420	2,949	-	2,949	10,969	-	10,969	22,616	-	22,616																					
2 Electrification																																										
2.1 Seoul-Susong (8.5 km)	-	-	-	-	-	-	800	840	1,640	-	-	-	-	-	-	800	840	1,640	1,650	1,732	3,382																					
2.2 Jecheon-Teongju (64 km)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,695	1,510	3,205	1,973	1,606	3,579	3,668	3,116	6,784	7,563	13,988																					
2.3 Industrial sidings	224	-	224	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	224	-	224	462	-	462																					
Subtotal Category 2	224	-	224	-	-	-	800	840	1,640	1,695	1,510	3,205	1,973	1,606	3,579	4,692	3,956	8,648	9,675	8,157	17,832																					
3 Increase in Station and Line Capacity																																										
3.1 Double tracking (about 90 km)	5,000	500	5,500	3,100	425	3,525	8,592	940	9,232	8,927	3,234	12,601	7,210	1,420	8,630	32,529	6,519	39,048	67,071	13,441	80,512																					
3.2 Bypass lines (4 places)	1,742	88	1,830	1,009	78	1,087	252	77	629	600	-	600	1,216	286	1,502	5,119	529	5,648	10,555	1,091	11,646																					
3.3 Additional crossing loops (41 places)	1,710	-	1,710	1,903	162	2,065	574	126	700	574	126	700	574	126	700	5,335	540	5,875	11,000	1,113	12,113																					
3.4 Marshalling yard extensions (4 places)	1,100	-	1,100	2,098	162	2,260	1,430	170	1,600	1,540	60	1,600	1,540	60	1,600	3,356	392	6,560	12,718	808	13,526																					
3.5 Station yard extensions (12 places)	-	-	-	508	82	590	253	57	310	251	64	315	296	60	356	1,308	263	1,571	2,657	543	3,240																					
3.6 Freight handling facilities	368	-	368	300	-	300	900	-	900	1,350	-	1,350	1,150	-	1,150	4,068	-	4,068	8,387	-	8,387																					
3.7 Lengthening of crossing loops (18 places)	392	-	392	-	-	-	264	45	309	616	105	721	352	60	412	1,624	210	1,834	3,348	433	3,781																					
3.8 Station installations	2,730	-	2,730	1,819	110	1,929	2,248	-	2,248	3,048	-	3,048	974	-	974	10,819	110	10,929	22,308	227	22,535																					
3.9 Signaling	1,747	1,026	2,773	986	-	986	4,014	-	4,014	4,885	-	4,885	6,623	-	6,623	18,255	1,026	19,281	37,640	2,115	39,755																					
3.10 Busan area improvement	-	-	-	-	-	-	200	-	200	811	62	873	-	-	-	1,011	62	1,073	2,084	128	2,212																					
Subtotal Category 3	14,789	1,614	16,403	11,723	1,019	12,742	18,727	1,415	20,142	22,602	3,651	26,253	18,395	1,952	20,347	86,236	9,651	95,887	177,808	19,899	197,707																					
4 Way and Structures																																										
4.1 Rail renewal, 30 kg rails (840 km)	1,100	3,400	4,500	743	2,295	3,038	687	2,125	2,812	440	1,360	1,800	550	1,700	2,250	3,520	10,880	14,400	7,258	22,432	29,690																					
4.2 Rail renewal, 60 kg rails (30 km)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	165	612	777	-	-	-	165	612	777	340	1,262	1,602																					
4.3 Track renewal, 90 kg rails (140 km)	650	360	990	975	510	1,485	1,300	680	1,980	650	340	990	975	510	1,485	4,550	2,380	6,930	9,382	4,908	14,290																					
4.4 Track renewal, 60 kg rails (60 km)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	975	612	1,587	975	612	1,587	1,950	1,224	3,174	4,021	2,524	6,545																					
4.5 Concrete sleepers (400,000)	675	-	675	675	-	675	1,350	-	1,350	1,350	-	1,350	1,350	-	1,350	5,400	-	5,400	11,135	-	11,135																					
4.6 Points and crossings (980)	200	250	450	350	-	350	350	-	350	300	120	420	300	120	420	1,500	490	1,990	3,093	1,011	4,004																					
4.7 Ballast (640,000 cu m)	-	-	-	640	-	640	640	-	640	640	-	640	640	-	640	2,560	-	2,560	5,278	-	5,278																					
4.8 Bridge strengthening (170 spans)	712	-	712	146	-	146	226	-	226	30	-	30	-	-	30	1,114	-	1,114	2,297	-	2,297																					
4.9 Tunnel strengthening	135	-	135	250	-	250	150	-	150	150	-	150	200	-	200	885	-	885	1,825	-	1,825																					
4.10 Level crossings	1,321	-	1,321	5,190	-	5,190	2,720	-	2,720	2,660	-	2,660	2,660	-	2,660	14,551	-	14,551	30,002	-	30,002																					
4.11 Permanent way workshop and equipment	421	1,086	1,507	300	1,075	1,375	188	474	662	-	-	-	-	-	-	909	2,635	3,544	1,874	5,433	7,307																					
4.12 Miscellaneous	290	-	290	1,940	-	1,940	2,097	-	2,097	210	-	210	320	-	320	4,857	-	4,857	10,014	-	10,014																					
Subtotal Category 4	5,504	5,076	10,580	11,209	3,880	15,089	9,708	3,279	12,987	7,570	3,044	10,614	7,970	2,942	10,912	41,961	18,221	60,182	86,319	37,570	124,089																					
5 Motive Power and Rolling Stock																																										
5.1 New diesel main line locomotives (42)	-	-	-	100	7,300	7,400	50	3,650	3,700	25	1,825	1,850	35	2,555	2,590	210	15,330	15,540	433	31,609	32,042																					
5.2 New diesel shunting locomotives (13)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	1,020	35	1,190	1,225	65	2,210	2,275	134	4,556	4,690																					
5.3 New electric locomotives (20)	898	9,206	10,104	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,050	35	1,190	1,225	65	2,210	2,275	134	4,556	4,690																					
5.4 New electric railcars (90)	8,150	-	8,150	9,021	-	9,021	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17,171	-	17,171	1,852	18,981	20,833																					
5.5 New breakdown cranes (4)	-	-	-	26	700	726	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	52	1,400	1,452	108	2,888	2,994																					
5.6 Motive power remodeling (351 units)	1,682	4,723	6,405	1,716	6,378	8,094	1,010	2,889	3,899	1,745	4,500	6,245	1,168	3,840	5,008	7,321	22,330	29,651	15,094	46,042	61,136																					
5.7 New passenger cars (442)	3,038	690	3,728	3,116	15,580	18,696	1,098	5,490	6,588	1,844	9,220	11,064	1,624	8,120	9,744	10,720	39,100	49,820	22,104	80,620	102,724																					
5.8 Passenger car remodeling (225)	-	-	-	214	-	214	207	-	207	371	-	371	403	-	403	1,195	-	1,195	2,464	-	2,464																					
5.9 New freight cars (3,270)	-	5,819	5,819	12,585	-	12,585	-	10,200	10,200	-	7,450	7,450	7,435	-	7,435	7,435	-	43,489	43,489	89,669	89,669																					
5.10 Freight car remodeling (2,825)	396	-	396	2,129	-	2,129	2,026	-	2,026	2,061	-	2,061	1,965	-	1,965	8,577	-	8,577	17,685	-	17,685																					
Subtotal Category 5	14,164	20,438	34,602	16,322	42,543	58,865	4,391	22,229	26,620	6,076	24,015	30,091	5,256	23,840	29,096	46,209	133,065	179,274	95,278	274,363	369,641																					
6 Rolling Stock Repair Facilities																																										
6.1 New hanger car shops	846	1,002	1,848	2,249	1,501	3,750	2,000	-	2,000	2,000	1,700	3,700	4,000	800	4,800	11,095	5,003	16,098	22,875	10,316	33,191																					
6.2 Improvement of existing backshops	-	50	50	310	1,450	1,760	550	600	1,150	400	500	900	-	-	-	1,310	2,550	3,860	2,701	5,258	7,959																					
6.3 Improvement of existing shops	273	252	525	810	270	1,080	1,390	580	1,970	472	140	612	335	70	405	3,280	1,312	4,592	6,763	2,705	9,468																					
Subtotal Category 6	1,119	1,254	2,423	3,369	3,221	6,590	3,940	1,180	5,120	2,872	2,340	5,212	4,335	870	5,205	15,685	8,865	24,550	32,339	18,279	50,618																					
7 Telecommunications, Power Facilities, Buildings and Other																																										
7.1 Telecommunications	582	171	753	625	-	625	459	-	459	284	-	284	212	-	212	2,162	171	2,333	4,458	353	4,811																					
7.2 Power facilities	110	-	110	560	35	595	320	15	335	200	5	205	200	5	205	1,390	60	1,450	2,866	124	2,990																					
7.3 Buildings	-	-	-	510	-	510	560	-	560	-	-	-	685	-	685	-	-	1,755	3,619	-	3,619																					
7.4 Housing facilities	653	-	653	880	-	880	442	-	442	1,365	-	1,365	1,000	-	1,000	4,340	-	4,340	8,948	-	8,948																					
7.5 Miscellaneous	3,159	613	3,772	1,450	283	1,733	1,150	150	1,300	1,150	150	1,300	1,150	150	1,300	8,059	1,346	9,405	16,617	2,775	19,392																					
Subtotal Category 7	4,504	784	5,288	4,023	318	4,343	2,931	165	3,096	2,999	155	3,154	3,247	155	3,402	17,706	1,577	19,283	26,508	3,252	39,760																					
Total Category 1-7	41,354	29,166	70,520	48,948	50,981	99,929	41,787	29,108	70,905	47,234	34,715	81,949	44,125	31,365	75,490	223,458	175,335	398,793	460,743	361,520	822,263																					
8 Physical contingencies (10% except for items 4.1-4.4, 4.11 and Category 3)																						2,544	499	3,043	3,061	456	3,517	3,523	360	3,883	3,893	778	4,671	3,637	470	4,107	16,658	2,563	19,221	34,348	5,283	39,631
9 Price contingencies (for local currency items 8% annually in 1977/78, 7.5% in 1979 and 7% in 1980/81; for foreign currency items 8% annually in 1977, 7% in 1978, 6.5% in 1979 and 6% in 1980/81)																						1,756	1,187	2,943	6,407	6,069	12,476	9,527	5,702	15,229	15,230	9,516	24,746	18,570	10,957	29,527	51,490	33,431	84,921	106,167	68,931	175,098
GRAND TOTAL	45,654	30,852	76,506	58,416	57,506	115,922	54,847	35,170	90,017	66,357	45,009	111,396	66,332	42,792	109,124	291,606	211,329	502,935	601,258	435,734	1,036,992																					

Table 3.2

KOREA  
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

KNR Investment Plan 1977-81, Items Starting in 1977 or Before

	1977		1978		1979		1980		Total expenditure 1977-80	
	Local	Foreign	Local	Foreign	Local	Foreign	Local	Foreign	Local	Foreign
1. New Line Construction										
1.1 Industrial sidings	1,000	-	1,000	-	1,300	-	-	-	2,300	4,742
Subtotal Category 1	1,000	-	1,000	-	1,300	-	-	-	2,300	4,742
2. Electrification										
2.1 Industrial sidings	224	-	224	-	-	-	-	-	224	462
Subtotal Category 2	224	-	224	-	-	-	-	-	224	462
3. Increase in Station and Line Capacity										
3.1 Double tracking (about 27 km)	5,000	5,500	3,100	425	3,525	4,000	750	-	12,100	1,675
3.2 Pyram lines (2 places)	1,742	88	1,830	78	1,887	-	-	-	2,551	166
3.3 Freight car crossing loops (10 places)	1,710	-	1,710	1,065	-	-	-	-	2,775	5,260
3.4 Marshal yard extensions (2 places)	1,100	-	1,100	910	90	1,300	740	60	3,960	240
3.5 Freight handling facilities (container yards)	368	-	368	-	-	-	-	-	368	759
3.6 Lengthening of existing loops (4 places)	382	-	382	-	-	-	-	-	392	-
3.7 Station improvements (16 places)	2,730	-	2,730	980	980	700	1,374	-	5,784	11,926
3.8 Signaling	1,747	1,026	2,773	-	-	-	-	-	1,747	1,026
Subtotal Category 3	14,789	1,614	16,403	5,864	5,933	7,457	5,910	840	29,677	3,107
4. Way and Structures										
4.1 Rail renewal, 50 kg rails (200 km)	1,100	3,400	4,500	-	-	-	-	-	1,100	3,400
4.2 Track renewal, 50 kg rails (20 km)	650	340	990	-	-	-	-	-	650	340
4.3 Concrete sleepers (50,000)	200	675	-	-	-	-	-	-	200	675
4.4 Paints and crossings (500)	712	250	450	-	-	-	-	-	712	250
4.5 Bridge strengthening (70 spans)	135	-	712	-	-	-	-	-	135	-
4.6 Tunnel strengthening	1,321	-	1,321	-	-	-	-	-	1,321	-
4.7 Level crossings	421	1,086	1,507	-	-	-	-	-	421	1,086
4.8 Permanent way equipment	290	-	290	-	-	-	-	-	290	-
4.9 Miscellaneous	5,504	5,076	10,580	-	-	-	-	-	5,504	5,076
Subtotal Category 4	898	9,206	10,104	-	-	-	-	-	898	9,206
5. Motive Power and Rolling Stock										
5.1 New electric locomotives (20)	8150	-	8,150	-	-	-	-	-	17,171	35,404
5.2 New electric railcars (90)	1,682	4,723	6,405	-	-	-	-	-	1,682	4,723
5.3 Motive power maintenance and repowering	3,038	690	3,728	-	-	-	-	-	3,038	690
5.4 New passenger cars (42)	-	5,819	5,819	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,819
5.5 New freight cars (750)	396	-	396	-	-	-	-	-	396	-
5.6 Freight car remodeling (103)	14,164	20,438	34,602	9,021	3,500	12,521	-	-	23,185	23,938
Subtotal Category 5	846	1,002	1,848	2,249	1,501	3,750	-	-	3,095	2,503
6. Rolling Stock Repair Facilities										
6.1 New Daeseon freight wagon shop	50	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	50	-
6.2 Improvement of existing backshops	273	252	525	-	-	-	-	-	273	252
6.3 Improvement of existing sheds	1,169	1,254	2,423	2,249	1,501	3,750	-	-	3,418	2,755
Subtotal Category 6	582	171	753	-	-	-	-	-	582	171
7. Other Investments										
7.1 Telecommunications	110	-	110	-	-	-	-	-	110	-
7.2 Power facilities	653	-	653	-	-	-	-	-	653	-
7.3 Housing facilities	3,159	613	3,772	300	133	433	-	-	3,439	746
7.4 Miscellaneous	4,504	784	5,288	300	133	433	-	-	4,804	917
Subtotal Category 7	41,354	29,166	70,520	19,734	5,727	25,461	5,910	840	69,112	35,793
Total Categories 1-7	2,544	499	3,043	1,071	223	1,294	591	84	218	4,418
8. Physical contingency (10% except for items 4.1 and 4.2 and Category 5)										
9. Price contingency (for local currency items 8% annually in 1977/78, 7.5% in 1979 and 7% in 1980; for foreign currency items 8% annually in 1977, 7% in 1978, 6.5% in 1979 and 6% in 1980)	1,756	1,187	2,943	2,563	702	3,265	1,367	179	1,546	693
GRAND TOTAL	45,654	30,852	76,506	23,368	6,652	30,020	7,868	1,103	8,971	3,019
									118,600	164,761
									79,775	244,536

Note: US\$1.00 = 485 won.

Source: KNR and mission.

Table 3.3

**KOREA**  
**SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT**

**KNR Investment Plan 1977-81, Items Starting in 1980/81**

	1980			1981			Total expenditure 1980/81					
	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total
	Won million						US\$'000					
<b>1 New Line Construction</b>												
1.1 Industrial sidings (2 places)	3,420	-	3,420	2,949	-	2,949	6,369	-	6,369	13,132	-	13,132
Subtotal Category 1	<u>3,420</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>3,420</u>	<u>2,949</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2,949</u>	<u>6,369</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>6,369</u>	<u>13,132</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>13,132</u>
<b>2 Electrification</b>												
2.1 Jechon-Yeongju (64 km)	1,695	1,510	3,205	1,973	1,606	3,579	3,668	3,116	6,784	7,563	6,425	13,988
Subtotal Category 2	<u>1,695</u>	<u>1,510</u>	<u>3,205</u>	<u>1,973</u>	<u>1,606</u>	<u>3,579</u>	<u>3,668</u>	<u>3,116</u>	<u>6,784</u>	<u>7,563</u>	<u>6,425</u>	<u>13,988</u>
<b>3 Increase in Station and Line Capacity</b>												
3.1 Double tracking (about 20 km)	5,280	745	6,025	7,210	1,420	8,630	12,490	2,165	14,655	25,753	4,464	30,217
3.2 Bypass lines (1 place)	600	-	600	1,216	286	1,502	1,816	286	2,102	3,744	590	4,334
3.3 Additional crossing loops (14 places)	574	126	700	574	126	700	1,148	252	1,400	2,367	519	2,886
3.4 Station yard extensions (5 places)	251	64	315	296	60	356	547	124	671	1,128	256	1,384
3.5 Freight handling facilities	450	-	450	450	-	450	900	-	900	1,855	-	1,855
3.6 Lengthening of crossing loops (11 places)	616	105	721	352	60	412	968	165	1,133	1,996	340	2,336
3.7 Station installations	774	-	774	974	-	974	1,748	-	1,748	3,604	-	3,604
3.8 Signaling	2,785	-	2,785	4,303	-	4,303	7,088	-	7,088	14,615	-	14,615
3.9 Busan area improvement	360	30	390	-	-	-	360	30	390	742	62	804
Subtotal Category 3	<u>11,690</u>	<u>1,070</u>	<u>12,760</u>	<u>15,375</u>	<u>1,952</u>	<u>17,327</u>	<u>27,065</u>	<u>3,022</u>	<u>30,087</u>	<u>55,804</u>	<u>6,231</u>	<u>62,035</u>
<b>4 Way and Structures</b>												
4.1 Rail renewal, 50 kg rails (180 km)	440	1,360	1,800	550	1,700	2,250	990	3,060	4,050	2,041	6,309	8,350
4.2 Rail renewal, 60 kg rails (30 km)	165	612	777	-	-	-	165	612	777	340	1,262	1,602
4.3 Track renewal, 50 kg rails (50 km)	650	340	990	975	510	1,485	1,625	850	2,475	3,351	1,753	5,104
4.4 Track renewal, 60 kg rails (60 km)	975	612	1,587	975	612	1,587	1,950	1,224	3,174	4,021	2,524	6,545
4.5 Concrete sleepers (200,000)	1,350	-	1,350	1,350	-	1,350	2,700	-	2,700	5,567	-	5,567
4.6 Points and crossings (480)	300	120	420	300	120	420	600	240	840	1,237	495	1,732
4.7 Bridge strengthening (7 spans)	30	-	30	-	-	-	30	-	30	62	-	62
4.8 Tunnel strengthening	150	-	150	200	-	200	350	-	350	722	-	722
4.9 Ballast (320,000 cu m)	640	-	640	640	-	640	1,280	-	1,280	2,639	-	2,639
4.10 Level crossings	2,660	-	2,660	2,660	-	2,660	5,320	-	5,320	10,969	-	10,969
4.11 Miscellaneous	210	-	210	320	-	320	530	-	530	1,093	-	1,093
Subtotal Category 4	<u>7,570</u>	<u>3,044</u>	<u>10,614</u>	<u>7,970</u>	<u>2,942</u>	<u>10,912</u>	<u>15,540</u>	<u>5,986</u>	<u>21,526</u>	<u>32,042</u>	<u>12,343</u>	<u>44,385</u>
<b>5 Motive Power and Rolling Stock</b>												
5.1 New diesel main line locomotives (12)	25	1,825	1,850	35	2,555	2,590	60	4,380	4,440	124	9,031	9,155
5.2 New diesel shunting locomotives (13)	30	1,020	1,050	35	1,190	1,225	65	2,210	2,275	134	4,556	4,690
5.3 New breakdown cranes (2)	-	-	-	26	700	726	26	700	726	54	1,443	1,497
5.4 Motive power remodeling/repairing (140 units)	1,745	4,500	6,245	1,168	3,840	5,008	2,913	8,340	11,253	6,006	17,196	23,202
5.5 New passenger cars (189)	1,844	9,220	11,064	1,624	8,120	9,744	3,468	17,340	20,808	7,150	35,753	42,903
5.6 Passenger car remodeling (145)	371	-	371	403	-	403	774	-	774	1,596	-	1,596
5.7 New freight cars (1,100)	-	7,450	7,450	-	7,435	7,435	-	14,885	14,885	-	30,691	30,691
5.8 Freight car remodeling (1,262)	2,061	-	2,061	1,965	-	1,965	4,026	-	4,026	8,301	-	8,301
Subtotal Category 5	<u>6,076</u>	<u>24,015</u>	<u>30,091</u>	<u>5,256</u>	<u>23,840</u>	<u>29,096</u>	<u>11,332</u>	<u>47,855</u>	<u>59,187</u>	<u>23,365</u>	<u>98,670</u>	<u>122,035</u>
<b>6 Rolling Stock Repair Facilities</b>												
6.1 New Daejeon repair shop	-	-	-	2,000	-	2,000	2,000	-	2,000	4,123	-	4,123
6.2 Improvement of existing backshops	400	500	900	-	-	-	400	500	900	825	1,031	1,856
6.3 Improvement of existing sheds	472	140	612	335	70	405	807	210	1,017	1,664	433	2,097
Subtotal Category 6	<u>872</u>	<u>640</u>	<u>1,512</u>	<u>2,335</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>2,405</u>	<u>3,207</u>	<u>710</u>	<u>3,917</u>	<u>6,612</u>	<u>1,464</u>	<u>8,076</u>
<b>7 Telecommunications, Power Facilities, Buildings and Others</b>												
7.1 Telecommunications	284	-	284	212	-	212	496	-	496	1,023	-	1,023
7.2 Power facilities	200	5	205	200	5	205	400	10	410	825	21	846
7.3 Buildings	-	-	-	685	-	685	685	-	685	1,413	-	1,413
7.4 Housing facilities	1,365	-	1,365	1,000	-	1,000	2,365	-	2,365	4,876	-	4,876
7.5 Miscellaneous	1,150	150	1,300	1,150	150	1,300	2,300	300	2,600	4,742	618	5,360
Subtotal Category 7	<u>2,999</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>3,154</u>	<u>3,247</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>3,402</u>	<u>6,246</u>	<u>310</u>	<u>6,556</u>	<u>12,879</u>	<u>639</u>	<u>13,518</u>
<b>Total Categories 1-7</b>	<u>34,322</u>	<u>30,434</u>	<u>64,756</u>	<u>39,105</u>	<u>30,565</u>	<u>69,670</u>	<u>73,427</u>	<u>60,999</u>	<u>134,426</u>	<u>151,397</u>	<u>125,772</u>	<u>277,169</u>
<b>8 Physical contingency (10% except for items 4.1-4.4 and Category 5)</b>	2,602	350	2,951	3,135	390	3,525	5,736	740	6,476	11,828	1,525	13,353
<b>9 Price contingency (for local currency items 8% annually in 1977/78, 7.5% in 1979 and 7% in 1980/81; for foreign currency items 8% annually in 1977, 7% in 1978, 6.5% in 1979 and 6% in 1980/81)</b>	10,999	8,253	19,252	16,423	10,654	27,077	27,422	18,907	46,329	56,541	38,984	95,525
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<u>47,922</u>	<u>39,037</u>	<u>86,959</u>	<u>58,663</u>	<u>41,609</u>	<u>100,272</u>	<u>106,585</u>	<u>80,646</u>	<u>187,231</u>	<u>219,766</u>	<u>166,281</u>	<u>386,047</u>

Note: US\$1.00 = 485 won.

Source: KNR and mission.



Table 3.4  
Page 1KOREA  
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

The Project (KOR Investments Starting in 1978-79)

Item	Line	1978		1979		1980		1981		Total expenditures 1978-81	
		Local	Foreign	Local	Foreign	Local	Foreign	Local	Foreign	Local	Foreign
1. New Line Construction											
1.1.1. Goni siding (0.9 km)	Cyongjeon	1,000	-	94	-	94	-	-	94	194	-
1.2. Siding for Changwon machinery complex		1,000	-	1,000	1,206	-	-	-	2,206	4,548	-
Subtotal Category 1		1,000	-	1,000	1,300	-	-	-	2,300	4,742	-
2. Electrification											
2.1. Seoul-Suagang (8.5 km)	Cyongjeon	-	-	800	840	1,640	-	-	800	1,640	1,732
Subtotal Category 2		-	-	800	840	1,640	-	-	800	1,640	1,732
3. Increase in Station and Line Capacity											
3.1.1.1. Gyeongju-Yeongju (8.6 km)	Cyongjeon	-	-	1,792	190	1,982	-	-	1,792	190	3,695
3.1.1.2. Yeongju-Daejeon (8.6 km)	Yong San	-	-	1,000	-	1,000	1,035	-	2,035	2,136	3,619
3.1.1.3. Seongju-Kaijeonbu (13.1 km)	Cyongjeon	-	-	1,500	2,063	1,454	3,517	-	5,017	5,553	10,345
Subtotal Category 3.1		-	-	4,292	190	4,482	3,647	-	7,939	10,615	21,893
3.2. Bypass Lines											
3.2.1.1. Gyeongju (3.5 km)	Donghae Nambu	200	-	200	552	77	629	-	752	77	829
Subtotal Category 3.2		200	-	200	552	77	629	-	752	77	829
3.3. Additional crossing loops											
3.3.1. 1 place	Cyongjeon	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	100	206	-
3.3.2. 2 places	Seongju	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	100	206	-
3.3.3. 3 places	Seongju	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	100	206	-
3.3.4. 1 place	Daejeon	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	100	206	-
3.3.5. 1 place	Seongju	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	100	206	-
3.3.6. 2 places	Seongju	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	100	206	-
3.3.7. 4 places	Seongju	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	100	206	-
3.3.8. 3 places	Seongju	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	100	206	-
Subtotal Category 3.3		838	162	1,000	524	126	700	-	1,412	288	594
3.4. Marshalling yard extensions											
3.4.1. Jecheon	Jung Ang	888	72	960	-	-	800	-	1,668	72	1,668
3.4.2. Jecheon	Donghae Nambu	300	-	300	220	80	300	-	520	80	1,072
Subtotal Category 3.4		1,188	72	1,260	220	80	800	-	2,208	152	2,460
3.5. Station yard extensions											
3.5.1. 3 places	Cyongjeon	171	34	205	120	30	150	-	291	64	355
3.5.2. 1 place	Cyongjeon	179	38	217	111	-	-	-	139	12	171
3.5.3. 3 places	Jeon Nam	179	38	217	111	-	-	-	311	63	374
Subtotal Category 3.5		529	82	590	253	51	310	-	761	139	900
3.6. Freight handling facilities											
3.6.1. Freight terminal Yeongju	Cyongjeon	300	-	300	500	-	500	300	1,600	3,299	-
3.6.2. Freight terminal West Seoul	Cyongjeon	-	-	400	400	-	400	400	1,200	2,474	-
Subtotal Category 3.6		300	-	300	900	-	900	700	2,800	5,773	-
3.7. Lengthening of crossing loops											
3.7.1. 3 places	He Nam	-	-	264	45	309	-	-	264	45	309
Subtotal Category 3.7		-	-	264	45	309	-	-	264	45	309
3.8. Station installations											
3.8.1. Seoul station yard facilities	Cyongjeon	200	-	200	800	-	900	-	1,900	3,918	-
3.8.2. Station buildings (30 places)		60	-	60	60	-	60	-	120	247	-
3.8.3. Underpass (30 places)		100	-	100	200	-	200	-	400	825	-
3.8.4. Passenger sheds (32 places)		180	-	180	180	-	180	-	360	742	-
3.8.5. Freight sheds (30 places)		199	-	199	198	-	198	-	397	797	-
3.8.6. Automatic ticket machines		110	-	110	110	-	110	-	220	227	-
Subtotal Category 3.8		839	110	945	1,548	-	1,548	-	3,287	6,778	-
3.9. Signaling											
3.9.1. Automatic train stop (19 station signals, 100 sets of cab equipment)		226	-	226	150	-	150	-	376	775	-
3.9.2. CTC Yeongju-Gyeongju (163.5 km)	Jung Ang	-	-	2,100	2,100	-	2,100	2,320	6,520	13,444	-
3.9.3. CTC Donghae-Gyeongju (34.9 km)	Dae Gu	-	-	200	250	-	250	-	450	928	-
3.9.4. Interlocking (19 places)	He Nam	200	-	200	100	-	100	-	200	412	-
3.9.5. Remote control (2 places)		100	-	100	100	-	100	-	200	412	-
3.9.6. Warning devices at level crossings (350 places)		410	-	410	164	-	164	-	574	1,184	-
3.9.7. External signaling (40 places)		50	-	50	50	-	50	-	100	206	-
Subtotal Category 3.9		986	-	986	4,014	-	4,014	2,320	2,320	19,423	-
3.10. Busan area improvement											
3.10.1. New track layout		-	-	200	451	32	483	-	651	32	683
Subtotal Category 3.10		-	-	200	451	32	483	-	651	32	683
4. Way and Structures											
4.1.1. Rail renewal, 50 kg rails (260 km)		743	2,295	3,038	687	2,125	2,812	-	1,420	4,620	9,113
4.2. Track renewal, 50 kg rails (70 km)		975	510	1,485	1,300	480	1,980	-	2,275	2,949	9,113
4.3. Concrete sleepers (150,000)		575	-	675	1,350	-	1,350	-	2,025	4,175	2,454
4.4. Points and crossings, renewal work		146	-	350	350	-	350	-	700	1,463	-
4.5. Bridge strengthening (93 spans)		250	-	250	150	-	150	-	372	767	-
4.6. Tunnel strengthening		640	-	640	640	-	640	-	1,280	2,639	-
4.7. Separation of rail and road level (59 places)		5,070	-	5,070	2,600	-	2,600	-	7,670	15,815	-
4.8. Level crossing barriers (40 places)		300	995	120	885	120	120	-	240	495	-
4.9. Track material workshop		320	-	320	320	-	320	-	640	1,320	-
4.10. Safety sidings (40 places)		100	-	100	80	-	80	-	160	371	-
4.11. Water supply		1,520	-	1,520	1,697	-	1,697	-	3,117	6,633	-
4.12. Right-of-way improvements		480	-	480	-	-	-	-	3,411	480	-
4.13. Track maintenance equipment		11,209	3,880	15,089	9,708	3,279	12,987	-	20,917	28,076	43,129
Subtotal Category 4		11,209	3,880	15,089	9,708	3,279	12,987	-	20,917	28,076	43,129





Table 3.4  
Page 2

Item	Line	1978			1979			1980			1981			Total expenditures 1978-81						
		Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total				
		Mon million																		
US\$ '000																				
<b>5 Motive Power and Rolling Stock</b>																				
<b>5.1 Motive power</b>																				
5.1.1	New diesel main line locomotives (30)	100	7,300	7,400	50	3,650	3,700	-	-	-	-	-	150	10,950	11,100	309	22,578	22,887		
5.1.2	New breakdown cranes (2)	26	700	726	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	700	726	54	1,443	1,497		
5.1.3	Diesel locomotives, remodeling (59)	1,000	6,000	7,000	475	2,850	3,325	-	-	-	-	-	1,475	8,850	10,325	3,041	18,248	21,289		
5.1.4	Diesel railcars, remodeling (14)	196	378	574	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	196	378	574	404	779	1,183		
5.1.5	Heating cars, remodeling (40)	520	-	520	520	-	520	-	-	-	-	-	1,040	-	1,040	2,144	-	2,144		
5.1.6	Breakdown cranes, remodeling (3)	-	-	-	15	39	54	-	-	-	-	-	15	39	54	31	81	112		
Subtotal Category 5.1		1,842	14,378	16,220	1,060	6,539	7,599	-	-	-	-	-	2,902	20,917	23,819	5,983	43,129	49,112		
<b>5.2 Passenger cars</b>																				
5.2.1	New special express coaches (34)	672	3,360	4,032	280	1,400	1,680	-	-	-	-	-	952	4,760	5,712	1,963	9,815	11,778		
5.2.2	New special express dining cars (6)	160	800	960	32	160	192	-	-	-	-	-	192	960	1,152	395	1,979	2,375		
5.2.3	New special express power source cars (5)	216	1,080	1,296	54	270	324	-	-	-	-	-	270	1,350	1,620	557	2,764	3,341		
5.2.4	New limited express coaches (145)	1,610	8,050	9,660	420	2,100	2,520	-	-	-	-	-	2,030	10,150	12,180	4,186	20,928	25,114		
5.2.5	New limited express dining cars (7)	90	450	540	36	180	216	-	-	-	-	-	126	630	756	260	1,299	1,559		
5.2.6	New limited express power source cars (14)	368	1,840	2,208	276	1,380	1,656	-	-	-	-	-	644	3,220	3,864	1,328	6,639	7,967		
5.2.7	Remodeling, passenger cars (30)	114	-	114	57	-	57	-	-	-	-	-	171	-	171	353	-	353		
5.2.8	Remodeling, baggage cars (50)	100	-	100	150	-	150	-	-	-	-	-	250	-	250	515	-	515		
Subtotal Category 5.2		3,130	15,580	18,710	1,305	5,490	6,795	-	-	-	-	-	4,635	21,070	25,705	9,358	43,444	53,002		
<b>5.3 Freight cars</b>																				
5.3.1	New box cars (550)	-	3,625	3,625	-	4,350	4,350	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,975	7,975	-	16,444	16,444		
5.3.2	New gondolas (870)	-	5,460	5,460	-	5,850	5,850	-	-	-	-	-	-	11,310	11,310	-	23,320	23,320		
5.3.3	Remodeling, cabooses (230)	195	-	195	104	-	104	-	-	-	-	-	269	-	269	617	-	617		
5.3.4	Remodeling, container cars (130)	84	-	84	72	-	72	-	-	-	-	-	156	-	156	321	-	321		
5.3.5	Improvement, freight cars (1,000)	1,850	-	1,850	1,850	-	1,850	-	-	-	-	-	3,700	-	3,700	7,629	-	7,629		
Subtotal Category 5.3		2,129	9,085	11,214	2,026	10,200	12,226	-	-	-	-	-	4,155	19,285	23,440	8,567	39,764	48,331		
Subtotal Category 5		7,301	39,043	46,344	4,391	22,229	26,620	-	-	-	-	-	11,692	61,272	72,964	24,108	126,337	150,445		
<b>6 Rolling Stock Repair Facilities</b>																				
6.1	New Daeseon passenger car shop	Gyeong Bu	-	-	-	2,000	-	2,000	2,000	1,700	3,700	2,000	800	2,800	6,000	2,500	8,500	12,371	5,155	17,526
Subtotal Category 6.1		-	-	-	2,000	-	2,000	2,000	1,700	3,700	2,000	800	2,800	6,000	2,500	8,500	12,371	5,155	17,526	
<b>6.2 Improvement of existing backshops</b>																				
6.2.1	Seoul	Gyeong Bu	250	1,150	1,400	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	250	1,150	1,400	515	2,371	2,886	
6.2.2	Busan	Gyeong Bu	-	-	-	550	600	1,150	-	-	-	-	-	550	600	1,150	1,134	1,237	2,371	
6.2.3	Incheon	Gyeong In	60	300	360	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60	300	360	124	619	743	
Subtotal Category 6.2		310	1,450	1,760	550	600	1,150	-	-	-	-	-	860	2,050	2,910	1,773	4,227	6,000		
<b>6.3 Improvement of existing sheds</b>																				
6.3.1	Locomotive repair facilities	510	70	580	740	280	1,020	-	-	-	-	-	1,250	350	1,600	2,577	722	3,299		
6.3.2	Electric railcar repair facilities	-	-	-	200	-	200	-	-	-	-	-	200	-	200	412	-	412		
6.3.3	Car repair facilities	300	200	500	450	300	750	-	-	-	-	-	750	500	1,250	1,547	1,030	2,577		
Subtotal Category 6.3		810	270	1,080	1,390	580	1,970	-	-	-	-	-	2,200	850	3,050	4,536	1,752	6,288		
Subtotal Category 6		1,120	1,720	2,840	3,940	1,180	5,120	2,000	1,700	3,700	2,000	800	2,800	9,060	5,400	14,460	18,680	11,134	29,814	
<b>7 Telecommunications, Power Facilities, Buildings and Others</b>																				
<b>7.1 Telecommunications</b>																				
7.1.1	Telecommunication line (90 km)	250	-	250	200	-	200	-	-	-	-	-	450	-	450	928	-	928		
7.1.2	Train radio equipment	312	-	312	196	-	196	-	-	-	-	-	508	-	508	1,047	-	1,047		
7.1.3	Dispatcher telephones	53	-	53	63	-	63	-	-	-	-	-	126	-	126	260	-	260		
Subtotal Category 7.1		615	-	615	459	-	459	-	-	-	-	-	1,084	-	1,084	2,235	-	2,235		
<b>7.2 Power facilities</b>																				
7.2.1	Power receiving facilities (10 places)	30	-	30	30	-	30	-	-	-	-	-	60	-	60	124	-	124		
7.2.2	Lighting facilities (30 places)	30	-	30	30	-	30	-	-	-	-	-	60	-	60	124	-	124		
7.2.3	Power line for emergency (50 km)	420	35	455	180	15	195	-	-	-	-	-	600	50	650	1,237	103	1,340		
7.2.4	Pole improvements (400 km)	80	-	80	80	-	80	-	-	-	-	-	160	-	160	330	-	330		
Subtotal Category 7.2		560	35	595	320	15	325	-	-	-	-	-	880	50	930	1,815	103	1,918		
<b>7.3 Buildings</b>																				
7.3.1	Relocation of Technical Research Institute	130	-	130	360	-	360	-	-	-	-	-	690	-	690	1,423	-	1,423		
7.3.2	Central supply office	380	-	380	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	380	-	380	783	-	783		
Subtotal Category 7.3		510	-	510	360	-	360	-	-	-	-	-	1,070	-	1,070	2,206	-	2,206		
<b>7.4 Housing facilities</b>																				
7.4.1	Housing for employees	690	-	690	336	-	336	-	-	-	-	-	1,026	-	1,026	2,116	-	2,116		
7.4.2	Lodging for train crews	190	-	190	106	-	106	-	-	-	-	-	296	-	296	610	-	610		
Subtotal Category 7.4		880	-	880	442	-	442	-	-	-	-	-	1,322	-	1,322	2,726	-	2,726		
<b>7.5 Miscellaneous</b>																				
7.5.1	Training and technical assistance	50	150	200	50	150	200	-	-	-	-	-	100	300	400	206	619	825		
7.5.2	Procurement of land and property	100	-	100	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	200	-	200	412	-	412		
7.5.3	Investment administration	1,000	-	1,000	1,000	-	1,000	-	-	-	-	-	2,000	-	2,000	4,124	-	4,124		
Subtotal Category 7.5		1,150	150	1,300	1,150	150	1,300	-	-	-	-	-	2,300	300	2,600	4,742	619	5,361		
Subtotal Category 7		3,725	185	3,910	2,931	165	3,096	-	-	-	-	-	6,656	350	7,006	13,724	722	14,446		
Total Categories 1-7		29,214	45,254	74,468	35,887	28,268	64,155	10,798	4,221	15,019	5,020	800	5,820	80,919	78,543	159,462	166,847	161,948	328,795	
<b>8 Physical contingency (10% except for items 4.1, 4.2, 4.10, 4.14 and Category 5)</b>																				
8		1,990	233	2,223	2,932	276	3,208	1,080	422	1,502	502	80	582	6,504	1,011	7,515	13,411	2,084	15,495	
<b>9 Price contingency (for local currency items 8% annually in 1977/78, 7.5% in 1979 and 7% in 1980/81; for foreign currency items 8% annually in 1977, 7% in 1978, 6.5% in 1979 and 6% in 1980/81)</b>																				
9		3,844	5,367	9,211	8,160	5,523	13,683	3,538	1,245	4,783	2,147	303	2,450	17,689	12,438	30,127	36,473	25,646	62,119	
GRAND TOTAL		35,048	50,854	85,902	46,979	34,067	81,046	15,416	5,888	21,304	7,669	1,183	8,852	105,112	91,392	197,104	216,731	189,678	406,409	

Note: US\$1.00 = 485 won.



Table 3.5KOREASIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTLoan Financed Items

	Unit	Quantity	Unit Cost (US\$)	Total Cost (US\$ million)
Rails 50 kg/m	tons	33,000	350	11.57
Track material workshop machinery				2.20
Track maintenance equipment				0.99
Breakdown cranes	no	2	720,000	1.44
Passenger cars:				
Special express coaches	no	34	290,000	9.82
Special express dining cars	no	6	380,000	1.98
Special express power source cars	no	5	560,000	2.78
Limited express coaches	no	145	145,000	20.93
Limited express dining cars	no	7	185,000	1.30
Limited express power source cars	no	14	475,000	6.64
Freight cars:				
Box cars	no	550	30,000	16.44
Gondolas	no	870	27,000	23.32
Rolling stock workshop equipment				3.31
Training and technical assistance				0.62
Subtotal				<u>103.34</u>
Contingencies				16.16
Transport sector studies				0.50
<u>Total</u>				<u>120.00</u>

Table 3.6

KOREASIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTKNR Rail Renewal Program, 1977-81

Line	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	Total 1977-81
						-----Track km-----
Gyeong Bu	17	17	16	15	20	85
Jung Ang	25	30	25	30 /a	-	110
Gyeong In	-	-	15	-	-	15
Chung Bug	20	20	-	-	-	40
Gyeong Bug	-	-	-	20	20	40
Dae Gu	25	-	-	-	-	25
Gyeong Weon	-	-	-	20	20	40
Gyeong Jeon	14	-	-	-	21	35
Ho Nam	10	-	-	-	-	10
Jeon Ra	35	-	-	-	-	35
Donghae Nambu	-	20	25	-	-	45
Tae Baeg	15	20	15	-	-	50
Yeong Dong	39	28	29	25	19	140
<u>Total</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>135</u>	<u>125</u>	<u>110</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>670</u>

/a 60 kg rails.

Source: KNR and mission.

Table 3.7KOREASIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTKNR Track Renewal Program, 1977-81

Line	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	Total 1977-81
	-----Track km-----					
Gyeong Bu	-	10	20	20	30	80
Jung Ang	-	10	20	30 <u>/a</u>	30 <u>/a</u>	90
Gyeong In	8	-	-	-	-	8
Ho Nam	4	-	-	-	-	4
Donghae Nambu	8	10	-	-	-	18
<u>Total</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>200</u>

/a 60 kg rails.

Source: KNR and mission.

Table 3.8

KOREASIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTKNR Track Material Workshop: Machinery and Equipment Requirements

Item	Quantity	Estimated Cost (US\$)
<u>Rail Reprofilng Plant</u>		
Multipurpose loader	1	264,000
Fourway straightening press	1	130,000
Road reprofiling machine	1	520,000
Friction rail saw	5	10,000
Rotating brush	1	3,000
Ultrasonic testing machine	1	20,000
Gantry crane	1	100,000
Roller gangway	1	180,000
Subtotal		<u>1,227,000</u>
<u>Switch Point Factory</u>		
Two-head planer	1	200,000
Rail bending machine	2	40,000
Heat treating machine	1	150,000
Friction rail saw	2	4,000
Universal drilling machine	1	40,000
Subtotal		<u>434,000</u>
<u>Sleeper Reconditioning Factory</u>		
Sleeper banding machine	1	200,000
Sleeper adzing and drilling machine	1	200,000
Gang trolley	1	20,000
Subtotal		<u>420,000</u>
<u>Rail Welding Plant</u>		
Gas welding machine	1	50,000
Driving and pressing set	1	15,000
Grinding machine	1	10,000
Friction rail saw	2	4,000
Rail end brushing machine	1	25,000
Rail drill	1	20,000
Subtotal		<u>124,000</u>
<u>Total</u>		<u>2,205,000</u>

Source: KNR.

KOREA  
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

Financing of Foreign Currency Part of the Project

	1978	1979	1980	1981	Total	IBRD	OECF /a	50-Cycle /b Group	U.S. EXIM Bank	Suppliers credit	K.F.X./c
						US\$ '000					
2. Electrification		1,732			1,732			1,732			
3.1.2 Double track Gongjeon-Bongyang (rails, 1,120 tons)		391			391		391				
3.1.3 Double track Yongseon-Susaeg (a) Rails, 680 tons (b) Electrification			237 1,897		237 1,897		237	1,897			
3.1.4 Double track Seongbug-Euijeonbu (a) Rails, 920 tons (b) Electrification			324 2,674		324 2,674		324	2,674			
3.2 By-pass lines (rails, 450 tons)		159			159		159				
3.3 Additional crossing loops (rails, 1,700 tons)	334	260			594		594				
3.4 Marshalling yard extensions (rails, 890 tons)	148	165			313		313				
3.5 Station yard extensions (rails, 820 tons)	169	118			287		287				
3.7 Lengthening of crossing loops (rails, 260 tons)		93			93		93				
3.8.6 Automatic ticketing machines	227				227					227	
3.10 Busan area improvement (rails, 190 tons)			66		66		66				
4.1 Rail renewal, 260 km (26,000 tons)	4,732	4,381			9,113	9,113					
4.2 Track renewal, 70 km (7,000 tons)	1,052	1,402			2,454	2,454					
4.11 Track material workshop machinery	1,227	977			2,204	2,204					
4.14 Track maintenance equipment	990				990	990					
5.1.1 New diesel main line locomotives (30)	15,052	7,526			22,578				19,191		3,387
5.1.2 New breakdown cranes (2)	1,443				1,443	1,443					
5.1.3 Diesel locomotives, remodeling (59)	12,372	5,876			18,248				15,511		2,737
5.1.4 Diesel railcars, remodeling (14)	779				779						779
5.1.6 Breakdown cranes, remodeling (3)		81			81					81	
5.2 New passenger cars (211)	32,124	11,320			43,444	43,444					
5.3 New freight cars (1,420)	18,732	21,032			39,764	39,764					
6. Rolling stock repair facilities (workshop equipment)	3,546	2,433	3,505	1,650	11,134	3,310				7,824	
7.2.3 Power line for emergency	72	31			103					103	
7.5.1 Training and technical assistance	310	309			619	619					
<u>Total</u>	<u>93,309</u>	<u>58,286</u>	<u>8,703</u>	<u>1,650</u>	<u>161,948</u>	<u>103,341</u>	<u>2,464</u>	<u>6,303</u>	<u>34,702</u>	<u>8,235</u>	<u>6,903</u>
Physical contingencies	480	563	870	165	2,084	393	246	630	-	815	
Price contingencies	11,066	11,388	2,567	625	25,646	15,766	523	1,717	4,953	1,720	967
<u>Grand Total</u>	<u>104,855</u>	<u>70,243</u>	<u>12,140</u>	<u>2,440</u>	<u>189,678</u>	<u>119,500</u>	<u>3,233</u>	<u>8,650</u>	<u>39,655</u>	<u>10,770</u>	<u>7,870</u>

/a Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, Japan.

/b European Consortium (for electrification).

/c Korean Foreign Exchange - purchased by KNR (not debt).





Item	1978				1979				1980				1981					
	J-F	M-A	M-J	J-A	S-O	N-D	J-F	M-A	M-J	J-A	S-O	N-D	J-F	M-A	M-J	J-A	S-O	N-D
4.1-4.4 <u>Rail and track renewal:</u>																		
<u>Rail renewal</u>																		
- bidding for material																		
- bidding for work																		
- supply of material																		
- work																		
<u>Track renewal</u>																		
- bidding for material																		
- bidding for work																		
- supply of material																		
- work																		
4.5 <u>Concrete sleepers:</u>																		
<u>Concrete sleepers</u>																		
- bidding																		
- supply of material																		
4.11 <u>Separation of rail and road level:</u>																		
<u>Construction work</u>																		
- bidding																		
- work																		
4.12 <u>Track material workshop:</u>																		
<u>Construction</u>																		
- bidding																		
- work																		
<u>Equipment</u>																		
- bidding																		
- delivery																		
- installation																		
4.13 <u>Right-of-way improvements:</u>																		
<u>Miscellaneous work</u>																		
- bidding																		
- work																		
5.1.1 <u>New diesel locomotives:</u>																		
<u>First lot (20)</u>																		
- bidding																		
- delivery																		
<u>Second lot (10)</u>																		
- bidding																		
- delivery																		
5.1.3 <u>Rebuilding of diesel locomotives:</u>																		
<u>Total quantity (39)</u>																		
- bidding																		
- supply of material																		
- work																		
5.2.1- <u>New special express coaches:</u>																		
5.2.2.3 <u>Total quantity (45)</u>																		
- bidding																		
- delivery																		
5.2.4- <u>New limited express coaches:</u>																		
5.2.2.6 <u>Total quantity (166)</u>																		
- bidding																		
- delivery																		
5.3.1- <u>New freight cars:</u>																		
5.3.3.2 <u>Total quantity (1,420)</u>																		
- bidding																		
- delivery																		
5.3.5 <u>Improvement of freight cars:</u>																		
<u>Equipment</u>																		
- bidding for material																		
- delivery																		
- installation																		
6.1 <u>New diesel passenger car workshop:</u>																		
<u>Earthworks</u>																		
- bidding																		
- work																		
<u>Buildings</u>																		
- bidding																		
- work																		
<u>Track</u>																		
- bidding																		
- supply of material																		
- work																		
<u>Equipment</u>																		
- bidding																		
- delivery																		
- installation																		

Table 3.11

## KOREA

## SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

## Procurement Schedule for Bank Financed Items

	E v e n t s						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Rails (33,000 tons)	03/01/78	03/15/78	05/15/78	06/15/78	07/01/78	01/01/79	10/01/79
Permanent way workshop machinery	04/01/78	04/15/78	07/15/78	08/15/78	09/01/78	03/01/79	09/01/79
Track maintenance equipment	03/01/78	03/15/78	05/15/78	06/15/78	07/01/78	01/01/79	06/01/79
Breakdown cranes (2)	03/15/78	04/01/78	06/15/78	07/15/78	08/01/78	06/01/79	07/01/79
Passenger cars:							
Special express cars (45)	03/15/78	04/01/78	06/15/78	07/15/78	08/01/78	08/01/79	02/01/80
Limited express cars (166)	03/15/78	04/01/78	06/15/78	07/15/78	08/01/78	08/01/79	02/01/80
Freight cars (1,420)	03/15/78	04/01/78	06/15/78	07/15/78	08/01/78	04/01/79	04/01/80
Rolling stock workshop equipment	01/15/79	02/01/79	05/15/79	06/15/79	07/01/79	01/01/80	01/01/81

- Events
- I. Bank's comments on tender documents
  - II. Bid invitation
  - III. Bid opening
  - IV. Bank's agreement to award of contract
  - V. Contract date
  - VI. Start of delivery
  - VII. Completion of delivery

February 1978

Table 3.12

KOREA

SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

Estimated Disbursement Schedule

	<u>US\$ million</u>	
	<u>Quarter</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
<u>IBRD Fiscal Year and Quarter:</u>		
<u>1978/79</u>		
To September 30, 1978	11.0	11.0
To December 31, 1978	5.0	16.0
To March 31, 1979	15.0	31.0
To June 30, 1979	16.0	47.0
<u>1979/80</u>		
To September 30, 1979	18.0	65.0
To December 31, 1979	18.0	83.0
To March 31, 1980	17.0	100.0
To June 30, 1980	11.0	111.0
<u>1980/81</u>		
To September 30, 1980	3.0	114.0
To December 31, 1980	3.0	117.0
To March 31, 1981	3.0	120.0

Principal assumptions:

1. Effective date of loan not later than June 15, 1978.
2. Bid invitation for rails and rolling stock not later than April 15, 1978.

Table 4.1

KOREASIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTGrouping of Project Capital Costs for Economic Analysis

	Million won	Percent
<u>Capacity increases /a</u>		
Lines	23,697	14.9
Motive power	23,819	14.9
Rolling stock - passenger	25,705	16.1
" " freight	23,440	14.7
Telecommunications and power	2,014	1.3
Subtotal	<u>98,675</u>	<u>61.9</u>
<u>Way and structures renewals</u>	16,129	10.1
<u>Seoul urban network (SMESRS)</u>	10,276	6.5
<u>Daejon passenger car shed</u>	8,500	5.3
<u>Miscellaneous</u>		
Safety related investments (including rail/road crossings and safety sidings)	8,550	
Line relocation part of larger industrial development projects	2,983	
Workshop improvements	5,960	
Miscellaneous including right-of-way improvements, buildings, housing etc.	8,389	
Subtotal	<u>25,882</u>	<u>16.2</u>
<u>Total /b</u>	<u>159,462</u>	<u>100.0</u>

/a See detailed allocation to passenger and freight services on Table 4.2.

/b Excluding contingencies.

Table 4.2

## KOREA

SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

Allocation of Project Capital Costs of Capacity Increases  
Between Passenger and Freight Services  
(In million won)

	<u>Passenger</u>			<u>Freight</u>		
	1978	1979	1980-81	1978	1979	1980-81
1. <u>Lines</u>						
By-pass lines	100	315		100	314	
New loops	500	850		500	1,832	
Marshalling yards	-	-		1,260	300	800
Station, yards etc.	-	-		590	310	
Freight terminals	-	-		300	900	1,600
Length loops	-	155		-	154	
Station buildings	649	948	450	300	600	450
Signalling /a	390	1,600	1,770	596	2,414	2,650
Subtotal	<u>1,639</u>	<u>3,868</u>	<u>2,220</u>	<u>3,646</u>	<u>6,824</u>	<u>5,500</u>
2. <u>Motive Power and</u> <u>Rolling Stock /b</u>						
New locos	820	410		6,580	3,290	
Remodelled locos	3,360	1,560		3,640	1,765	
Remodelled rail cars and heating cars	1,094	520		-	-	
Breakdown cranes	350	24		376	30	
Cars (passenger and freight)	18,910	6,795		11,214	12,226	
Subtotal	<u>24,534</u>	<u>9,309</u>		<u>21,810</u>	<u>17,311</u>	
3. <u>Telecommunications</u> <u>and power /c</u>	700	453		520	341	
Totals by Year	<u>28,873</u>	<u>13,630</u>	<u>2,220</u>	<u>25,976</u>	<u>24,476</u>	<u>5,500</u>
Total Project			<u>98,675</u> (from Table 4.1)			
+ 10% physical contingencies on 1 and 3	234	432	220	417	717	550
For rate of return calculation (rounded)	27,100	14,100	2,400	26,400	25,200	6,100

/a Proportional to the number of trains/day for passenger and freight services.

/b According to the locos needed for passenger and freight services.

/c Proportional to train-km for passenger and freight services.

KOREASIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTComparative Freight Transport Costs by Alternative Modesi) Revenues and Costs of Rail Transport

	<u>Revenues</u>			<u>Costs</u>			<u>Difference</u>		
	1974	1975	1976	1974	1975	1976	1974	1975	1976
	----- in won/ton-km -----								
Coal	2.02	2.76	3.87	2.89	3.48	5.12	-0.87	-0.72	-1.25
Cement	2.65	4.03	5.44	3.02	4.16	5.16	-0.37	-0.13	+0.28
All freight	2.31	3.34	4.64	4.72	5.64	5.76	-2.41	-2.30	-1.12

---

Costs include apportioned station, train operating, fixed facilities maintenance, rolling stock maintenance, administration and management, and depreciation costs.

Source: KNR

ii) Road Transport

	<u>Truck 6t</u>	<u>Truck 12t</u>		
	-----won/km	-----	<u>Won/ton-km</u>	<u>/a</u>
Operating costs:				
(end 1976) economic	206	241	45.7	26.8
financial	221	272	49.1	30.2
Tariffs				
one way (return empty) per ton-km			41.6	
round trip			26.7	

---

/a Assumes operation at 75% of capacity

Source: MOT

iii) Coastal Shipping

	<u>Won per ton</u>
Tariffs (1976)	
Mukho-Incheon (1,000 km vs 300 km overland)	2,079-2,621
Busan-Incheon (700 km vs 450 km overland)	1,769-2,166

---

Source: MOT

iv) Modal Comparison

For the purpose of this analysis the modal comparison is for bulk commodities such as coal, cement, ore and fertilizer since no further capacity is provided by the project for general cargo or bulk oil. The figures above show that the line haul cost of road transport is much higher than that of either rail or coastal shipping. The traffic forecasts given in Part II already reflect the share of coastal shipping when it is competitive i.e. for cement plants, fertilizer plants, oil refineries located on or near the coast. For the remaining traffic for which rail capacity is provided by the project, coastal shipping is no longer a valid alternative as it would require long terminal transport at either end, which would require either rail capacity or a very high cost road transport.

Rail Versus Road Costs. Assuming average rail transport distance of 165 km; this is the average for cement. Average distances for coal and ore are larger and would give even a further advantage to rail:

	<u>Rail cost</u>	<u>Road cost</u>
Line haul cost, 165 km @ W 5.2/t = W 858		@ W 26.8/t = W 4,422
Terminal costs <u>/a</u>	W 1,000	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>W 1,858</u>	<u>W 4,422</u>
Per ton-km	11.3	26.8
Difference	<u>W 15.5/ton-km</u>	

---

/a Estimated on the basis of 1970 cost analysis by consultants Touche Ross. Including loading, unloading and transportation costs from station within a 5 km radius, the terminal costs were then estimated at W 434/ton. At the factory end, costs are identical since all plants have sidings and direct loading of either rail or road.

Table 4.4

## KOREA

SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTEconomic Return on Capacity Increase for Freight Services

	Capital costs <u>/a</u> (W million)	Traffic that would divert to other modes without project <u>/b</u> (in million ton-km)	Economic cost savings from alternative mode <u>/c</u> (W million)
1978	26,400	500	7,500
1979	25,200	1,100	16,500
1980	4,000	1,100	16,500
1981	2,100	1,100	16,500
1982-2003	-	1,100	16,500
Rate of return is 42%			

/a Include investment in - freight wagons  
 - locomotives (on the basis of diesel loco-km for freight trains)  
 - line capacity increases and telecommunications equipment allocated to freight services (see detailed allocation of costs in Table 4.2).

/b This is taken conservatively as the capacity generated by the box and gondola cars acquired under the project, assuming improved utilization. The figures above represent somewhat less than 2/3 of the freight traffic increase forecast for 1978 and 1979, and only about 85% of the traffic increase in bulk commodities except oil. The remaining traffic will be handled by improvement in use of the existing stock, including remodelling. Remodelling costs are included in /a above although no specific benefits have been quantified.

/c Difference between transport costs by rail and the least costly alternative. This is generally trucking since coastal shipping is only competitive for traffic with origin and destinations at or near ports and this has already been taken into consideration when forecasting railway traffic. An average of W 15/ton-km is assumed as the cost difference (Table 4.3).



KOREASIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTComparative Passenger Transport Costs by Alternative Modes(i) Revenues and Costs of the Special and Limited Express Trains

	<u>Revenues</u>		<u>Costs</u>		<u>Difference</u>	
	1976	1977	1976	1977 /a	1976	1977
	----- in won/pass-km -----					
Special express	8.70	9.55	4.17	5.00	4.53	4.55
Limited express:						
nonair-conditioned	5.17	4.87	2.83	3.40	2.34	1.47
air-conditioned	-	7.23	-	4.20	-	3.03

/a Estimates.

Costs include apportioned station, train operating, fixed facilities maintenance, rolling stock maintenance, administration and management, but exclude depreciation.

Source: KNR and mission estimates.

(ii) Expressway Bus

		<u>Per pass-km</u>	
		<u>With 40 pass.</u>	<u>With 50 pass.</u>
Operating costs (end 1976)	economic W 145/km	3.63	2.90
	financial W 178/km	4.45	3.56
Tariffs (end 1976) per pass-km	1-200 km		4.74
	201-400 km		4.34

Source: MOT

Table 4.6

KOREASIXTH RAILWAY PROJECTFinancial Return on Capacity Increase for Passenger Services

	Capital costs /a (W million)	Capacity Added by the Project /b		Operating Profits /c		
		Special Express	Limited Express	Special Express	Limited Express	Total
		(million pass-km)		(W million)		
1978	27,100	170	1,050	780	3,150	3,930
1979	14,100	270	1,450	1,240	4,350	5,590
1980	1,500	290	1,590	1,330	4,770	6,100
1981	900	310	1,700	1,430	5,100	6,530
1982-2003	-	310	1,700	1,430	5,100	6,530
Rate of return is 17%						

/a Includes investment in - passenger coaches  
 - locomotives (on the basis of diesel loco-km for passenger trains)  
 - line capacity increases and telecommunication equipment allocated for passenger services (see detailed allocation of costs in Table 4.2).

/b Capacity resulting from acquisition of new coaches, calculation includes improvement in utilization of both existing and added stock.

/c Difference between operating costs excluding depreciation and revenues, i.e. W 4.6 per pass-km for Special Express and W 3.0 per pass-km for air-conditioned Limited Express (see Table 4.5).

**KOREA**  
**SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT**

**Income Statements, 1971-81**  
(Won billion)

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
	Actual - /a						Tentative	Forecast			
<b>Operating Revenues</b>											
Passenger revenue	17.3	20.7	22.8	29.7	41.5	52.5	66.7	70.2	74.1	79.1	81.9
Freight revenue	11.6	13.3	15.7	19.5	28.9	43.5	59.5	65.1	70.2	74.3	79.3
Other operating revenues	2.3	2.5	3.1	3.8	5.2	6.6	8.9	7.6	8.1	8.6	9.0
Subtotal Operating Revenues	<u>31.2</u>	<u>36.5</u>	<u>41.6</u>	<u>53.0</u>	<u>75.6</u>	<u>102.6</u>	<u>135.1</u>	<u>142.9</u>	<u>152.4</u>	<u>162.0</u>	<u>170.2</u>
Add: % Passenger fare increases							(10%)	5.3 (10%)	15.6 (10%)	26.2 (10%)	38.0
% Freight rate increases							(15%)	7.4 (15%)	22.7 (15%)	38.7 (10%)	53.4
Passenger revenue increases due to MRP /b							-	3.2	5.9	8.8	11.6
Subtotal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15.9	44.2	73.7	103.0
Re-stated operating revenues	<u>31.2</u>	<u>36.5</u>	<u>41.6</u>	<u>53.0</u>	<u>75.6</u>	<u>102.6</u>	<u>135.1</u>	<u>158.8</u>	<u>196.6</u>	<u>235.7</u>	<u>273.2</u>
<b>Operating Expenses</b>											
Labor	13.2	13.8	14.3	17.7	26.4	44.6	60.7	72.3	81.4	91.5	102.2
Fuel	3.9	4.2	6.3	15.0	15.5	15.3	16.2	18.6	21.8	23.0	24.5
Maintenance /c	7.3	7.9	8.0	11.6	19.0	23.2	27.4	34.6	38.0	42.0	46.1
General	3.4	3.9	5.4	4.6	7.3	14.5	13.7	14.0	15.0	16.0	17.0
Subtotal	<u>27.8</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>34.0</u>	<u>48.9</u>	<u>68.2</u>	<u>97.6</u>	<u>118.0</u>	<u>139.5</u>	<u>156.2</u>	<u>172.5</u>	<u>189.8</u>
Less: Economies due to MRP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.6	5.4	7.8	9.1
Total cash expenses	<u>27.8</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>34.0</u>	<u>48.9</u>	<u>68.2</u>	<u>97.6</u>	<u>118.0</u>	<u>134.9</u>	<u>150.8</u>	<u>164.7</u>	<u>180.7</u>
Depreciation	4.0	4.5	4.9	5.2	6.5	15.0	17.4	20.9	23.8	28.2	33.1
Total operating expenses	<u>31.8</u>	<u>34.3</u>	<u>38.9</u>	<u>54.1</u>	<u>74.7</u>	<u>112.6</u>	<u>135.4</u>	<u>155.8</u>	<u>174.6</u>	<u>192.9</u>	<u>213.8</u>
Net operating revenue (loss)	(0.6)	2.2	2.7	(1.1)	0.9	(10.0)	(0.3)	3.0	22.0	42.8	59.4
Interest charges	3.3	5.5	6.5	7.4	10.4	15.1	20.3	22.0	28.5	33.5	37.7
Other revenues/expenses (net) /d	(0.7)	(7.6)	(3.3)	(23.2)	5.4	1.7	0.5	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.8
Net revenue (deficit)	(4.6)	(10.9)	(7.1)	(31.7)	(4.1)	(23.4)	(20.1)	(18.0)	(5.2)	10.8	23.5
Subsidy from Government	-	0.7	1.5	5.7	14.4	13.7	21.7	14.6	12.0	7.5	-
Net income (deficit) - adjusted	<u>(4.6)</u>	<u>(10.2)</u>	<u>(5.6)</u>	<u>(26.0)</u>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>(9.7)</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>(3.4)</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>18.3</u>	<u>23.5</u>
<b>Ratios</b>											
Operating Ratio	102	94	93.5	102	99	110	100	98.0	89.5	82	78
Interest charge coverage	-	0.3	0.4	-	0.1	-	-	0.1	0.8	1.3	1.6
Debt service coverage	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	1.1	1.4	1.6
Return on net fixed assets	-	0.9	1.1	-	0.1	-	-	0.3	2.1	3.5	4.2

/a Actual - audited.

/b Management Rationalization Plan (revenue increase includes additional baggage revenues due to increase in charges).

/c Includes workshops labor costs.

/d Includes losses/gains on foreign exchange fluctuations.

March 1978

Table 5.2

## KOREA

## SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

## Operating Revenues and Costs - Effects of Inflation, 1970-76

Year	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
	(Currency Won)						
1. Exchange rate (to US\$)	310	350	394	398.5	406	484	484
2. Price index: Wholesale	100	108.6	123.8	132.4	189.6	238.2	267.0
3. Consumer	100	112.1	125.5	129.3	160.0	202.0	233.1
4. Wages	100	119.1	138.1	153.4	207.3	263.6	355
5. Wholesale (Imports)	100	107.1	116.1	152.4	219.2	208.8	211.9
6. Average of 2, 3 and 5 /a	100	109.4	121.8	138.0	189.6	216.3	237.3
6(a) Weighted /b	-	113.9	129.0	144.7	195.6	232.0	279.7
7. Traffic-pass-km (million)	9,818	8,750	10,062	10,720	11,077	12,926	14,305
8. Traffic-ton-km (million)	7,709	7,841	7,241	8,593	9,005	9,293	9,728
9. <u>Total traffic units (million)</u>	<u>17,527</u>	<u>16,591</u>	<u>17,303</u>	<u>19,313</u>	<u>20,082</u>	<u>22,219</u>	<u>24,033</u>
10. Revenues:/c Passenger	19.4	17.3	20.7	22.8	29.7	41.5	52.5
11. Freight	11.1	11.6	13.3	15.7	19.5	28.9	43.5
12. Other	2.5	2.3	2.5	3.1	3.8	5.2	6.6
13. <u>Total revenues</u>	<u>33.0</u>	<u>31.2</u>	<u>36.5</u>	<u>41.6</u>	<u>53.0</u>	<u>75.6</u>	<u>102.6</u>
<u>Operating expenses /c</u>							
14. Staff costs	11.4	13.2	13.8	14.3	17.7	26.4	44.5
15. Other (excl. depreciation)	12.4	14.6	16.0	19.6	31.2	41.8	53.0
16. <u>Total working expenses</u>	<u>23.8</u>	<u>27.8</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>34.0</u>	<u>48.9</u>	<u>68.2</u>	<u>97.6</u>
17. Depreciation	3.9	3.9	4.5	4.9	5.2	6.5	15.0
18. <u>Total operating expenses</u>	<u>27.7</u>	<u>31.7</u>	<u>34.3</u>	<u>38.9</u>	<u>54.1</u>	<u>74.7</u>	<u>112.6</u>
19. Revenue per pass-km (10 + 7) (won)	1.976	1.977	2.057	2.127	2.681	3.210	3.673
20. Revenue per ton-km (11 + 8) (won)	1.440	1.479	1.837	1.827	2.165	3.110	4.636
21. Adjusted revenue per pass-km (19 + 6(a) (won)	1.976	1.736	1.595	1.470	1.371	1.384	1.313
22. Adjusted revenue per ton-km (20 + 6(a) (won)	1.440	1.299	1.424	1.263	1.107	1.341	1.657
<u>Costs Adjusted for Inflation</u>							
23. Staff costs (14 + 4)	11.4	11.1	10.0	9.3	8.5	10.0	12.6
24. Other costs (15 + 6)	12.4	13.3	13.1	14.2	16.5	19.3	22.3
25. <u>Total working expenses</u>	<u>23.8</u>	<u>24.4</u>	<u>23.1</u>	<u>23.5</u>	<u>25.0</u>	<u>29.3</u>	<u>34.9</u>
<u>Working Expenses per Traffic Unit (won)</u>							
26. Current (16 + 9)	1.358	1.676	1.722	1.760	2.435	3.069	4.061
27. Deflated (26 + 6a) (25 + 9)	1.358	1.471	1.334	1.216	1.245	1.323	1.452
<u>Staff Statistics</u>							
28. Total staff	43,800	43,600	44,300	41,200	39,900	39,500	39,300
29. Average cost per employee (14 + 28) (won 000)	260	303	311	347	444	668	1,135
30. Average cost per employee (deflated) (29 + 4)	260	255	227	227	214	255	321
31. Traffic units per employee (9 + 28) (won 000)	400	380	350	469	503	562	611
<u>Financial Ratios</u>							
32. Working ratio (16 + 13) %	72	89	82	82	92	90	92
33. Operating ratio (18 + 13) %	84	102	95	93	102	95	106
34. Debt service coverage	1.7	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.3	0.4
35. Return on net fixed assets in use	2.9	-	0.9	1.1	-	0.1	-

/a Arithmetic average.

/b Line 16 x 100  
line 25

/c Billions of won

February 1978

Table 5.3

## KOREA

## SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

Balance Sheets, 1971-81  
(Won billions)

Fiscal December 31	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
	Actual			/b			Tentative	Forecast			
<b>Current Assets</b>											
Cash	0.5	0.4	1.4	1.8	3.3	5.4	5.9	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1
Accounts receivable	-	3.6	4.5	4.0	7.5	9.4	8.1	11.0	12.8	17.4	19.5
<b>Total quick assets</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>10.8</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>14.0</b>	<b>14.1</b>	<b>15.9</b>	<b>20.5</b>	<b>22.6</b>
Inventory	11.2	3.7	4.0	5.5	9.5	14.6	15.1	18.4	21.0	23.2	26.0
<b>Total current assets</b>	<b>11.7</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>11.3</b>	<b>20.3</b>	<b>29.4</b>	<b>29.1</b>	<b>32.5</b>	<b>36.9</b>	<b>43.7</b>	<b>48.6</b>
<b>Current Liabilities</b>											
Current portion of long-term debt	-	2.3	2.3	3.1	3.3	4.6	4.8	5.2	6.5	7.5	9.0
Accounts payable	-	12.0	11.8	13.9	5.2	4.5	9.4	11.4	13.0	13.9	15.0
All other	-	5.3	4.2	5.1	5.4	6.2	6.0	7.0	8.0	8.5	9.0
<b>Total current liabilities</b>	<b>16.4</b>	<b>19.6</b>	<b>18.3</b>	<b>22.1</b>	<b>13.9</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>20.2</b>	<b>23.6</b>	<b>27.5</b>	<b>29.9</b>	<b>33.0</b>
Net working capital	(4.7)	(11.9)	(8.4)	(10.8)	6.4	14.1	8.9	8.9	9.4	13.8	15.6
<b>Fixed Assets</b>											
Fixed assets	173.1	197.4	207.1	232.0	274.5	736.9/c	799.6	920.0	1,091.6	1,274.3	1,467.9
Land	33.9	33.7	130.2	127.5	130.5	223.2	225.9	265.4	292.8	317.3	341.3
<b>Gross book value</b>	<b>207.0</b>	<b>231.1</b>	<b>337.3</b>	<b>359.5</b>	<b>405.0</b>	<b>960.1</b>	<b>1,025.5</b>	<b>1,185.4</b>	<b>1,384.4</b>	<b>1,591.6</b>	<b>1,809.2</b>
Less accumulated depreciation	17.0	25.8	25.8	31.0	37.6	193.3	216.2	235.4	256.9	282.8	313.7
<b>Net book value</b>	<b>190.0</b>	<b>205.3</b>	<b>311.5</b>	<b>328.5</b>	<b>367.4</b>	<b>766.8</b>	<b>809.3</b>	<b>950.0</b>	<b>1,127.5</b>	<b>1,308.8</b>	<b>1,495.5</b>
Add: Construction in progress	6.5	24.5	29.1	42.2	43.0	24.1	32.7	32.7	32.7	32.7	32.7
<b>Total net fixed assets</b>	<b>196.5</b>	<b>229.8</b>	<b>340.6</b>	<b>370.7</b>	<b>410.4</b>	<b>790.9</b>	<b>842.0</b>	<b>982.7</b>	<b>1,160.2</b>	<b>1,341.5</b>	<b>1,528.2</b>
Deferred assets /a	32.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Other Assets</b>											
Investments	2.2	4.4	6.4	5.9	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Prepaid and other	11.6	0.1	0.1	0.1	-	-	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3
<b>Total other assets</b>	<b>13.8</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>7.4</b>
<b>TOTAL ASSETS</b>	<b>238.1</b>	<b>222.4</b>	<b>338.7</b>	<b>365.9</b>	<b>416.9</b>	<b>805.1</b>	<b>858.3</b>	<b>999.0</b>	<b>1,177.0</b>	<b>1,362.7</b>	<b>1,551.2</b>
Long-term debt	75.3	80.5	100.5	154.6	194.5	245.1	275.0	340.3	420.6	482.8	533.0
Provision for severance pay	-	1.0	1.3	1.7	1.9	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
<b>Equity and/or Ownership /b</b>											
Revaluation of assets	72.9	77.6	177.1	175.3	175.2	521.0/c	504.3	586.3	681.1	784.9	904.3
Fixed capital (cash or in kind)	73.2	69.7	69.9	70.4	71.0	71.1	64.9	82.5	99.0	116.2	119.3
Accumulated surplus (deficit)	16.7	(6.4)	(10.1)	(36.1)	(25.7)	(35.4)	10.8	(13.4)	(27.0)	(24.5)	(8.7)
<b>Total equity and/or ownership</b>	<b>162.8</b>	<b>140.9</b>	<b>236.9</b>	<b>209.6</b>	<b>220.5</b>	<b>556.7</b>	<b>580.0</b>	<b>655.4</b>	<b>753.1</b>	<b>876.6</b>	<b>1,014.9</b>
<b>TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES</b>	<b>238.1</b>	<b>222.4</b>	<b>338.7</b>	<b>365.9</b>	<b>416.9</b>	<b>805.1</b>	<b>858.3</b>	<b>999.0</b>	<b>1,177.0</b>	<b>1,362.7</b>	<b>1,551.2</b>
<b>Ratios</b>											
Current ratio	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	1.5	1.7	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.5
Liquid ratio	-	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.8	1.1	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
Debt/equity ratio	32/68	36/64	30/70	42/58	47/53	29/71	32/68	35/65	36/64	36/64	35/65

/a Deferred loss on foreign exchange fluctuations.

/b 1972-76 figures adjusted according to audit reports.

/c Includes results of revaluation in 1976.

March 1978

Table 5.4

KOREA  
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

Long-term Debt as of December 31, 1976

	Year	Original amount	Amount outstanding (Won million)	Interest rate %	Repayment (years)		
					Grace period	Repayment period	
USAID - First loan	1962	(\$)	6,388,391	1,239	5.75	1	20
- Second loan	1965	(\$)	10,711,923	2,578	5.75	1	20
- Third loan	1960	(\$)	18,509,995	3,443	5.75	1	15
IDA - Cr. 25-KO	1962	(\$)	13,992,924	3,952	5.75	1	25
- Cr. 110-KO	1967	(\$)	10,645,205	4,559	6.00	3	22
- Cr. 183-KO	1970	(\$)	15,000,000	7,548	7.00	4	21
IBRD - Ln. 669-KO	1970	(\$)	40,000,000	17,870	7.00	4	21
- Ln. 863-KO	1972	(\$)	40,000,000	18,560	7.25	4	21
- Ln. 1101-KO	1975	(\$)	100,000,000	25,914	8.50	5	20
OECF (Japan) - First loan	1966	(Y)	4,279,388,398	3,706	5.75	2	18
- Second loan	1967	(Y)	3,339,553,900	3,242	5.75	2	18
- Third loan	1972	(Y)	15,408,000,000	25,568	5.00	5	15
- Fourth loan	1976	(Y)	4,300,000,000	-	3.5	7	13
UK	1964	(£)	500,000	116	6.75/7.75	4	10
KFW - First loan	1970	(DM)	17,000,000	1,825	5.75	7	18
- Second loan	1973	(DM)	17,000,000	3,271	5.75	7	18
50 C/S Group - Loan 1	1969			- 20,169			
Loan 2	1970			1,708			
Loan 3	1974		/a	2,503	/b	/c	/c
Loan 4	1975			419			
Exim Bank (US) - Loan 1	1968	(\$)	5,999,000	17,036	6.00	-	7
- Loan 2	1975	(\$)	3,780,000		7.00	1	10
Suppliers credits		(\$)		2,218	5.25/6.20		
KDB - Various	1966-76	(W)		66,662	6.00	5	15
Ministry of Communications	1976	(W)		10,000	6.00	5	15
Total outstanding /d				244,106			

/a In various currencies.

/b Varying between 6% and 8%.

/c Varying between 2 and 3 years' grace and 7-13 years' repayment.

/d On the basis of US\$1.00 = Won 485.

Source: KNR.

KOREA

SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

Financial Forecasts - Methodology and Principal Assumptions

1. Traffic

Traffic will increase as forecast in Tables 2.5-2.10.

2. Revenues

(a) Basic

(i) Passenger revenues have been calculated on the basis of agreed traffic forecasts, analyzed under: Intercity commuters and noncommuters, (further subdivided under Saemul express, limited express, ordinary express and ordinary trains), military and Seoul Metropolitan Electric Suburban Railway Services (SMESRS), converted to revenues by applying the average revenue per passenger-km earned on each service during the first five months of 1977.

(ii) Freight revenues have similarly been calculated on the basis of agreed traffic forecasts analyzed under major commodities, converted to revenues by applying the average revenue per ton-km earned by each such commodity (or group of commodities), during the first five months of 1977.

(b) Increased Revenues

(i) Assuming tariff increases as discussed in para. 5.23 of the report. Although, as discussed in para. 2.33, such increases should be selective, the annual effect on revenues is treated as though they would be across-the-board./a

(ii) KNR has calculated increased passenger revenues, due to (a) upgrading of services on major trunk lines (additional sleeper trains and airconditioned limited express trains) and (b) tariff increases on baggage trains, due to service improvements.

3. Operating Expenses

(a) Labor Costs - KNR has calculated the average number of staff needed each year, both for workshop and nonworkshop functions, and has calculated a basic annual cost on the current (1977) average annual cost per employee (workshop employees cost about 6% higher than

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/a In the Grey Cover report, the increases as agreed at negotiations will be indicated.

nonworkshop staff). Effect is then given to assumed annual cost increases averaging 12% in the years 1978-80, and 11% in 1981. Forecast savings due to staff reductions caused by the Management Rationalization Plan (MRP) are shown separately.

- (b) Fuel Costs - KNR has estimated the engine-km needed to carry the forecast traffic, under engine types (diesel, electric and steam locomotives and diesel and electric railcars), then applying the current cost of fuel per engine-km (by type), and inflating the annual costs by factors of 8% p.a. in 1978 and 1979, and 7.5% p.a. in 1980 and 1981.
- (c) Maintenance Costs - Costs are increased annually in line with traffic increases. For maintenance of facilities, KNR has forecast costs (excluding labor) increasing at 25% of the annual percentage increase in traffic units, while for maintenance of rolling stock 50% is used. Workshop labor costs are as calculated in (a) above. As in (b) above, annual costs (except labor) are inflated, using the same percentages.
- (d) Other Costs - (Administrative and General), are based on 1977 budgeted costs, inflated thereafter as in items (b) and (c) above.
- (e) Cost Savings - As mentioned in item (ii) above, KNR has estimated cost savings due to the MRP, for labor and other costs.
- (f) Depreciation - KNR has based its calculations on the figures arrived at in 1976, taking into account the asset revaluation of that year. After eliminating land, the overall percentage of depreciation to gross fixed assets was found to be 2.4%. This is applied to the gross value excluding land as at the beginning of the year, to which the estimated annual revaluation is added (8% in years 1977-79, 7.5% in years 1980/81).
- (g) Interest Charges - have been forecast on the basis of existing loans plus an estimated rate of 8% p.a. for new foreign borrowings, and 6% p.a. for new local borrowing. Grace periods for loans secured after 1977: Foreign, 4 years (except Eximbank, 1 year); Local, (KDB) 5 years.

#### 4. Balance Sheet

- (a) Receivables apply only to freight services, whereas passenger service is currently on a cash basis. As such, receivables are forecast on a 60-day basis, or 17% of total freight revenues.
- (b) Inventories are forecast at about 12-13% of total operating costs.
- (c) Accounts Payable were forecast on a basis of 6% of total cash expenses.



5. General

KNR's forecasts assume the Government's granting of cash subsidies to KNR for operations and/or investment of W 22.2 billion in 1977, W 11.0 billion in 1978, W 11.5 billion in 1979, W 9.7 billion in 1980 and W 3.1 billion in 1981.

Table 5.6

## KOREA

## SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

Cash Flow Statement 1972-81  
(Won billion)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	Totals 1977-81
	Actual						Forecast				
<u>Sources of Funds</u>											
Cash generated by KNR:											
Net operating revenue (loss)	1.8	2.7	(1.4)	0.9	(10.0)	(0.3)	3.0	22.0	42.8	59.4	126.9
Depreciation	4.5	4.9	5.2	6.5	15.0	17.4	20.9	23.8	28.2	33.1	123.4
Net nonoperating revenue (expense)	0.1	1.3	6.3	3.5	6.4	0.5	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.8	6.1
<u>Total cash generated</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>10.9</u>	<u>11.4</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>24.9</u>	<u>47.1</u>	<u>72.5</u>	<u>94.3</u>	<u>256.4</u>
Increase in severance pay provisions	-	-	0.4	-	1.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Funds provided by Government:											
Operating subsidy	-	1.5	5.7	14.4	13.7	21.7	14.6	12.0	7.5	-	55.8
Investment	-	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.9	-	3.0	4.5	9.7	3.1	20.3
Sale of assets	-	-	-	-	-	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	4.3
Borrowing:											
Proposed Bank loan	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.4	49.7	5.8	-	57.9
Other foreign borrowing	-	-	-	-	-	30.8	25.8	11.2	42.8	42.8	153.4
Local	-	-	-	-	-	33.3	51.5	35.0	33.0	30.0	182.8
<u>Total borrowing</u>	<u>6.9</u>	<u>27.4</u>	<u>37.6</u>	<u>53.3</u>	<u>59.1</u>	<u>64.1</u>	<u>79.7</u>	<u>95.9</u>	<u>81.6</u>	<u>72.8</u>	<u>394.1</u>
Decrease in "Other Assets"	22.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ex/Railroad Fund	-	-	-	6.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Total sources of funds</u>	<u>36.2</u>	<u>38.6</u>	<u>54.3</u>	<u>85.2</u>	<u>86.5</u>	<u>104.1</u>	<u>123.0</u>	<u>160.4</u>	<u>172.2</u>	<u>171.2</u>	<u>730.9</u>
<u>Application of Funds</u>											
Capital investment											
Local currency	-	-	-	-	-	45.7	58.4	54.9	66.3	66.3	291.6
Foreign exchange	-	-	-	-	-	30.8	28.2	60.9	48.6	42.8	211.3
<u>Total capital investment</u>	<u>24.9</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>41.4</u>	<u>44.1</u>	<u>52.9</u>	<u>76.5</u>	<u>86.6</u>	<u>115.8</u>	<u>114.9</u>	<u>109.1</u>	<u>502.9</u>
Debt service											
Interest charges	5.8	6.5	7.4	10.4	15.1	20.3	22.0	28.5	33.5	37.7	142.0
Repayment	10.7	8.0	9.8	11.1	14.6	15.9	14.4	15.6	19.4	22.6	87.9
<u>Total debt service</u>	<u>16.5</u>	<u>14.5</u>	<u>17.2</u>	<u>21.5</u>	<u>29.7</u>	<u>36.2</u>	<u>36.4</u>	<u>44.1</u>	<u>52.9</u>	<u>60.3</u>	<u>229.9</u>
Increase in "Other Assets"	-	10.3	-	2.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unexplained charges to earned surplus	0.4	2.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Net change in working capital	(5.6)	1.3	(4.3)	16.9	3.9	(8.6)	-	0.5	4.4	1.8	(1.9)
<u>Total application of funds</u>	<u>36.2</u>	<u>38.6</u>	<u>54.3</u>	<u>85.2</u>	<u>86.5</u>	<u>104.1</u>	<u>123.0</u>	<u>160.4</u>	<u>172.2</u>	<u>171.2</u>	<u>730.9</u>

March 1978

KOREA  
SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT

Comparison of Traffic Forecasts and Actuals

A. Freight

Tons (million)							Ton-km (million)					
863-KO			Actual			863-KO			Actual			
Coal	Other	Total	Coal	Other	Total	Coal	Other	Total	Coal	Other	Total	
1972	11.66	18.92	30.58	11.3	20.3	31.6	2,682	4,688	7,370	2,620	4,621	7,241
1973	12.79	20.72	33.51	13.6	24.0	37.6	3,019	5,128	8,147	3,201	5,390	8,591
1974	12.82	22.20	35.02	15.1	24.3	39.4	3,026	5,423	8,449	3,408	5,597	9,005
1975	13.40	24.17	37.57	16.7	26.0	42.7	3,163	5,872	9,035	3,688	5,605	9,293
1976	13.76	25.91	39.67	16.1	27.7	43.8	3,248	6,263	9,511	3,662	6,066	9,728
1101-KO			Actual			1101-KO			Actual			
1974	14.7	25.9	40.6	15.1	24.3	39.4	3,375	5,699	9,074	3,408	5,597	9,005
1975	16.6	26.8	43.4	16.7	26.0	42.7	3,802	6,245	10,047	3,688	5,605	9,293
1976	17.6	30.1	47.7	16.1	27.7	43.8	4,105	6,768	10,873	3,662	6,066	9,723

B. Passengers

Passengers (million)										Pass-km (million)									
863-KO					Actual					863-KO					Actual				
LD	/a	C	/a	M	/a	Total	LD	C	M	Total	LD	C	M	Total	LD	C	M	Total	
1972	95.4	42.0	1.7	139.1			109.2	26.3	1.6	137.1	8,590	953	510	10,053	8,914	629	519	10,062	
1973	97.9	42.5	1.7	142.1			118.9	22.5	1.6	143.0	8,815	965	510	10,290	9,681	552	487	10,720	
1974	97.6	75.0	1.7	174.3			140.4	26.6	1.5	168.5	8,784	1,206	510	10,500	10,011	596	471	11,078	
1975	99.8	110.0	1.7	211.5			187.3	32.2	1.4	220.9	8,984	1,407	510	10,901	11,837	655	434	12,926	
1976	101.0	150.0	1.7	252.7			210.5	36.9	1.3	248.7	9,090	1,650	510	11, 10	13,160	750	395	14,305	
----- 1101-KO -----										----- 1101-KO -----									
1974	120.5	27.8	1.5	149.8			140.4	26.6	1.5	168.5	10,387	604	450	11,441	10,011	596	471	11,078	
1975	165.9	88.4	1.5	255.8			187.3	32.2	1.4	220.9	11,740	1,544	450	13,734	11,837	655	434	12,926	
1976	194.1	112.1	1.5	307.7			210.5	36.9	1.3	248.7	12,876	1,937	450	15,263	13,160	750	395	14,305	

/a LD = Long Distance, C = Commuters, M = Military.

December 1977

Sensitivity Analysis - Assuming Traffic Increases at 50% of Forecast Rate

With Tariff Increases as Proposed by the Government  
(Won billion)

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
<u>Operating Revenues</u> (before tariff increases)					
Passengers	66.7	67.8	68.7	73.4	75.1
Freight	59.5	62.4	65.0	66.9	69.4
Other	8.9	7.6	8.1	8.6	9.0
Subtotal	<u>135.1</u>	<u>137.8</u>	<u>141.8</u>	<u>148.9</u>	<u>153.5</u>
MRP-increased revenues	-	3.2	5.9	8.8	11.6
Tariff increases - Passengers	- (10%)	5.1 (10%)	14.4 (10%)	24.3 (10%)	34.9
- Freight	- (15%)	7.1 (15%)	21.0 (15%)	34.8 (10%)	46.7
<u>Total operating revenues</u>	<u>135.1</u>	<u>153.2</u>	<u>183.1</u>	<u>216.8</u>	<u>246.7</u>
<u>Operating Expenses</u>	<u>135.4</u>	<u>155.0</u>	<u>172.6</u>	<u>189.7</u>	<u>210.0</u>
<u>Net Operating Revenue</u>	(0.3)	(1.8)	10.5	27.1	36.7
Interest	(20.3)	(22.0)	(28.5)	(33.5)	(37.7)
Other revenue	0.5	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.8
<u>Net revenue</u>	<u>(20.1)</u>	<u>(23.8)</u>	<u>(16.7)</u>	<u>(4.9)</u>	<u>(0.8)</u>
<u>Debt Service</u>	<u>36.2</u>	<u>36.6</u>	<u>44.4</u>	<u>53.1</u>	<u>60.5</u>
<u>Cash Generation</u>					
Net operating revenue	(0.3)	(1.8)	10.5	27.1	36.7
Other revenue	0.5	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.8
Depreciation	17.4	20.9	23.8	28.2	33.1
<u>Total</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>20.1</u>	<u>35.6</u>	<u>56.8</u>	<u>71.6</u>
<u>Cash Surplus</u> (deficit)	<u>(18.6)</u>	<u>(16.5)</u>	<u>(8.8)</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>11.1</u>
Net operating revenue (before traffic adjustment)/a	(0.3)	3.0	22.0	42.8	59.4
Net operating revenue (after traffic adjustment)	(0.3)	(1.8)	10.5	27.1	36.7
<u>Reduction in net operating revenue</u>	-	<u>4.8</u>	<u>11.5</u>	<u>15.9</u>	<u>22.7</u>
% of operating revenues	-	3.1	6.3	7.3	9.2

/a Table 5.1.

Note:	<u>Cash generation</u>	<u>Project period</u>	<u>Plan period</u>
		(Won billions)	
	Net cash surplus (original)	(7.5)	26.5
	Net cash surplus (revised)	(25.3)	(29.1)
	Reduction in cash generation	<u>17.8</u>	<u>55.6</u>

March 1978

Sensitivity Analysis - Assuming Traffic Increases at 100% of Forecast Rate

With 50% of Tariff Increases as Proposed by Government /a  
(Won billion)

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
<u>Operating Revenues</u> (before tariff increases)					
Passengers	66.7	70.2	74.1	79.1	81.9
Freight	59.5	65.1	70.2	74.3	79.3
Other	8.9	7.6	8.1	8.6	9.0
Subtotal	<u>135.1</u>	<u>142.9</u>	<u>152.4</u>	<u>162.0</u>	<u>170.2</u>
MRP-increased revenues	-	3.2	5.9	8.8	11.6
Tariff increases - Passengers	- (10%)	5.3 (5%)	7.8 (5%)	13.1 (5%)	19.0
- Freight	- (15%)	7.4 (7.5%)	11.3 (7.5%)	19.4 (5%)	26.7
<u>Total operating revenues</u>	<u>135.1</u>	<u>158.8</u>	<u>177.4</u>	<u>203.3</u>	<u>227.5</u>
<u>Operating Expenses</u> (as on Table 5.1)	<u>135.4</u>	<u>155.8</u>	<u>174.6</u>	<u>192.9</u>	<u>213.8</u>
<u>Net Operating Revenue</u>	(0.3)	3.0	2.8	10.4	13.7
Interest	(20.3)	(23.0)	(28.1)	(34.7)	(41.4)
Other revenue	0.5	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.8
<u>Net revenue (loss)</u>	<u>(20.1)</u>	<u>(19.0)</u>	<u>(24.0)</u>	<u>(22.8)</u>	<u>(25.9)</u>
<u>Debt Service</u>	<u>36.2</u>	<u>37.5</u>	<u>43.7</u>	<u>54.1</u>	<u>64.0</u>
<u>Cash Generation</u>					
Net operating revenue	(0.3)	3.0	2.8	10.4	13.7
Other revenue	0.5	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.8
Depreciation	17.4	20.9	23.8	28.2	33.1
<u>Total</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>24.9</u>	<u>27.9</u>	<u>40.1</u>	<u>48.6</u>
<u>Cash Surplus (deficit)</u>	<u>(18.6)</u>	<u>(12.6)</u>	<u>(15.8)</u>	<u>(14.0)</u>	<u>(15.4)</u>
Net operating revenue (before tariff adjustment)/b	(0.3)	3.0	22.0	42.8	59.4
Net operating revenue (after tariff adjustment)	(0.3)	3.0	2.8	10.4	13.7
<u>Reduction in net operating revenue</u>	-	-	<u>(19.2)</u>	<u>(32.4)</u>	<u>(45.7)</u>
% of operating revenues	-	-	10.8	15.9	20.1

/a After 1978 (1978 tariff increases are firm).

/b Table 5.1.

Note:		Project	Plan
	<u>Cash generation</u>	<u>period</u>	<u>period</u>
		(Won billions)	
	Net cash surplus (original)	7.5	26.5
	Net cash surplus (deficit) revised	(28.4)	(76.7)
	Reduction in cash generation	<u>(35.9)</u>	<u>(103.2)</u>

Sensitivity Analysis - Assuming Traffic Increases at 50% of Forecast Rate

With 50% of Tariff Increases as Proposed by Government /a  
(Won billion)

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
<u>Operating Revenues</u> (before tariff increases)					
Passengers	66.7	67.8	68.7	73.4	75.1
Freight	59.5	62.4	65.0	66.9	69.4
Other	8.9	7.6	8.1	8.6	9.0
Subtotal	<u>135.1</u>	<u>137.8</u>	<u>141.8</u>	<u>148.9</u>	<u>153.5</u>
MRP-increased revenues	-	3.2	5.9	8.8	11.6
Tariff increases - Passengers	- (10%)	5.1 (5%)	10.6 (5%)	15.6 (5%)	20.5
- Freight	- (15%)	7.1 (7.5%)	15.3 (7.5%)	22.0 (5%)	27.5
<u>Total operating revenues</u>	<u>135.1</u>	<u>153.2</u>	<u>173.6</u>	<u>195.3</u>	<u>213.1</u>
<u>Operating Expenses</u> (as on page 1)	<u>135.4</u>	<u>155.0</u>	<u>172.6</u>	<u>189.7</u>	<u>210.0</u>
<u>Net Operating Revenue</u> (loss)	(0.3)	(1.8)	1.0	5.6	3.1
Interest	(20.3)	(22.8)	(28.4)	(35.3)	(42.6)
Other revenue	0.5	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.8
<u>Net revenue</u> (loss)	<u>(20.1)</u>	<u>(23.6)</u>	<u>(26.1)</u>	<u>(28.2)</u>	<u>(37.7)</u>
<u>Debt Service</u>	<u>36.2</u>	<u>38.2</u>	<u>44.0</u>	<u>54.7</u>	<u>65.2</u>
<u>Cash Generation</u>					
Net operating revenue (loss)	(0.3)	(1.8)	1.0	5.6	3.1
Other revenue	0.5	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.8
Depreciation	17.4	20.9	23.8	28.2	33.1
<u>Total</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>20.1</u>	<u>26.1</u>	<u>35.3</u>	<u>38.0</u>
<u>Cash Surplus</u> (deficit)	<u>(18.6)</u>	<u>(18.1)</u>	<u>(17.9)</u>	<u>(19.4)</u>	<u>(27.2)</u>
Net operating revenue (before traffic & tariff adjustment) /b	(0.3)	3.0	22.0	42.8	59.4
Net operating revenue (after traffic & tariff adjustment)	(0.3)	(1.8)	1.0	5.6	3.1
<u>Reduction in net operating revenue</u>	-	<u>(4.8)</u>	<u>(21.0)</u>	<u>(37.2)</u>	<u>(56.3)</u>
% of operating revenues	-	3.1	12.1	19.2	26.4


/a After 1978 only.

/b Table 5.1.

Note:

<u>Cash generation</u>	<u>Project period</u> (Won billions)	<u>Plan period</u>
Net cash surplus (original)	7.5	26.5
Net cash surplus (deficit)	(32.4)	(97.6)
Reduction in cash generation	<u>(39.9)</u>	<u>(124.1)</u>

**KOREA**  
**APPRAISAL OF A SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT**  
**Ministry of Transportation**  
**Organization Chart**




Note: Railways (KNR) and ports (KMPA)  
 report directly through the Vice-Minister and Minister







**KOREA**  
**APPRAISAL OF A SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT**  
**Korea National Railroad Organization**







Scale: Million tons















## KOREA

## Seoul Metropolitan Electrified Suburban Railway System (SMESRS)

